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Abstract 
 
 
The corporate governance literature generally assumes that shareholders’ 
incentives to monitor management depend on how much of the firm the shareholders 
own. Specifically, large shareholders have a strong incentive to monitor management 
while shareholders who own a small number of shares have proportionally little incentive 
to monitor. This dissertation proposes that another determinant of monitoring incentive is 
how long large shareholders hold their shares, which can be measured by the turnover 
rate of their shares. I define large shareholders as outside blockholders with at least 5% 
ownership stake in the firm, and I use the outside blockholder turnover rate as a measure 
of the outside blockholders’ investment horizons.  
Outside blockholders’ investment horizons for a firm in which they invest (an 
investee firm) are likely to depend on the nature of the outside blockholders and the 
investee firm’s characteristics that influence costs and benefits of monitoring 
management. The outside blockholders’ investment horizons, in turn, influence their 
cost-benefit trade-offs in monitoring management, and thus the extent to which the 
outside blockholders monitor investee firm management. 
To test this assertion, this dissertation addresses two primary issues. First, I 
examine whether outside blockholders’ investment horizons vary across the firms in 
which they invest, and if so, what determine their investment horizons. Prior studies 
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measure investor horizons solely based on the investors’ average portfolio characteristics. 
An implicit assumption of this approach is that investors’ horizons do not vary across 
investee firms in their portfolio. My empirical results show that outside blockholders’ 
horizons, as measured by outside blockholder turnover, do vary across investee firms, 
and that this variation depends on the characteristics of the investee firms. The systematic 
association in the data further suggests that outside blockholders’ horizons vary in ways 
that reflect outside blockholders’ rational responses to their monitoring cost-benefit trade-
offs due to investee firm characteristics. 
Second, I examine how outside blockholders’ horizons are related to the design of 
the investee firm’s CEO compensation. Prior studies on investor horizons argue that 
shorter horizons of large investors result in limited monitoring by these investors and can 
lead to higher agency costs in investee firms. The results of this study, however, suggest 
that those firms do not necessarily suffer higher agency costs. Specifically, I find that 
investee firms with greater outside blockholder turnover (i.e., shorter-horizon outside 
blockholders) are likely to design CEO compensation with greater pay-performance 
sensitivity and a higher level of CEO compensation. Further, the greater pay-performance 
sensitivity is primarily due to option-based incentives but not due to cash-based 
incentives. These results indicate that firms with shorter-horizon outside blockholders use 
incentive contracting more extensively to counter the potentially weaker monitoring by 
their outside blockholders.  
To summarize, the findings in this dissertation imply first, that large shareholders’ 
monitoring incentives, as reflected by their investment horizons, are determined to a 
 v
significant extent by investee firm characteristics. Second, I find that investee firms use 
CEO incentive contracting as an alternative to shareholder monitoring. 
 vi
 FORWORD 
 
My endeavor to a doctoral degree would not have been possible without the help 
and support from others. I would like to thank my dissertation committee, Professors 
John Harry Evans III (Chair), Kenneth Lehn, Nandu Nagarajan, and Dhinu Srinivasan for 
their invaluable help and guidance. I am deeply indebted to Professor Evans for his 
mentoring during my doctoral study. His influence on me, as a person and a scholar, has 
gone far beyond my dissertation and will stay with me for the rest of my life. I gratefully 
acknowledge that Dr. Nagarajan, Dr. Lehn, Dr. Srinivasan and Dr. Cheng have been very 
generous with their time and intellectual inputs at every stage of my studies.  
Besides my committee, many people contributed to the completion of my doctoral 
studies at Katz. The Accounting Faculty at Katz, especially Professor Jacob Birnberg, 
deserves special thanks for their teaching and support. Ms. Carrie Uzyak-Woods and Ms. 
Joan Ballas have always been very helpful and supportive. I also thank Sukesh Patro, a 
friend and colleague, for his inputs and support for my dissertation.  
Finally, I thank my parents who have always believed in me and encouraged me 
throughout my life. Their love and teaching molded me as who I am now. I dedicate my 
dissertation to my father and my brother, who are no longer with me. I thank my sister 
and her husband for their generous help and support.  
 
 
 
 vii
  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
                              
Page 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW......................................................................................................... 9 
2.1 HETEROGENEOUS MONITORING INCENTIVES OF LARGE INVESTORS .................................................... 9 
2.1.1 Investment Strategies and Monitoring Styles by Investor Type.................................................... 9 
2.1.2 Investment Horizons................................................................................................................... 16 
2.2 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND CEO INCENTIVE COMPENSATION ......................................................... 21 
2.3 EARNINGS AND STOCK RETURNS AS PERFORMANCE MEASURES........................................................ 24 
CHAPTER 3 INVESTMENT HORIZONS OF OUTSIDE BLOCKHOLDERS......................................... 27 
CHAPTER 4 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS.......................................................................... 32 
4.1 DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE FORMATION......................................................................................... 32 
4.2 RECLASSIFICATION OF BLOCK TYPES ................................................................................................. 34 
4.3 MEASUREMENT OF BLOCKHOLDER TURNOVER .................................................................................. 35 
4.4 COMPENSATION MEASURES ............................................................................................................... 41 
4.5 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS.................................................................................................................... 42 
CHAPTER 5 DETERMINANTS OF OUTSIDE BLOCKHOLDER TURNOVER.................................... 49 
5.1 OUTSIDE BLOCKHOLDER TURNOVER HYPOTHESES ............................................................................ 50 
5.2 UNIVARITE ANALYSIS ........................................................................................................................ 55 
5.3 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS.................................................................................................................. 59 
5.3.1 Factor Analysis .......................................................................................................................... 59 
5.3.2 Multivariate Estimation of Outside Blockholder Turnover........................................................ 62 
CHAPTER 6 OUTSIDE BLOCKHOLDER TURNOVER AND CEO COMPENSATION ....................... 67 
6.1 HYPOTHESES ...................................................................................................................................... 67 
6.2 UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS ...................................................................................................................... 72 
6.3 MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF CEO COMPENSATION AND OUTSIDE BLOCKHOLDER TURNOVER........ 78 
6.3.1 Regression Model....................................................................................................................... 78 
6.3.2 Results........................................................................................................................................ 82 
CHAPTER 7 ROBUSTNESS TESTS.......................................................................................................... 90 
7.1 PAY-PERFORMANCE SENSITIVITY....................................................................................................... 90 
7.2 OUTSIDE BLOCKHOLDER TURNOVER.................................................................................................. 92 
CHAPER 8 CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................................................... 94 
FIGURES ..................................................................................................................................................... 98 
TABLES..................................................................................................................................................... 101 
APPENDIX ................................................................................................................................................ 115 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................................................... 120 
 
 
 
 viii
 
 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES & TABLES 
 
Page 
Figure 1  Univariate Analysis – Structure of Total CEO Compensation (Median) 
                by Outside Blockholder Turnover .................................................................... 98 
Figure 2  Univariate Analysis – Ratio of ROA Volatility to Return Volatility 
               (Median) by Outside Blockholder Turnover...................................................... 99 
Figure 3  Univariate Analysis – Structure of CEO Compensation (Median) by 
                Ratio of ROA Volatility to Return Volatility ................................................. 100 
 
Table 1    Sample Composition by Sample Year and Descriptive Statistics for 
                Block Turnover ............................................................................................... 101 
Table 2    Descriptive Statistics by Industry ................................................................... 102 
Table 3    Descriptive Statistics for Firm Characteristics ............................................... 103 
Table 4    Mean (Median) Outside Blockholder Turnover (OUTTURN) Sorted by 
                Investee Firm Characteristics.......................................................................... 104 
Table 5    Correlations – Block Ownership and Firm Characteristics ............................ 105 
Table 6.1 Factor Analysis (Principal Component) ......................................................... 106 
Table 6.2 Correlations – Block Ownership and Factors ................................................. 106 
Table 7    Outside Blockholder Turnover – OLS Estimation ......................................... 107 
Table 8    Correlations – CEO Compensation and Outside Blockholder Turnover........ 108 
Table 9    CEO Compensation Sorted by Block Ownership Characteristics .................. 109 
Table 10  Blockholder Turnover and Options/Total CEO Compensation 
                (OPTIONS/TCOMP) ...................................................................................... 111 
Table 11  Blockholder Turnover and Option Delta (∆OPTION) ................................... 112 
Table 12  Blockholder Turnover and Total CEO Compensation (TCOMP) .................. 113 
Table 13  Blockholder Turnover and Cash Compensation............................................. 114 
 
 
 
 
 ix
 
 
CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
The separation of ownership and control in a public corporation results in a 
potential agency problem between the owner who provides capital (shareholder) and the 
employee manager who runs the corporation on behalf of the owner. Specifically, in the 
absence of other governance mechanisms, the employee manager can potentially seek to 
further his self-interest at the expense of the owner’s interest (Jensen and Meckling 
[1976]). Therefore, the effective monitoring of management to mitigate this potential 
agency conflict in publicly held corporations has long interested various interest groups, 
such as investors, market intermediaries, regulatory bodies, researchers and other 
stakeholders.  
Monitoring management takes various forms of shareholder activities that are 
aimed at directly or indirectly influencing the management’s decisions. Examples include 
gathering information about managerial performance, conducting private negotiations 
with management, publicizing shareholder activism, soliciting shareholder proposals, 
initiating litigation against the management, and in extreme situations, mounting a proxy 
contests to replace current management (Del Guercio and Hawkins [1999)]; Shleifer and 
Vishny [1986]; Bethel, Liebeskind and Opler [1998]).  
While these monitoring activities mitigate the agency problem, they also impose 
costs on the shareholders. Therefore, shareholders’ monitoring activities primarily hinge 
on the cost-benefit trade-offs of these activities (e.g., Grossman and Hart [1980]; Shleifer 
and Vishny [1986]). Specifically, because monitoring management is costly, shareholders 
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with small investments in a corporation are unlikely to have the necessary incentive to be 
active monitors. On the other hand, shareholders with large investments (blockholders) 
are more likely to find that investing time and effort in monitoring is cost-effective. This 
implies that with a highly diffused ownership structure where no single owner has a 
significant amount of ownership interest, shareholders do not have much incentive to 
actively monitor the managers.   
The less shareholders can monitor managers’ actions directly, agency theory 
predicts that the shareholders provide greater motivation to the managers to maximize 
firm value by tying the managers’ pay-off to firm value or to other performance measures 
(Holmstrom [1979]; Prendergast [2002]). To understand the relation between shareholder 
monitoring and firms’ use of incentives for managers, one stream of research examines 
how ownership concentration by various types of large investors affects CEO incentives 
(e.g., Mehran [1995]; Core, Holthausen and Larcker [1999]; Hartzell and Starks [2003]). 
This dissertation introduces a measure of large shareholder1 turnover as a 
determinant of shareholders’ monitoring incentives above and beyond the size of 
shareholders’ stakes in the firm. I then examine how large shareholder turnover helps to 
explain firms’ design of CEO compensation contracts.  I define large shareholder 
turnover as the proportion of total outside block ownership that changes hands annually. 
This measure reflects outside blockholders’ investment horizons that are specific to a 
firm in which they invest (“investee firm” hereafter).   
Outside blockholders’ investment horizons for a particular investee firm in their 
portfolio is likely based on the nature of the outside blockholders and the investee firm’s 
                                                 
1 Following the SEC filing criterion, I define a large shareholder as one who owns at least 5% of a firm’s 
outstanding voting stock. I use the terms ‘large shareholders’ and ‘blockholders’ interchangeably. 
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characteristics. The outside blockholders’ investment horizons, in turn, influence their 
cost-benefit trade-offs in monitoring management, and thus the extent of resources 
devoted to monitoring the investee firm’s management. 
To test the above assertion, this dissertation examines two main issues. First, I 
examine the relation between outside blockholder horizons (as measured by outside 
blockholder turnover) and investee firm characteristics. This is unlike previous studies 
that relate investor horizons to the investors’ portfolio characteristics (e.g., Bushee 
[1998]).  Second, I examine the extent to which the investee firms’ outside blockholder 
turnover explains their use of CEO incentive compensation, an alternative to shareholder 
monitoring. When examining the relation between outside blockholder turnover and CEO 
incentive compensation, I control for the effects of traditional measures of ownership 
structure (i.e., the level and the concentration of outside block ownership).  
Large shareholders (i.e., blockholders) have an information advantage2 compared 
to general investors in the market via their better access to the management of investee 
firms, greater expertise in monitoring and their ability to gather information more 
efficiently (Shleifer and Vishny [1986]; Kahn and Winton [1998]; Heflin and Shaw 
[2000]). Large shareholders can use this information advantage in two ways. They can 
use it to improve the monitoring of managerial performance or to intervene in the 
management of the investee firm for greater long-term firm value (control benefits).3 
                                                 
2  When explaining the motivation of Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure) (17 CFR Parts 240, 243 and 249), 
the SEC expresses its concern about “the selective disclosure of material information by issuers…to 
securities analysts or selected institutional investors…” Effective October 23, 2000, Regulation FD 
disallows public corporations’ selective disclosure of their material information in favor of a certain group 
of investors. To the extent that Regulation FD limits block purchases motivated by information advantage, 
Regulation FD works against my hypotheses that hinge on blockholders’ information advantage.  
3 Shareholder intervention can take different forms, including carrying out informal negotiation with the 
management (Shleifer and Vishny [1986]), soliciting shareholder proposals, initiating adverse publicity 
(Del Guercio and Hawkins [1999]), mounting a proxy contest (Shleifer and Vishny [1989]), replacing 
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Alternatively, they can pursue short-term profits from share trading strategies that use 
their information advantage (trading profits). Improving long-term firm value through 
monitoring or intervention in management generally takes longer time than exploiting 
profits through trading on private information. Therefore, investment strategies for 
control benefits require large shareholders to have longer investment horizons than do 
investment strategies for trading profits.   
Large shareholders’ choices of how to exploit their information advantage depend 
on the relative size of their net-control benefits and net-trading profits (Kahn and Winton 
[1998]), and the net-control benefits and the net-trading profits are directly related to the 
investee firm characteristics. For instance, high information asymmetry and high insider 
ownership of an investee firm increase large shareholders’ costs of intervention in the 
investee firm management and thus reduce their net-control benefits. On the other hand, 
higher share liquidity and lower transaction costs of share trades are of greater benefit to 
the large shareholders who seek trading profits. Therefore, these investee firm 
characteristics will influence large shareholders’ decision on how to use their information 
advantage and thus their investment horizons.  
Consistent with this prediction, I find that investee firms with higher intervention 
costs proxied by firm risk and information asymmetry have greater outside blockholder 
turnover, reflecting the shorter horizons of outside blockholders in such firms. Similarly, 
investee firms with greater share liquidity have greater outside blockholder turnover.  
Outside blockholder turnover is also higher in high growth firms, possibly due to less 
potential for control benefits in those firms. Finally, inside block ownership significantly 
                                                                                                                                                 
management (Bethel, Liebeskind and Opler [1998]), or ultimately, taking over the firm (Grossman and Hart 
[1980]); Shleifer and Vishny [1986]). 
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deters outside blockholder turnover, reflecting lower share liquidity and higher 
transaction costs of share trades in firms with higher inside ownership.  
Greater outside blockholder turnover of a firm implies that there exist 
counterbalancing agency mechanisms that will substitute for the reduction in shareholder 
monitoring resulting from the greater outside blockholder turnover. One alternative 
mechanism that is discussed extensively in the agency literature is executive 
compensation. Therefore, I expect that firms with greater outside blockholder turnover 
will rely more on outcome-based compensation as an alternative to shareholder 
monitoring by the outside blockholders. To compensate for the additional risk associated 
with greater outcome-based compensation, expected management compensation must 
also be higher. This reasoning suggests that investee firms with higher outside 
blockholder turnover are more likely to design CEO compensation with greater pay-
performance sensitivity and a higher level of compensation. Finally, following the agency 
prediction that the relative weight on two performance measures is decreasing function of 
the relative noisiness of the performance measures (Banker and Datar [1989]), I 
hypothesize that the investee firms will achieve the greater CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity by putting more weight on performance measures with relatively less noise.  
My empirical results generally support these predictions. After controlling for all 
other firm characteristics, firms with higher outside blockholder turnover show a 
significantly greater reliance on incentives to induce desirable actions of their CEOs, and 
pay larger total CEO compensation for the risk associated with the incentives. 
Additionally, these firms tend to put more weight on stock returns than on accounting 
earnings when determining CEO incentives. The data suggests that greater weight on 
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stock returns is associated with greater noise in accounting earnings in firms with higher 
outside blockholder turnover.   
Overall, the findings in this dissertation suggest that outside blockholders’ 
decisions concerning their investment horizons in an investee firm reflect the monitoring 
cost-benefit trade-offs that they make in the investee firm. This decision, in turn, is 
factored into the investee firm’s design of CEO compensation contracts in ways that are 
consistent with the optimal mitigation of agency conflict in the investee firm.    
This dissertation contributes to the literature on ownership structure and executive 
compensation in several ways. First, I provide evidence that in addition to the level and 
the concentration of outside block ownership, horizons of outside blockholders are an 
important determinant of their monitoring incentives. Prior research relates a higher level 
of outside ownership to greater monitoring by the outside shareholders (Mehran [1995]; 
Core, Holthausen and Larcker [1999]; Talmor and Wallace [2000]; Hartzell and Starks 
[2003]). Recent studies, however, have emphasized that not all large investors have the 
same investment strategies and monitoring skills (Bethel, Liebeskind and Opler [1998]; 
Downes, Houminer and Hubbard [1999]; Del Guercio and Hawkins [1999]). Bethel, 
Liebeskind and Opler (1998) find that blockholders’ monitoring styles vary with their 
type4, and call for further research on the relation between shareholders’ investment 
horizons and their monitoring activities.  This dissertation directly addresses this issue 
and provides evidence that investment horizons of outside blockholders (measured by 
their turnover) are systematically associated with the way CEOs in the investee firms are 
                                                 
4 Bethel, Liebeskind and Opler (1998) classify blockholders into activist individual blockholders, financial 
blockholders and strategic blockholders. They then examine how each type of blockholders influences 
investee firm governance, such as CEO turnover, restructuring and long-term performance. 
 6
compensated, and that the relation is consistent with firms’ effort to minimize agency 
costs.   
Second, most studies on investor horizons use the investors’ average portfolio 
management characteristics as a proxy for shareholder horizons of investee firms in the 
investors’ portfolio (Bushee[1998]; Gaspar, Massa and Matos [2004]); Dikolli, Kulp and 
Sedatole [2004]; Shin[2005]). This approach implicitly assumes that investors apply the 
same investment strategy to all investee firms in their portfolio. However, investors may 
apply different investment strategies to different investee firms (I discuss this issue in 
Chapter 3). Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2004) indeed share this view and cite the need for 
research on investee firm characteristics that determine investors’ investment horizons. 
This dissertation directly responds to this call by analyzing how investee firm 
characteristics influence outside blockholders’ investment horizons. To my knowledge, 
this is the first study that documents how outside blockholder turnover is systematically 
associated with investee firm characteristics. This finding has an important implication 
for studies on investor horizons. That is, studies examining the relation between investor 
horizons and corporate governance characteristics need to account for the potential 
endogeneity of investor horizons.  
Third, prior studies (Potter [1992]; Bushee [1998]; Gaspar, Massa and Matos 
[2004]) suggest that investors’ relatively short investment horizons can increase agency 
costs by reducing the effectiveness of shareholder monitoring. In contrast, my study 
suggests that variation in investors’ choice of horizons is rationally related to investee 
firm characteristics, and that there exist counterbalancing agency mechanisms such as the 
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appropriate design of CEO compensation contracts. In other words, firms with short-
horizon shareholders do not necessarily suffer higher residual agency costs. 
The rest of my dissertation proceeds as follow. Chapter 2 reviews prior research 
and Chapter 3 discusses outside blockholder turnover. Chapter 4 describes the data 
sources and provides descriptive statistics. Chapter 5 develops and estimates outside 
blockholder turnover. Chapter 6 examines the association between outside blockholder 
turnover and firms’ design of CEO compensation. Chapter 7 conducts robustness tests 
and Chapter 8 provides conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This literature review focuses on the heterogeneous monitoring incentives of large 
shareholders and their influence on firms’ design of CEO incentives. The review broadly 
consists of three sections. Section 2.1 reviews the literature on the variation in large 
investors’ monitoring incentives. Section 2.2 discusses how ownership structure, as a 
proxy for shareholder monitoring, influences CEO compensation. Section 2.3 
summarizes the studies on firms’ use of earnings and stock returns as performance 
measures to determine CEO incentives. 
2.1 Heterogeneous Monitoring Incentives of Large Investors 
 
The literature on ownership views the size of an investor’s ownership stake in an 
investee firm as primary determinant of the investor’s incentives to monitor management 
of the investee firm. More recent studies, however, have suggested that various other 
factors also influence large investors’ monitoring incentives. In this section, I discuss 
investors’ heterogeneous investment strategies and their monitoring styles based on their 
type and their investment horizon.   
2.1.1 Investment Strategies and Monitoring Styles by Investor Type 
 
Agency problems due to diffused ownership structure stem from not only the 
separation of ownership and control but also free-rider problems among shareholders. 
While small atomistic shareholders generally do not benefit from costly monitoring, large 
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shareholders can benefit because they are able to capture a larger fraction of the wealth 
gains from the monitoring. Further, small individual shareholders have little incentive to 
monitor the managers because it is cost-beneficial to free ride on the efforts of large 
shareholders. Therefore, when examining the relation between ownership structure and 
shareholder monitoring, the prior literature has primarily focused on large shareholders 
(e.g., Grossman and Hart [1980]; Shleifer and Vishny [1986]; Huddart [1993]).   
The literature on large shareholders (investors) can be broadly classified into 
studies on block ownership in general and studies focusing on institutional ownership. 
The following sub-sections describe the large investors’ investment strategies and 
monitoring styles documented in these two lines of literature.   
Blockholders:  
Following the SEC filing requirement, the literature defines blockholders as 
shareholders who own at least 5% of voting stock. Due to their significant ownership 
stake, studies on ownership structure generally view blockholders (particularly, outside 
blockholders) as active monitors. This section discusses two studies that document 
heterogeneity in blockholders’ monitoring activities.  Bethel, Liebeskind and Opler 
(1998) classify block purchasers into activists, financial block purchasers and strategic 
block purchasers. Activists are primarily large, well known individual investors or 
investor groups, such as Carl Icahn, Irwin Jacobs, Bass Brothers, Mario Gabelli, and 
George Soros. Financial block purchasers are banks, pension funds, mutual funds or 
insurance companies. Strategic block purchasers are non-financial investors who are 
unopposed by management. Bethel, Liebeskind and Opler (1998) document that activists 
differ from the other two types of block purchasers because they directly intervene in the 
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management of the investee firms. In contrast, financial block purchasers or strategic 
block purchasers are generally passive in monitoring management. As evidence of the 
significance of this distinction, within the two years following block trades by the 
activists, sample firms experienced a significant increase in divestitures and spin-offs, 
CEO turnover, and improvement in long-term operating performance. In contrast, no 
such changes were observed after the block trades involving financial or strategic 
blockholders.  
Next, Barclay, Holderness and Sheehan (2001) distinguish blockholders based on 
the nature of the block-share transactions: block trades versus private placements. They 
define a block trade as the transfer of block-shares from one blockholder to another 
blockholder. In contrast, private placement is the sale of block-shares by a target firm to a 
block purchaser, typically through issuance of stock. Using 204 block trades and 594 
private placements for the period 1978-1997, Barclay, Holderness and Sheehan (2001) 
examine the variation in the activities of the block purchasers. They find that block trade 
purchasers are more likely to become activists than are private placement block 
purchasers. In the block trade sample firms, 20% of block trade purchasers or their 
representatives subsequently became the CEO of the investee firm, but less than 1% of 
private placement block purchasers did likewise.  Further, 85% of block trade purchasers 
become active in the management of investee firms, whereas only 12% of private 
placement purchasers did.5   
The empirical findings reported in these two papers demonstrate that 
heterogeneous investment strategies and monitoring styles arise even after controlling for 
                                                 
5 They search The Wall Street Journal and  the Dow Jones News Service for evidence of interaction 
between the investee firm and the two types of block purchasers during the two years following the trade or 
placement.  
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block size. These results suggest that share-holding size is not the only determinant of the 
monitoring incentives of large shareholders.  
Institutional Investors6:  
Rule 13-F of the SEC defines institutional investors as entities such as bank trusts, 
insurance companies, mutual funds and pension funds that manage and invest at least 
$100 million on behalf of others. The SEC classifies institutional investors into five 
groups: 
• banks 
• insurance companies 
• investment companies (mutual funds) 
• investment advisors 
• others (public pension funds or university endowments). 
 
Institutional investors have attracted significant interest from researchers, 
corporate managers and regulatory bodies due to their rapidly increasing investment size 
in U.S. corporations. The mean institutional ownership per investee firm increased from 
6.1% in 1950 to 50% in 2002 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
[2003]). As a result, institutional investors control more than $4 trillion of investment 
(Chidambaran and John [2000]). Studies on institutional ownership generally rely on the 
aggregate level of institutional ownership in an investee firm rather than on the 
distribution of institutional ownership, such as the concentration of institutional 
ownership or ownership per institutional investor (e.g., McConnell and Survaes [1990]; 
Rajgopal, Jiambalvo and Venkatachalam [2002]; Hartzell and Starks [2003]).  This 
approach effectively treats institutional investors as a homogeneous group.  More recent 
studies, however, document significant heterogeneity across institutional investors in 
                                                 
6 Institutional investors discussed in this section are not necessarily blockholders. The literature on 
institutional ownership generally focuses on aggregate ownership by all institutional investors in an 
investee firm rather than individual institutional ownership.  
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their investment strategy and monitoring styles (Borokhovich, Brunarski and Parrino 
[2000]; Gillan and Starks [2004]; Almazan, Hartzell and Starks [2004]).  
Based on in-depth interviews with top managers of large institutional investors, 
Downes, Houminer and Hubbard (1999) document and compare the monitoring styles of 
private mutual funds and pension funds and their positions concerning the corporate 
governance of the firms in their portfolio. They find that private mutual-fund investors 
monitor primarily investee firm performance as opposed to investee firm governance 
procedures. Monitoring investee governance is considered unusual, and occurs primarily 
in cases of gross mismanagement.  In contrast, pension-fund investors routinely monitor 
investee firms’ long-term performance and governance quality. Both pension-fund 
investors and private mutual-fund investors view time and money as the most significant 
direct monitoring costs. Whereas pension-fund investors believe that good governance of 
investee firms results in better shareholder value in the long-run, mutual-fund investors 
indicate skepticism concerning whether lobbying for governance change is worth the 
costs. The following quotes (Downes, Houminer and Hubbard [1999]) sum up the 
differences between private mutual-fund investors and pension-fund investors.  
 Private mutual-fund position 
“…It is difficult to prove financial benefits of good governance structures…If a 
company has a smart and strong CEO with appropriate compensation incentives, 
it may do well for years without these structures. But these structures are 
important safety valves when crises arise, when CEO succession is an issue or 
when the business begins to go downhill…” Robert Pozen – President of Fidelity 
Management & Research Company (FMR), Harvard Business Review (1994) 
 
Pension-fund position 
“…The major goal of our corporate assessment program is to review our portfolio 
long-term performance and general corporate governance procedure. We are 
interested in answering this central question: Does the company have a vital and 
independent board performing a vigorous and challenging role in overseeing 
management’s conduct of the business?...For companies where we cannot answer 
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“yes”, we have an important role as a responsible owner.” John Biggs – CEO of 
TIAA-CREF, Director’s Monthly (1996) 
 
Targeting a narrower class of investors, Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) 
examine the impact and motivation of pension fund activism for corporate governance 
issues for the period from 1987 through 1993. They find significant heterogeneity across 
pension funds in their activism objectives and tactics. Specifically, different pension 
funds have different ranges of their funds devoted to indexing. More highly indexed 
funds have less opportunity to implement the “Wall Street Walk” option of selling stock 
when fund managers are displeased with the performance of a firm in their portfolio. 
Thus, relative to actively managed funds (i.e., funds targeting more short-term 
investment), indexed funds tend to rely more on the publicity of their activism. Publicity 
not only affects the direct target of a funds’ activism but also potentially other companies 
who observe the activism. The threat of publicity may give funds leverage with target 
management and motivate other companies to proactively improve their corporate 
governance structures without being explicitly targeted.  
Researchers also classify institutional investors based on the extent of their 
potential affiliation with the investee firms (Brickley, Lease, Smith [1988]; Borokhovich, 
Brunarski and Parrino [2000]; Almazan, Hartzell and Starks [2004]). Specifically, they 
argue that bank trust departments and insurance companies are more likely to have 
business relationships with investee firms and, therefore, to be sensitive to pressure from 
the investee firms. This tendency is weaker for investment advisers and investment 
companies because they are less likely to have business relations with their investee 
firms. Their results suggest that pressure-sensitive institutions (banks or insurance 
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companies) are more likely to “go-along” with management decisions than pressure-
insensitive institutions.  
Borokhovich, Brunarski, and Parrino (2000) examine the market reaction to 
investee firms’ adoption of anti-takeover provisions conditioned on the identity of their 
outside institutional blockholders. They report that when an investee firm has 
blockholders who are pressure-insensitive institutions, the market reaction to the investee 
firm’s anti-takeover adoption is positive. However, when the blockholders are pressure-
sensitive institutions, the market reaction is negative. One interpretation of these results is 
that pressure-sensitive institutional blockholders allow managers of investee firms to 
implement anti-takeover provisions to entrench themselves, whereas pressure-insensitive 
institutional blockholders allows only anti-takeover provisions that maximize shareholder 
value.  
Researchers have analyzed differences among large investors and how these 
differences influence investee firms’ performance or governance. The literature review so 
far documents that large investors’ investment strategies and monitoring styles vary 
significantly with investor type. Whereas these classification schemes are insightful, they 
are still far from complete and raise several questions. For example, using the 
institutional investor classification scheme, it is clear that pension funds are more active 
in monitoring than are mutual funds (Downes, Houminer and Hubbard [1999]). However, 
not all pension funds are active in monitoring. Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) report 
significant heterogeneity across pension funds in their activism objectives and tactics.  
A potential reason for the difficulties in predicting investment strategies and 
monitoring styles of investors based solely on their type is that an investor may vary its 
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investment strategy and monitoring style in part based on investee firm characteristics. If 
this is the case, one may, first, expect to see a large investor taking different investment 
strategies for different investee firms in its portfolio. Second, to understand what 
monitoring roles large investors play in investee firms, researchers need to examine the 
large investors’ investment strategies and monitoring styles in conjunction with the 
investee firm characteristics. In this dissertation, I take the view that investee firm 
characteristics influence investment strategies of large investors. Therefore, I explore 
whether investors’ horizons vary across investee firms in their portfolio (Chapter 3), and 
examine what firm characteristics explain the variation in investor horizons as measured 
by outside blockholder turnover (Chapter 5).   
2.1.2 Investment Horizons 
 
In addition to the distinctions noted in subsection 2.1.1, researchers have also 
characterized investors according to their investment horizons. Froot, Perold and Stein 
(1992) compare the investment horizons of different institutional investors. They find that 
based on 1989 trading volume, mutual-fund investors and insurance companies had 
average investment horizons of 1.9 years and 2.5 years, respectively. Foundations and 
endowments had an average horizon of 4.5 years. Pension funds’ horizons differ 
depending on their investment style. Actively trading pension funds had an average 
horizon of 1.9 years, while passively trading pension funds had an average horizon of 7.1 
years.  
Based on institutional investors’ average portfolio management characteristics 
(portfolio diversification, portfolio turnover and sensitivity to earnings news), Bushee 
(1998) classifies the institutional investors into three investment strategy groups: transient 
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institutional investors, quasi-indexers and dedicated institutional investors. Transient 
investors have well diversified portfolios and higher portfolio turnover (shorter 
investment horizon). They are also more likely to use momentum strategies.7 Quasi-
indexers also have highly diversified portfolios but demonstrate lower portfolio turnover 
(intermediate investment horizons). They tend to rely more on a buy-and-hold investment 
strategy and demonstrate contrarian-trading tendencies. Dedicated investors tend to have 
highly concentrated portfolios with lower portfolio turnover (longer investment horizon). 
They demonstrate almost no trading sensitivity to current earnings.  
Bushee (1998) uses the fraction of an investee firm’s shares held by each type of 
institutional investor as a proxy for the investee firm’s overall shareholder horizon. 
Specifically, he examines how the total ownership held by each of the three types of 
investors affects the likelihood that the investee firms will cut R&D expenses when their 
operating performance is below market expectations. He finds that firms with a higher 
concentration of ownership by transient institutional investors are more likely to cut their 
R&D expenses when their operating performance is slightly below market expectations. 
He interprets this result as managers attempting to increase short-term profit at the 
expense of long-term firm value in response to the pressure from the shorter-horizon 
investors.  
Similar to Bushee (1998), Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2004) estimate the average 
investment horizon of each institutional investor based on the institution’s portfolio 
                                                 
7 Momentum is defined as the rate of acceleration of a security’s price or volume. Investors using  a 
momentum strategy rely on the idea that short-term future stock returns move in the same direction as the 
movement of recent past returns. Momentum traders often take a long or short position in the stock based 
on acceleration in a stock’s price (or earnings) with the hope that its momentum will continue. This strategy 
relies more on short-term movements in price rather than fundamental particulars of companies 
(Investopedia  www.answers.com).  
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turnover (referred to as the investor’s “churn rate”). They use the investors’ churn rates to 
construct a proxy for shareholder horizons of investee firms. Specifically, they measure 
an investee firm’s overall shareholder horizon by summing each institutional investor’s 
portfolio churn rate weighted by the investor’s percentage shareholdings in the investee 
firm. They then hypothesize that weaker monitoring by shareholders with shorter 
horizons leads managers of takeover target firms to pursue their self-interest at the 
expense of shareholders’ interest in the takeover bargaining between acquirers and the 
target firm. Consistent with their hypothesis, they find that target firms with shorter-
horizon investors receive lower takeover premiums 
Outside blockholder turnover, the turnover measure that I use in this dissertation, 
is conceptually similar to the measures used by Bushee (1998) and Gaspar, Massa, and 
Matos (2004) in that it is designed to reflect shareholder monitoring of investee firms. 
However, unlike their measures which use the investors’ average portfolio characteristics, 
my measure of outside blockholder turnover uses actual block ownership data in each 
investee firm. Table A provides an example that compares Bushee’s classification with 
my measure of outside blockholder turnover. 
XYZ Corporation is a hypothetical company with the ownership structure shown 
in Table A. All investors listed in Table A are outside shareholders. Based on Bushee’s 
(1998) classification, the institutional investors who own XYZ Corporation’s shares are 
made up of one dedicated institutional investor (Blockholder C) and 40 transient 
institutional investors. This classification is not specific to XYZ Corporation, but rather 
reflects the investors’ overall trading pattern. For example, Blockholder C would be 
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classified as a dedicated institutional investor whether it has block ownership in XYZ 
Corporation or in some other investee firm.  
 
Table A Ownership Structure - Example  
Company Name:  XYZ Corporation 
Fiscal 
year Investor Class 
Investor 
Type 
Number of 
investors 
Percentage of 
voting stock 
1998 
  
  
  
Blockholder A  
Blockholder B 
Blockholder C - Dedicated 
Transient investors 
Individual  
Corporation 
Institution 
Institution 
  1 
  1 
  1 
40 
10% 
 5% 
15% 
20% 
1999 
  
  
Blockholder D 
Blockholder C - Dedicated 
Transient investors 
Individual 
Institution 
Institution 
  1 
  1 
40 
10% 
15% 
20% 
 
Following Bushee’s classification, XYZ Corporation has 15% of its ownership 
reflecting long-term horizons (dedicated institutional ownership) and 20% of its 
ownership reflecting short-term horizons (transient institutional) in both 1998 and 1999. 
Block ownership by Blockholders A, B and D would not be considered because they are 
not institutional investors. 
XYZ Corporation’s outside blockholder turnover in 1999 is the percentage of 
outside block ownership that changed hands in the period from the end of 1998 to the end 
of 1999. Specifically, Blockholders A (10%) and B (5%) exited XYZ Corporation, and 
Blockholder D (10%) entered XYZ Corporation during this period. The total outside 
block ownership in 1998 and 1999 is 30% and 25%, respectively. Therefore, outside 
blockholder turnover of XYZ Corporation is measured as (10% + 5% + 10%) / (30% + 
25%) = 0.5455 (54.55%). The ratio shows that 54.55% of XYZ Corporation’s outside 
block ownership changed hands.  
The above difference has significant implications in research design. For example, 
Bushee’s (1998) classification is a composite index of institutional investors’ investment 
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characteristics (i.e., portfolio diversification, portfolio turnover and the extent to which 
they employ momentum strategy). In contrast, outside blockholder turnover reflects 
changes in outside blockholders specific to the investee firm on hand and aims to 
examine how horizons of outside blockholders differ from size of outside block 
ownership in shareholder monitoring of investee firms. I provide more detailed 
discussions about the implications of the difference in Section 4.3.  
The general conclusion in the literature on shareholder horizons is that firms with 
shorter-horizon investors monitor management less effectively and suffer higher agency 
costs. However, this conclusion raises the question of why we observe short-horizon 
investors playing such a significant role in corporate ownership if their short investment 
horizons increase agency costs and reduce long-term firm value. A possible explanation 
is that investee firms rely on other governance mechanisms to counterbalance the effect 
of shareholders’ shorter-horizons.  
Consistent with the preceding point, two recent studies suggest that institutional 
investors’ average investment horizons can influence the pay-performance sensitivity of 
CEO compensation (Dikolli, Kulp and Sedatole [2004]; Shin [2005]). Using Bushee’s 
(1998) classification, Dikolli, Kulp and Sedatole (2004) document that the greater the 
ownership by transient institutional investors, the weaker is the pay-performance 
sensitivity of CEO cash compensation. However, their study does not capture other ways 
in which blockholders’ investment horizons can influence the design of CEO 
compensation contracts. For example, it is not clear from their study whether the lower 
pay-performance sensitivity of CEO cash compensation (lower risk) is accompanied by 
lower total CEO compensation (lower risk premium), or alternatively, whether the lower 
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pay-performance sensitivity is offset by an increase in pay-performance sensitivity of 
CEO equity compensation (higher risk).  
In a similar study, Shin (2005) also uses Bushee’s [1998] classification scheme 
and shows that institutional ownership is positively associated with CEO equity 
compensation the investee firm regardless of the institutional investors’ horizons. His 
results are consistent with Hartzell and Starks (2003) who find a positive association 
between the level of institutional ownership and pay-performance sensitivity of CEO 
option compensation. As will be seen later, the insignificant effect of institutional 
investors’ horizons on CEO equity-based compensation (Shin [2005]) is inconsistent with 
the findings of this dissertation. This is potentially due to the differences between 
Bushee’s classification and my measure of outside blockholder turnover. 
In summary, the studies referenced in this section suggest that how long investors 
intend to hold their shares influences how they monitor management of the investee firm 
and the design of CEO incentives in investee firms. However, research in this area 
remains very limited, and the relation between investor horizons and corporate 
governance still provides interesting unanswered questions. This dissertation aims to 
provide some additional insights in this area.   
2.2 Ownership structure and CEO incentive compensation 
 
The agency problem in a diffused ownership structure stems from the separation 
of ownership and control. Specifically, in the absence of other governance mechanisms, 
managers tend to seek to further their self-interest even when that is not the best interest 
of the shareholders. An extensive literature on ownership structure and executive 
compensation suggests that firms use monitoring and incentives to align the managers’ 
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interests with those of shareholders (e.g., Mayers and Smith [1992]; Ke, Petroni and 
Safieddine [1999]; Hartzell and Starks [2003]).  
The literature on ownership generally describes shareholder monitoring as the set 
of shareholder activities that aim to directly or indirectly influence management’s 
decisions, such as gathering information about managerial performance, conducting 
private negotiations with management, publicizing shareholder activism, soliciting 
shareholder proposals, initiating litigation, and in extreme situations, mounting a proxy 
contest (Del Guercio and Hawkins [1999)]; Shleifer and Vishny [1986]; Bethel, 
Liebeskind and Opler [1998]). Although managerial incentives can take various forms, 
the agency theory literature primarily focuses on periodic financial compensation.8 While 
shareholder monitoring and incentives mitigate agency problem, however, they are also 
costly to the owners. Therefore, firms are expected to use some mix of monitoring and 
incentives based on various cost-benefit trade-offs.  
In the agency literature, monitoring and incentives are typically viewed as 
alternative mechanisms to mitigate the agency problem.9  For example, assuming 
complete observation is possible, Holmstrom (1979) demonstrates that the costs of 
relying on imperfect performance measures can be avoided, and the first-best solution to 
the agency problem can be achieved by employing a forcing contract that penalizes 
behavior inconsistent with the principal’s directives. However, when managers’ effort 
                                                 
8 Other researchers argue that CEO’s existing equity portfolio (options and stock) should also be considered 
when examining CEO incentives. That is, they argue that total firm-specific CEO incentives reflect not 
only current CEO compensation but also changes in the value of the CEO’s existing equity portfolio 
(Jensen and Murphy [1990]; Hall and Liebman [1998]; Core, Guay and Verrecchia [2003]).  
9 Alternatively, some researchers view shareholder monitoring and incentive as complementary 
mechanisms to align managers’ interest with shareholders (Huddart [1993]; Hartzell and Starks [2003]; 
Almazan, Hartzell and Starks [2004]). These researchers define ‘monitoring’ as an activity to acquire more 
accurate signals of managerial effort, and argue that monitoring allows shareholders to make CEO 
compensation more sensitive without imposing additional compensation risk. In my dissertation, however, I 
take the view that monitoring and incentives are substitutes, following the conventional agency literature. 
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level is not observable, the owner must rely on imperfect performance measures, and 
thereby incur the cost of the risk premium to compensate the manager for bearing risk.  
Several executive compensation researchers report empirical evidence that is 
consistent with the argument that monitoring and incentives are substitutes. Mehran 
(1995) uses blockholding as a proxy for shareholder monitoring and provides empirical 
evidence that such holdings act as a substitute for incentive compensation. Specifically, 
he finds that firms with a larger percentage of their shares held by outside blockholders, 
and hence with greater monitoring by the outside blockholders, use less equity-based 
compensation than do firms with fewer outside blockholders. In their study on the 
ownership characteristics of insurance companies, Ke, Petroni and Safieddine (1999) also 
provide the support for monitoring and incentives acting as substitutes.  Unlike publicly-
held firms, privately-held firms are typically owned by a few large shareholders. 
Therefore, relative to the shareholders of publicly-held firms with dispersed ownership 
structure, shareholders of privately-held firms are likely to have a stronger incentive to 
monitor management, as well as better access to management. Thus, the authors argue 
that privately-held companies will rely more on monitoring and less on incentive 
compensation contracting. Consistent with their argument, they find stronger pay-
performance sensitivity, i.e. a larger positive association between return on assets (ROA) 
and the level of compensation for publicly-held firms than for privately owned firms. 
Similarly, Mayers and Smith (1992) predict and find that CEO compensation in mutual 
insurance companies with more concentrated ownership is less sensitive to firm 
performance than is CEO compensation in stock insurance companies which have more 
diffused ownership. This result suggests that greater shareholder monitoring reflected in 
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more concentrated ownership reduces the mutual insurance companies’ reliance on 
incentive compensation. 
Beatty and Zajac (1994) examine the trade-off between incentives and monitoring 
in IPO firms. They document that firms with stronger monitoring of management, as 
proxied by the existence of outside owner-directors or outside blockholders have lower 
equity-based CEO compensation and lower CEO equity ownership. 
Overall, the studies of executive compensation relying on agency theory generally 
conclude that shareholder monitoring substitutes for incentive compensation in aligning 
the manager’s interest with those of shareholders.  In addition, the studies discussed in 
Section 2.1.2 suggest that firms with shorter-horizons investors tend to have weaker 
shareholder monitoring. These two lines of literature together predict that firms with 
shorter-horizon shareholders are more likely to rely on incentive compensation than are 
firms with longer-horizon shareholders. Using outside blockholder turnover as a measure 
of the investment horizon of the outside blockholders, this dissertation examines whether 
firms with higher outside blockholder turnover are more likely to show greater reliance 
on incentive compensation than firms with lower outside blockholder turnover.   
2.3 Earnings and Stock Returns as Performance Measures 
 
To tie CEO compensation to firm performance, firms must choose how much 
weight to put on alternative performance measures. The most commonly used 
performance measures in CEO compensation are accounting earnings and the firm’s 
stock returns. In a study of 177 large U.S. firms, Murphy (2000) documents that while 
firms use a variety of financial and non-financial measures for executive compensation, 
almost all firms rely on some measures of accounting performance. Equity-based CEO 
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compensation explicitly ties CEO compensation to the firm’s stock performance. Core 
and Guay (2003) report that during the period from 1993 to 2000, the majority of CEO 
compensation in their sample took the form of equity incentives. Further, Hall and 
Liebman (1998) report that 70% of the CEOs in their sample received option grants in 
1994 with median option value of $1.2 million.  
Agency theory suggests that the weight on a given performance measure is 
decreasing in the noisiness of the performance measure, and the relative weight on two 
performance measures is a decreasing function of the relative noisiness of the 
performance measures (Banker and Datar [1989]; Lambert [2001]; Bushman and Smith 
[2001]). That is, if A and B are both noisy signals of managerial performance, as measure 
A becomes noisier relative to measure B, the optimal incentive contract will reduce the 
weight on measure A relative to that on measure B.   
Consistent with this theory, prior studies find that the weight on stock price in a 
CEO’s total compensation varies inversely with the noise in the stock price (Garen 
[1994]; Aggarwal and Samwick [1999]; Core and Guay [2002b]). Additionally, Lambert 
and Larcker (1987) and Sloan (1993) examine cash compensation and find that the 
weight on accounting earnings relative to the weight on stock returns in determining cash 
compensation is a decreasing function of variance of accounting earnings relative to stock 
return variance. Specifically, as the variance of accounting earnings relative to stock 
return variance increases, firms put less weight on accounting earnings than on stock 
returns in determining cash compensation. Consistent with this view, Yermack (1995) 
reports that CEO compensation is more sensitive to stock returns in companies with noisy 
accounting data.  
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A natural extension of the above studies is to examine any systematic associations 
between governance characteristics and noise in different performance measures. For 
example, Dikolli, Kulp and Sedatole (2004) document that CEO cash compensation is not 
sensitive to either earnings or stock returns in firms with greater concentration of 
transient institutional investors (shorter-horizon investors). They argue that transient 
investors’ frequent trading and their limited monitoring of investee firms increase the 
noise in both earnings and stock returns of the investee firms. Therefore, these investee 
firms reduce the weight on both earnings and stock returns when determining CEO cash 
compensation.  
Dikolli, Kulp and Sedatole’s (2004) argument can be applied to the horizons of 
outside blockholders. Outside blockholders with shorter-horizons will turn over their 
block shares more frequently than outside blockholders with longer-horizons. Further, as 
suggested by the studies discussed in Section 2.2, outside blockholders with shorter 
horizons tend to have less monitoring incentives than those with longer-horizons. 
Therefore, to the extent that higher outside blockholders turnover is associated with 
greater noise in earnings and stock returns, firms with higher outside blockholder 
turnover will put less weight on the two performances than do firms with lower outside 
blockholder turnover.  
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CHAPTER 3  
INVESTMENT HORIZONS OF OUTSIDE BLOCKHOLDERS 
 
Chapter 2 discussed the literature that demonstrates the significant effects of 
investor types and investor horizons on investee firm governance. For example, the 
literature finds that individual activist blockholders are more likely to intervene in the 
management of investee firms than are financial blockholders (Bethel, Liebeskind and 
Opler [1998]). Pension funds are more active in monitoring investee firms’ governance 
than are mutual funds (Downes, Houminer and Hubbard [1999]). Due to the nature of 
their business, investment advisors and investment companies tend to be more vigilant in 
monitoring management of investee firms than banks and insurance companies 
(Almazan, Hartzell and Starks [2004]). Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2004) argue and 
document that shorter-horizon institutional investors are less effective monitors than are 
longer-horizon institutional investors in takeover target firms.   
While each of these classification schemes provides insights into the monitoring 
styles of investors, the various classification schemes do not capture how an investor’s 
monitoring can vary with the characteristics of the investee firm. That is, each 
classification scheme imposes a specific investing and monitoring style on an investor 
irrespective of the investee firms in question. However, it is very likely that investors 
determine their investment strategies and monitoring styles in part based on investee firm 
characteristics. If this is the case, an investor will demonstrate variation in its investment 
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strategies across different investee firms in its portfolio, and the variation will be 
systematically associated with investee firm characteristics.   
In this chapter, I explore how large investors’ investment horizons vary, using a 
sub-sample of outside blockholders from my overall sample. Specifically, I first examine 
the variation in investment horizons across the sub-sample of outside blockholders. This 
test will provide information about whether outside blockholders are different from each 
other in terms of their investment horizons. I then examine whether investment horizons 
of each outside blockholder also vary across investee firms within the outside 
blockholder’s portfolio. If the outside blockholders’ investment horizons are determined 
primarily based on their own characteristics, the outside blockholders will hold a 
predominant proportion of their portfolio for a particular holding period. In other words, 
there will be very little variation in each outside blockholder’s block holding periods. 
These two examinations together will provide preliminary information about what 
determine large shareholders’ investment horizons.     
For this analysis, I pull outside blockholders with at least 10 investee firms in 
their portfolio from my overall sample, and measure their block holding periods in their 
investee firms. The overall sample investee firms, taken together, have a total of 1,102 
unique blockholders over the four-year sample period. The 1,102 unique blockholders 
consist of 527 unique inside blockholders (managers, directors, ESOP or affiliated 
entities who each own at least 5% of the firm’s voting shares) and 575 unique outside 
blockholders (blockholders who are not insiders and own at least 5% of the firm’s voting 
shares). Of the 575 outside blockholders, 61 own blocks in at least 10 of my sample 
investee firms during the sample period. Appendix 1 lists these 61 blockholders, the 
 28
portfolio size for each blockholder, the distribution of block holding periods across the 
four-year horizon, and the mean portfolio holding period.   
In measuring the distribution of block holding periods for each blockholder over 
the sample period, I assume for simplicity that the blockholders who are present at the 
end of the first year in the four-year sample period acquired their block ownership in the 
firm during the first year. Based on this measurement convention, the minimum holding 
period of block shares over the four-year sample period is less than 1 year (0-1 year), and 
the maximum holding period is 3-4 years.  For example, Appendix 1 shows that AXA 
Financial Corp. owned blocks in 48 investee firms in its portfolio during the four-year 
sample period. It held blocks in 35 investee firms (73% of the 48 investee firms) for 0-1 
year, nine investee firms (19%) for 1-2 years, two investee firms (4%) for 2-3 years and 
another two investee firms (4%) for 3-4 years. The weighted average holding period for 
AXA, as shown in Appendix 1, is 1.40 years. Obviously, this measurement convention 
understates the actual holding period for most sample firms because it assumes that no 
blockholders held shares prior to the four-year sample period.10  Nevertheless, it still 
captures the relative extent to which each blockholder tended to hold its blocks for 
shorter or longer periods over the four-year sample period. Furthermore, because the 
measurement reduces the extent of variation in the holding period by cutting short the 
longer holding periods, it biases the study away from finding greater variation in the 
holding periods.  
 The mean portfolio holding periods for the 61 outside blockholders in Appendix 
1 range from 1.09 years for Nicholas Applegate Capital Management to 3.41 years for 
                                                 
10 Instead of using the block holding period, I use turnover of outside blocks as a proxy for investment 
horizons of the outside blockholders in my data analyses.  I provide detailed discussions on the 
measurement of outside blockholder turnover in Section 4.3. 
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State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. This range of holding periods across blockholders 
demonstrates that some blockholders tend to hold their blocks for considerably longer 
period than others. For example, AXA Financial’s average block holding period was 1.40 
years, whereas FMR Corp’s average block holding period was 2.27 years.  
To test the statistical significance of the variation in block holding periods across 
the investors listed in Appendix 1, I ranked the 61 blockholders based on their mean 
portfolio holding period and examine whether the distributions of the block holding 
periods are different across the blockholders.11 The test result shows that the distributions 
of the block holding periods are significantly different across blockholders (Chi-square 
291.67, p<0.00). In other words, the outside blockholders are different from each other in 
their pattern of block holding period. 
Next, I examine whether the outside blockholders’ block holding periods vary 
across their investee firms. The distributions of block holding periods within each 
blockholder’s portfolio support the prediction that investors’ investment horizons differ 
across the investee firms in their portfolio. The 61 outside blockholders, on average, hold 
51% of their portfolio for 0-1 year, 22% for 1-2 years, 13% for 2-3 years and 14% for 3-4 
years of the four-year sample period. The large variation within each outside 
blockholder’s portfolio suggests that the outside blockholders determine their block 
holding period based on investee firm characteristics.   
The overall results suggest that large shareholders’ investment horizons vary 
based on both the large shareholders’ own investment characteristics and the investee 
firm characteristics. For instance, FMR Corp.’s portfolio consists of 405 unique firms in 
the sample during the four-year sample period. FMR Corp. held 39% of its portfolio for 
                                                 
11 I use Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test. 
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less than one year, 20% for 1-2 years, 17% for 2-3 years, and 24% for 3-4 years during 
the four-year sample period. In other words, while FMR Corp demonstrated, on average, 
a longer investment horizon over the sample period (mean of 2.27 years) than did AXA 
Financial (mean of 1.40 years), FMR Corp. nevertheless held a larger proportion of its 
portfolio over 0-1 year of the sample period than over any other interval in the sample 
period.  
An important implication of these results is that without taking into account 
investee firm characteristics, studies that examine the relation between investor horizons 
and governance of investee firms are likely to have a problem of omitted variables. 
Specifically, investee firm characteristics that are not in the model can potentially affect 
both investor horizons and the governance characteristics of investee firms, resulting in a 
spurious relation between investor horizons and the governance characteristics of 
investee firms. 
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CHAPTER 4  
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
4.1 Data Sources and Sample Formation 
 
The overall sample consists of 874 publicly listed U.S. investee firms drawn from 
the Investor Responsibility Research Center’s (IRRC) surveys in 1995, 1998 and 2000 
(Rosenbaum 1995, 1998 and 2000). Block ownership data12 are from Dlugosz, 
Fahlenbrach, Gompers and Metrick (2004) (DFGM hereafter), who obtained the 
information from Compact Disclosure and proxy statements filed with the SEC. DFGM 
(2004) use voting power when computing the block ownership of their sample firms. 
Financial, stock price and CEO compensation data come from COMPUSTAT, CRSP and 
EXECUCOMP, respectively. From DFGM’s sample of 1,913 unique firms during the 
period from 1996 to 2001, I removed 767 firms that do not have at least four consecutive 
years of ownership data. I further dropped 30 firms due to errors in the ownership data or 
lack of proxy statements, and 185 firms due to missing data in COMPUSTAT, CRSP or 
EXECUCOMP. Because my main variable of interest is turnover of outside blockholders, 
                                                 
12 The SEC requires that all beneficial owners of more than 5% of a company’s voting stock be listed in the 
proxy statement. Therefore, jointly held shares are listed multiple times for each blockholder in the block. 
For example, Warren Buffett and Berkshire Hathaway jointly own 8.1% of Coca Cola Co. Warren Buffett 
is a director of Coca Cola. The Coca Cola proxy statement, therefore, lists the 8.1% held by Warren Buffett 
under ‘Beneficial Ownership by Directors and Executive Officers’, and also reports the 8.1% block held by 
Berkshire Hathaway under ‘Principal Share Owners’. Compact Disclosure frequently ignores the footnote 
details of these jointly held blocks. Instead, they list each blockholder as it appears in the summary table, 
resulting in multiple counts of the jointly held block ownership. DFGM segregate the shared block 
ownership to correct the errors and create variables that identify the blockholders with shared ownership. 
This process results in some blockholders with less than 5% ownership. Therefore, using the identifiers as 
suggested by DFGM, I verify the segregated block ownership against the proxy statements and sum them 
back to obtain the total corrected block ownership. For instance, I treat Warren Buffett and Berkshire 
Hathaway as a single entity that owns 8.1% of Coca Cola Co.’s voting shares.  
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I also removed 57 firms with zero outside block ownership over the four-year sample 
period. The final sample includes 874 unique investee firms with starting year in 1996, 
1997 or 1998. The sample firms are generally large due to IRRC’s focus on large firms in 
their surveys and my data screening procedures that require sample firms to have data 
available in COMPUSTAT, EXECUCOMP and CRSP. Of the 874 unique sample firms, 
233 firms have data for the sample period 1996-1999, 208 firms have data for the sample 
period 1997-2000, and 433 firms have data for the sample period 1998-2001.  
When analyzing data, I use four-year averages of outside blockholder turnover, 
block ownership and financial data for each firm in my sample for the following reasons. 
An examination of correlations indicates that the outside blockholder turnover and other 
block ownership variables are serially correlated during the four-year sample period, and 
the autocorrelations are statistically significant.13 The autocorrelation of outside 
blockholder turnover is problematic in the pooled time-series OLS estimation of outside 
blockholder turnover. Specifically, the autocorrelation of outside blockholder turnover 
can seriously understate the true standard deviation of the regression coefficients of 
predictor variables in the OLS regression, making the t-test of the regression coefficients 
not strictly applicable (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim and Wasserman [1996]). Further, the 
high autocorrelation of the block ownership variables suggest that for this sample period, 
any systematic associations between ownership characteristics and CEO compensation 
are more likely coming from cross-sectional variation than from within firm variation. 
                                                 
13 Four year average correlations of the annual block ownership of the sample firms are 0.79 for total block 
ownership; 0.94 for manager block; 0.89 for director block ownership; 0.68 for outside block ownership; 
0.91 for ESOP block ownership and 0.71 for affiliated (gray) block ownership. The correlation for annual 
outside blockholder turnover is 0.23. 
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Finally, using four-year averages minimizes the effect of temporary fluctuations in key 
variables.  
4.2 Reclassification of Block Types 
 
DFGM classify blockholders into one of five categories: 1) officers, 2) directors, 
3) affiliated entities, 4) Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), and 5) outside 
blockholders. DFGM categorize individual blockholders who are directors of the firm as 
“director blockholders”, but categorize blockholders (often corporations or financial 
institutions) whose representatives sit on the board of the firm as “outside blockholders” 
rather than “director blockholders”. This classification may understate director block 
ownership because it does not include director block ownership held by corporations or 
institutions. Therefore, I redefine “director blockholders” to include all non-manager 
blockholders who are directors of the firm or whose representatives sit on the board of 
the firm. Using the information in the proxy statements and existing information in 
DFGM’s ownership data, I reclassify the blockholder ownership as follows: 
Manager block (MGRBLK):  A blockholder who is a manager (the manager may or may 
    not also be a director)  
 
Director block (DIRBLK):  A non-manager blockholder who is a director of the firm  
      or whose representative is a director of the firm 
 
Outside block (OUTBLK):  A blockholder who is neither a manager nor a director and 
who is not related to the founding family and has no other 
significant business relation with the company 
 
ESOP block (ESOPBLK):  Blocks owned by employee stock ownership plans,  
employees savings plans, employees’ retirement plans or  
any other blocks owned by the firms’  employees 
 
Gray block (GRAYBLK):  Affiliated blockholders as defined by DFGM – trusts for a 
                founding family, subsidiaries or entities with significant  
                    business relation with the firm 
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For some subsequent analyses, I group the block ownership into outside blocks 
(OUTBLK) and inside blocks (INBLK), where INBLK includes manager blocks, director 
blocks, ESOP blocks and gray blocks.14 
4.3 Measurement of Blockholder Turnover 
 
Blockholder turnover of an investee firm is the percentage of the investee firm’s 
block ownership that changes hands annually, and reflects the investment horizons of the 
blockholders. Specifically, higher blockholder turnover indicates shorter investment 
horizons of the investee firm’s blockholders, whereas lower blockholder turnover 
indicates longer investment horizons of the investee firm’s blockholders. While observed 
blockholder turnover is an ex post measure of the blockholders’ investment horizons, I 
assume that it also reflects the blockholders’ ex ante intentions about how long they plan 
to hold their block shares. 
  A more direct approach to measuring blockholders’ investment horizons within an 
investee firm would be simply to measure how long each blockholder held the block 
ownership in the investee firm, and then to aggregate these individual holding periods 
weighted by the size of each block. However, my data does not enable me to take this 
approach. The DFGM blockholder data covers the period 1996-2001, and I restrict my 
sample to those firms with at least four years of consecutive blockholder data. Therefore, 
my data represents a four-year window into the complete blockholder history of the 874 
firms in my sample. This four-year window is not sufficient to accurately measure total 
block holding periods which extend beyond the four-year sample period.  
                                                 
14 I use outside blocks (OUTBLK) and insider blocks (INBLK) in the turnover regression model. For the 
compensation model, I use the level of outside block ownership (OUTBLK) and indicator variables for 
manager blocks and director blocks. The rationale for using indicator variables is discussed in Section 6.2. 
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Using blockholder turnover has some advantages compared to using the duration 
of the holding period. The four-year blockholder data set identifies all blockholders and 
the percentage of the investee firm’s total shares that they own as of each proxy date 
(annual data). Therefore, I can accurately measure any annual changes in blockholders 
during the sample period without making any assumption about the duration of holding 
periods which extend outside the sample period.15 In addition, because both my 
blockholder turnover measure and the level of block ownership are measured annually 
based on the proxy information, I can directly relate the annual blockholder turnover 
measure and the level of block ownership to CEO compensation characteristics. A 
parallel method based on block holding periods would be complicated by the issue of the 
aligning the holding period with the level of block ownership. Therefore, I use 
blockholder turnover as a measure of blockholder horizons. Because my study focuses on 
outside blockholder turnover, I then break the total turnover into turnover of outside 
block ownership and turnover of all other types of block ownership. I focus primarily on 
outside blockholder turnover in my data analyses. 
Changes in an investee firm’s blockholders are due to the exit of existing 
blockholders and the entry of new blockholders. At one extreme, an investee firm could 
have a set of blockholders who remained with the investee firm for its entire life, 
resulting in no blockholder turnover. At the other extreme, another investee firm could 
have a set of continually changing blockholders, resulting in a very high blockholder 
turnover. Therefore, I measure blockholder turnover by the rate at which existing 
                                                 
15 Blockholder turnover measure does not capture the transactions by blockholders who might have held the 
firms’ stock only for a short period during the proxy year. This can potentially result in understated 
blockholder turnover rates. However, understated blockholder turnover would work against this study 
because it would dampen the effect of blockholder turnover on CEO compensation by reducing the 
variation in blockholder turnover.  
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blockholders exit an investee firm and new blockholders enter. Specifically, blockholder 
turnover in yeart+1 is the sum of ownership of the existing blockholders who exit  and the 
ownership of new blockholders who enter during yeart+1 scaled by the total block 
ownership at the end of yeart and at the end of yeart+1. The following example illustrates 
the calculation of blockholder turnover for Teradyne Inc., a transportation firm in my 
sample.  
     Table B Example of Block Ownership and Blockholder Turnover Calculation 
 
Company Name : Teradyne Inc. 
Proxy 
date Blockholder name % of outstanding voting shares 
5/21/1998 
 
 
Capital Group Companies, Inc. 
Pioneering Management 
Scudder Kemper Investment 
Neuberger and Berman LLC. 
       Total  
   14.1% 
  5.5 
13.7 
  7.5  
  40.8% 
5/27/1999 
 
FMR Corp. 
Neuberger and Berman LLC. 
       Total 
  13.6% 
  6.0 
 19.6% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Teradyne’s aggregate block ownership as of 5/21/1998 and 5/27/1999 is 40.8% 
and 19.6%, respectively. During the period from 5/21/1998 to 5/27/1999, three 
blockholders (Capital Group, Pioneering Management, Scudder Kemper Investment), 
owning 33.3% of Teradyne’s stock, exited the firm. One new blockholder (FMR Corp.), 
owning 13.6%, entered. Therefore, my measure of Teradyne’s blockholder turnover in 
the fiscal year 1999 is (33.3% + 13.6%)/(40.8% + 19.6%) = 0.7765. The turnover rate of 
0.7765 means that 77.65% of Teradyne’s block shares were transferred from one set of 
blockholders to another set of blockholders during the fiscal year 1999. The blockholder 
turnover rate ranges from 0% (none of the blockholders who were present at the 
beginning of the proxy year turned over their block shares during the proxy year) to 
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100% (all blockholders who were present at the beginning of the year their block shares 
during the proxy year).    
This measure is a modified version of the mutation ratio used by Franks, Mayer 
and Rossi (2004) (See Appendices 2A and 2B for more details). I discuss descriptive 
statistics of the blockholder turnover in the sub-section titled Blockholder turnover of 
Section 4.5.   
As discussed in Section 2.1, Bushee (1998) classifies institutional investors to 
capture the investment horizons of those institutional investors. My outside blockholder 
turnover measure and Bushee’s classification are similar in that both measures aim to 
capture investee firms’ shareholder horizons which, in turn, influence the investee firms’ 
shareholder monitoring of management. However, my outside blockholder turnover 
measure is different from Bushee’s in several ways.  
First, Bushee’s classification is based upon a composite index of average portfolio 
characteristics (i.e., portfolio diversification, portfolio turnover and the extent to which 
they employ momentum strategy). By aggregating these different dimensions of the 
portfolio characteristics, his classification scheme loses the information about individual 
dimensions of the portfolio characteristics. For example, Bushee’s measure cannot 
distinguish between the effect of portfolio turnover and the effect of portfolio 
diversification on investee firms’ R&D spending.  
In contrast, because my outside blockholder turnover measure focuses on a single 
characteristic, it allows for the inclusion of other dimensions of ownership structure such 
as the level of block ownership and the dispersion of block ownership. The primary goal 
of using outside blockholder turnover in this dissertation is not to classify outside 
 38
blockholders based on their overall investment strategies, but to examine whether the 
investment horizons of outside blockholders (measured by the rate of outside blockholder 
turnover) matters to their monitoring incentives. Further, this approach enables me to 
analyze how the effect of outside blockholders’ investment horizons differs from the 
effects of the level and the concentration of outside block ownership, ownership 
attributes that have been considered as primary determinants of shareholders’ monitoring 
incentives in prior studies (Grossman and Harts [1980]; Shleifer and Vishny [1986]; 
Huddart [1993]).      
Second, Bushee classifies institutional investors based on each investor’s average 
portfolio characteristics and then uses the proportion of ownership held by each investor 
type as proxy for the investee firms’ overall shareholder horizons. In contrast, I directly 
measure investee firms’ outside blockholder turnover (horizons) in my sample. This 
difference has an important implication in my research design. By using institutional 
investors’ average portfolio characteristics, Bushee (1998) removes the variation of 
investment strategies across investee firms in each investor’s portfolio. By doing so, he 
implicitly assumes that the variation in an investee firm’s shareholder horizons is solely 
due to the differences among the investors. In other words, he does not allow an 
investor’s investment horizon to vary with investee firm characteristics. In contrast, my 
approach does the investee firm characteristics to influence the investor’s investment 
horizon.   
As discussed in Chapter 3 and demonstrated in Appendix 1, investment horizons 
vary not only across investors but also across investee firms within each investor’s 
portfolio.  This result suggests that investor horizons are in part determined by investee 
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firm characteristics. This is important because it means that any observed relation 
between investor horizons and investee firm governance, such as CEO compensation, is 
potentially spurious because firm characteristics can potentially influence both investor 
horizons and investee firm governance. To address this issue, I let the outside 
blockholders’ investment horizons vary with investee firm characteristics by directly 
measuring outside blockholder turnover at the investee firm level. I then employ two- 
stage simultaneous estimation to account for the potential endogeneity of outside 
blockholder turnover.  
Third, Bushee exclusively focuses on institutional ownership, whereas I include 
all large investors (i.e., blockholders) whether they are institutions, individuals or 
corporations. The underlying motivation of my dissertation is to examine how the 
investment horizons of share ownership differ from the size of ownership in determining 
investors’ monitoring incentives. The exit and the entry of investors with a large fraction 
of ownership matter more to the monitoring of investee firm management than do the exit 
and the entry of investors who own a very small fraction of ownership. By focusing on 
large investors, I will be better able to contrast the effect of ownership horizons and the 
effect of ownership size on the monitoring of management.  
 As suggested by the above differences, outside blockholder turnover provides 
additional information about the role of investor horizons on corporate governance to the 
literature on ownership structure as well as the literature on investor horizons. 
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4.4 Compensation Measures  
 
I use two measures of the level of CEO compensation (total CEO compensation and CEO 
cash compensation) and two measures of CEO pay-performance sensitivity (the ratio of 
stock options granted to total CEO compensation and ∆OPTION).  
Total CEO compensation (TCOMP) is the total payments made to a CEO for the 
fiscal year ($000), including salary, bonus, stock options granted and all other 
compensation. Cash compensation (CASH) is the sum of CEO salary and cash bonus 
($000) for the year. The ratio of stock options granted to total CEO compensation 
(OPTIONS/TCOMP) measures the extent to which a CEO’s total compensation is tied to 
stock performance. Stock options granted is the aggregate value of stock options granted 
to a CEO during the fiscal year valued using S&P’s Black-Scholes method. ∆OPTION is 
the change in the value of options granted during the fiscal year per $1,000 in shareholder 
wealth (Yermack [1995]; Hartzell and Starks [2003]).  
In addition to the above four performance measures, I also use two interaction 
terms, [ROA*HITURN] and [ADJRET*HITURN], to examine 1) how the pay-
performance sensitivity of total CEO compensation (CEO cash compensation) may 
potentially vary depending on the level of outside blockholder turnover (H1), and 2) how 
the weights on the performance measures, ROA and ADJRET, change as outside 
blockholder turnover changes (H2).16  ROA denotes return on assets, and ADJRET 
                                                 
16 Other researchers regress the changes in CEO compensation on the changes in shareholder wealth and 
use the coefficient on the changes in shareholder wealth as a pay-performance sensitivity measure; i.e., the 
coefficient shows the magnitude of the change in CEO compensation that is associated with the change in 
shareholder wealth (e.g., Jensen and Murphy [1990]; Hartzell and Starks [2003]).  This measure, however, 
does not allow me to examine Hypothesis 2 which predicts differential sensitivity of CEO compensation to 
accounting earnings and stock returns. Therefore, I use accounting earnings and stock returns instead of 
changes in shareholder wealth to measure the pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation as well as 
the weights placed on the two performance measures.  
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denotes market adjusted stock returns. HITURN is an indicator variable for the sample 
firms with above median outside blockholder turnover.  
In the total CEO compensation (CEO cash compensation) regression, 
[ADJRET*HITURN] is the interaction between market adjusted stock returns (ADJRET) 
and the indicator variable for high outside blockholder turnover (HITURN), and 
[ROA*HITURN] is the interaction between return on assets (ROA) and HITURN. 
Positive coefficients for the interaction terms would be consistent with total CEO 
compensation (CEO cash compensation) being more sensitive to the performance 
measures when outside blockholder turnover is higher.  
Comparing the size of the coefficients on ROA and ADJRET with those on  
[ADJRET*HITURN] and [ROA*HITURN]) will show how the weights on ROA and 
ADJRET change as outside blockholder turnover increases from below median to above 
median. Specifically, the coefficients on ROA and RET reflects the weights on the two 
performance measures for total CEO compensation (CEO cash compensation) when 
outside blockholder turnover is below median (HITURN = 0). The coefficients on 
[ADJRET*HITURN] and [ROA*HITURN]) reflects the weights on the two performance 
measures for total CEO compensation (CEO cash compensation) when outside 
blockholder turnover is above median ((HITURN = 1). 
4.5 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Blockholder turnover  
Outside blockholder turnover is the annual proportion of an investee firm’s block 
ownership that changed hands, averaged over the four-year sample period. Because the 
annual turnover calculation requires data at both the beginning and end of the years, the 
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four-years of data yield three annual turnover rates for each sample firm. Table 1 Panel A 
reports descriptive statistics of blockholder turnover by blockholder type and by year 
within the sample period. Total blockholder turnover (TOTALTURN) is the sum of 
turnover across five categories of blockholders: outside blockholders (OUTTURN), 
manager blockholders (MGRTURN), director blockholders (DIRTURN), ESOP 
blockholders (ESOPTURN) and gray blockholders (GRAYTURN). For example, the first 
six rows of Panel A show that the 233 firms with data for 1996-1999 had, on average, 
29.04% of total blockholder turnover in 1999. Further, most of this turnover involved 
outside blockholders, who accounted for 27.17% of the 29.04% total turnover rate. In 
contrast, the other four blockholder categories together accounted for less than 2% of the 
29.04% total turnover rate. The smaller proportion of turnover rate for the later four 
groups reflects first, that these blockholder categories hold smaller proportion of the 
investee firm stock. Second, the turnover rates for these blockholder categories also tend 
to be smaller.     
The last column of Table 1 shows that the average total blockholder turnover rates 
(TOTALTURN) for the sample periods 1996-1999, 1997-2000 and 1999-2001 were 
28.68%, 30.64% and 32.32%, respectively. Similarly, outside blockholder turnover rates 
(OUTTURN) for the same sample periods were 26.85%, 28.27% and 30.18%, 
respectively. In other words, turnover by outside blockholders accounted for the great 
majority (92-94%) of total blockholder turnover during the sample period.   
Manager blockholders and gray blockholders accounted for the smallest 
proportion of the total blockholder turnover. Out of 28.68-32.32% of total blockholder 
turnover, 0.26-0.43% is due to manager blockholder turnover (MGRTURN) and 0.10-
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0.30% is due to gray blockholder turnover (GRAYTURN). Director blockholders and 
ESOP blockholders contribute slightly higher turnover rates; 0.45-0.93% is due to 
director blockholder turnover (DIRTURN) and 0.50-1.00% is due to ESOP blockholder 
turnover (ESOPTURN). These results show that outside blockholders are the dominant 
source of blockholder turnover in the sample firms over the sample period.  
Table 1 Panel B reports the distribution of total blockholder turnover by type of 
blockholder and sample year. The average outside blockholder turnover rate for the 
period 1996-2001 is 28.84% with the lowest rate, 26.19%, in 1997-1998 (reflected in 
the1998 turnover rate) and the highest rate, 29.99%, in 1999-2000 (reflected in the 2000 
turnover rate). The pattern of outside blockholder turnover over the six-year period does 
not show any significant fluctuations, indicating no significant effect of the 2000-2001 
stock market crash on outside blockholder turnover of the sample firms. Manager 
blockholder turnover, director blockholder turnover, ESOP blockholder turnover and 
gray blockholder turnover again generally do not account for more than 1.0% of total 
blockholder turnover and demonstrate stable patterns in the period 1996-2001. 
Industry distribution 
Table 2 Panel A reports the distribution of the sample firms in Fama-French 12-
industry portfolios. The number of firms in each industry groups varies from 5 to160 
firms. Manufacturing is the largest (160 firms), followed by Business Equipment (141 
firms) and Sales/Service industry (131 firms). Telephone/Television Transmission has the 
smallest number of firms (5 firms) in the sample.  
 Table 2 Panel B reports four-year averages of block ownership variables and CEO 
compensation by industry. Telephone/Television Transmission (Industry #7) and Utilities 
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(Industry #8), two regulated industries, show significantly lower levels of outside block 
ownership. The Telephone/Television Transmission industries have the lowest outside 
blockholder turnover, and also a significantly higher level of CEO cash compensations 
than other industries. The Utilities industry shows the lowest rate of option-to-total CEO 
compensation, and also the lowest level of total CEO compensation.    
Firm characteristics  
Table 3 documents four-year averages of sample firm characteristics. The sample 
firms are generally large with average assets (ASSET) and market value of equity 
(MKTBV) of $5,603 million and $5,445 million, respectively. The mean (median) 
number of business segments (SEGNUM) in which sample firms operate is 2.36 (2.00).  
Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) report 2.18 business segments for their sample firms for 
the period 1993-1998. As suggested by the large firm size, the sample firms are relatively 
well covered by analysts. On average, 10.38 analyst forecasts (ESTNUM) were available 
for each sample firm for any given month during the sample period. The mean (median) 
annual stock return (RET) was 0.198 (0.141), and the mean (median) return on assets 
(ROA) was 0.047 (0.047). These performance results are consistent with the strong stock 
market in the last half of the 1990s.   
CEO compensation  
Table 3 shows that the mean (median) total CEO compensation (TCOMP) over 
the four-year sample period was $4.21 million ($2.46 million), which is very similar to 
the $4.21 million ($1.76 million) for the period 1993 to 2000 reported by Core, Guay and 
Verrecchia (2003). The large standard deviation of total CEO compensation ($6,631 
million) suggests that total CEO compensation varies widely across the sample. On 
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average, 34.9% of total CEO compensation is in the form of stock options 
(OPTIONS/TCOMP). ∆OPTION is the average change in the value of stock options 
granted in the current year per $1,000 in shareholder wealth, and measures pay-
performance sensitivity of stock option compensation (Yermack [1995]; Hartzell and 
Starks [2003]; Core, Guay and Larcker [2003]). The average ∆OPTION is $2.019 per 
$1,000 change in shareholder wealth with a median of $1.085. These values are larger 
than Hartzell and Starks’ corresponding mean and median values of $0.98 and $0.17 for 
the period 1992 to1997 and Yermack’s $0.59 and $0.07 for the period 1984 to 1991. This 
is consistent with the increasing use of options in CEO compensation throughout the 
1990s.  
Block ownership 
The descriptive statistics of block ownership (Table 3) show that outsiders hold 
the majority block ownership. The mean (median) outside block ownership is 16.02% 
(14.48%) of total outstanding voting stock, followed by manager blockholders (average 
4.01%) and director blockholders (average 3.10%). However, the distributions of 
manager block ownership and director block ownership are highly skewed, as evidenced 
by the fact that 60-80% of all sample firms have no manager or director blockholders. 
The Herfindahl index of outside block ownership (HFOUT) indicates how concentrated a 
firm’s outside block ownership is. The sample firms’ mean (median) Herfindahl Index is 
0.482 (0.470). These statistics suggest that the sample firms on average have about two 
outside blockholders with each outside blockholder having an average of half the total 
block ownership, i.e., about 7-8% of the firm’s stock. As noted earlier in Table 1, the last 
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line of Table 3 shows that the mean (median) block turnover by outside blockholders 
(OUTTURN) was 28.84% (24.63%).   
The correlations in Table 8 show that outside blockholder turnover is highly 
negatively associated with the existence of a manager blockholder (MGRDUM) (ρ =  
-0.30, p < 0.01) or a director who is also a blockholder (DIRDUM) (ρ = -0.29, p < 0.01). 
The aggregate level of outside block ownership (OUTBLK) is positively associated with 
outside blockholder turnover (OUTTURN) (ρ = 0.09, p < 0.01).  
The descriptive statistics on outside blockholder turnover and block ownership 
provide interesting preliminary results on outside blockholder turnover. Over the four-
year sample period, the sample firms experienced an annual rate of blockholder turnover 
of about 30%, and the great majority (92-94%) of the blockholder turnover represented 
the turnover of outside blockholders. This result is consistent with the operation of two 
important dimensions of outside block ownership: outside blockholders’ ownership size 
(measured by the level and the concentration) and outside blockholders’ investment 
horizons.  Further, the relatively low correlation (ρ=0.09) between outside blockholder 
turnover (OUTTURN) and the level of outside block ownership (OUTBLK) suggests that 
the rate of outside blockholder turnover is not determined solely by the size of outside 
block ownership. Taken together, these results suggest that the investment horizons of 
outside block ownership and size of outside block ownership are two different 
dimensions of outside block ownership.  
The preliminary examinations so far suggest that investment horizons of outside 
blockholders are likely to vary with investee firm characteristics (Chapter 3) and that 
outside blockholder horizons and the size of outside block ownership capture two 
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different dimensions of outside block ownership structure (Chapter 4). Extending these 
results, Chapter 5 explores what firm characteristics are systematically associated outside 
blockholder turnover, and Chapter 6 examines how outside blockholder horizon is 
different from the level and the concentration of outside block ownership in explaining 
CEO incentive compensation. 
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CHAPTER 5  
DETERMINANTS OF OUTSIDE BLOCKHOLDER TURNOVER 
 
The ownership literature generally views the size of ownership stake as the 
primary determinant of the extent of shareholder monitoring (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 
[1986]; McConnell and Servaes [1990]; Cole and Mehran [1998]; Ke, Petroni and 
Safieddine [1999]). My central thesis is that in addition to the size of investors’ 
ownership stakes, how long investors intend to hold their shares will also influence their 
investment in monitoring managerial performance. To date, only limited research has 
examined the relation between shareholders’ investment horizons and their monitoring, 
and empirical examinations of the determinants of shareholders’ investment horizons are 
even scarcer. For example, Bethel, Liebeskind and Opler (1998, p.632) conclude that the 
role of large shareholders’ investment horizons on the extent of their monitoring in an 
investee firm remains an open issue. Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2004) call for more 
research on the determinants of an investee firm’s shareholder base (i.e., shareholder 
horizons). To address this issue, this chapter uses a firm’s outside blockholder turnover as 
a measure of shareholder horizons and seeks to identify firm characteristics that explain 
variation in outside blockholder turnover across investee firms.  
Section 5.1 discusses relevant firm characteristics and develops hypotheses 
relating those characteristics to outside blockholder turnover (investor horizons). Section 
5.2 provides univariate analysis results, and Section 5.3 tests the hypotheses in a 
multivariate setting. 
 
5.1 Outside Blockholder Turnover Hypotheses 
 
Blockholders have better access to the management of the investee firms and to 
more firm-specific information than other investors in the market can obtain (Shleifer and 
Vishny [1986]; Kahn and Winton [1998]; Heflin and Shaw [2000]). I refer to this as the 
blockholders’ information advantage. Blockholders can potentially use this advantage 
either to intervene in management of the investee firm to enhance long-term firm value 
(control benefits) or to seek short-term profits from share trades (trading profits) (Kahn 
and Winton [1998]). The two strategies generally involve different investment horizons: 
i.e., pursuing control benefits generally requires longer investment horizons, whereas 
pursuing trading profits generally involve shorter investment horizons. Therefore, I 
expect investment horizons of outside blockholders (i.e., outside blockholder turnover) to 
vary with investee firm characteristics that influence the relative size of control benefits 
and trading profits. I identify intervention costs, share liquidity, firm performance and 
inside ownership as those investee firm characteristics. In the following sub-sections, I 
discuss each characteristic and develop testable hypotheses.   
Intervention costs 
While intervention in the management of the investee firm can potentially 
improve long-term firm value, it is also costly. A blockholder’s intervention costs include 
monitoring costs (Noe [2002]) and block holding costs, such as loss of liquidity 
(Chidambaran and John [1999]) and foregone trading benefits (Kahn and Winton [1998]).  
Monitoring costs include expenditures on resources to monitor management, solicitation 
of shareholder proposals, potential legal challenges or, in an extreme situation, mounting 
a proxy contest (Bethel, Liebeskind and Opler [1998]). Assuming that the marginal 
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benefits of intervention are fixed across investee firms, these costs reduce the net-control 
benefits available to the blockholders. Therefore, holding all else constant, firms with 
higher intervention costs are less likely to attract long-horizon blockholders who seek to 
intervene in management of the investee firm to improve firm value. This implies that 
they are more likely to have blockholders who trade frequently to exploit their private 
information (Bethel, Liebeskind and Opler [1998]; Kahn and Winton [1998]). 
Information for intervention of management is different from information for 
short-term trading profits. Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) classify information into 
“strategic information” and “speculative information”. Strategic information is 
information that indicates a better course of action for the investee firm but is useless 
unless acted on. Speculative information simply helps to predict the future value of the 
investee firm, and is useful only for trading purposes (Holmstrom and Tirole [1993], 
p.699). Relative to the cost of speculative information, the cost of gathering strategic 
information is likely to be higher in firms with greater information asymmetry and 
greater firm risk, such as young firms in a rapidly evolving industry. For example, it may 
be hard for outside blockholders to determine optimal management policies in investee 
firms that are specialized in new technologies, have an intensive R&D focus or rely on 
specialized intangibles such as human skills (Kahn and Winton [1998]). Relative to the 
cost of gathering strategic information, the cost of gathering speculative information for 
share trading is lower in those firms.  
Therefore, investee firms with greater information asymmetry and greater risk are 
less likely to have blockholders who seek control benefits,17 i.e., longer investment 
                                                 
17 Alternatively, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that monitoring managerial performance is more difficult 
in firms operating in unstable environment than those operating in stable environment. Therefore, the 
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horizons and lower blockholder turnover. In turn, they are more likely to have 
blockholders who seek trading profits, i.e., shorter investment horizons and higher 
blockholder turnover.  
H1 Holding all else constant, investee firms with higher risk and greater information  
asymmetry are more likely to have greater outside blockholder turnover. 
 
  
To acquire control of an investee firm, investors need to control a significant 
percentage of the investee firm’s voting shares. As investee firm size increases, the cost 
of acquiring any given fraction of ownership also increases. Therefore, it is costlier for 
the investors to accumulate enough shares to intervene in the management when the 
investee firm size is larger.18 This suggests that large firms are less likely to have 
investors who seek control benefits and more likely to have shorter-horizon blockholders, 
i.e., investors with greater turnover.  
H2 Holding all else constant, larger investee firms are more likely to have greater 
outside blockholder turnover.  
 
Share Liquidity 
Illiquid stocks tend to have greater bid-ask spreads, increasing the transaction 
costs of share trades (Falkenstein [1996]; Bushee and Noe [2000]; Gompers and Metrics 
[2001]). Although all outside blockholders would prefer high share liquidity, such 
liquidity will be more important to blockholders who turn over their portfolio more 
frequently than those who do not.  Falkenstein (1996) examines equity holdings of 
                                                                                                                                                 
noisier a firm’s environment, the greater the payoff to owners in maintaining tighter control. Based on this 
argument, they predict that firms transacting in noisier environment are likely to have more concentrated 
ownership. However, Demsetz and Lehn’s (1985) hypothesis does not consider investment horizons of 
shareholders. Instead, they assume that all shareholders have long-term horizons, and have an option to 
either delegate control to the management or to keep the control.  
18 Alternatively, smaller firms often have greater inside ownership, such as family-owned firms, and thus 
have greater intervention costs. To separate the firm size effect on outside blockholder turnover from the 
effect of inside ownership, I include both firm size and inside block ownership in the outside blockholder 
turnover model. 
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mutual funds (a class of investors with generally shorter investment horizons) and 
documents that mutual funds have a significant preference for stocks with high liquidity. 
Bushee and Noe (2000) find that transient institutional investors (shorter-horizon 
investors) prefer firms with high share liquidity, while dedicated institutional investors 
(longer-horizon investors) do not display such a preference. These results suggest that 
investee firms with greater share liquidity are more likely to attract shorter-horizon 
outside blockholders; i.e., they will experience greater blockholder turnover.   
 
H3 Holding all else constant, investee firms with greater share liquidity are likely to  
have higher outside blockholder turnover.  
 
 
Firm Performance  
Existing literature documents that poorly performing firms or firms that are 
expected to perform poorly (low growth firms) tend to attract activist shareholders who 
seek control benefits. Specifically, managers who fail to create shareholder value tend to 
be disciplined by large shareholders. Denis and Serrano (1996) report that management 
turnover increases significantly in poorly performing takeover target firms in which 
outside blockholders acquire an ownership stake. Bethel, Liebeskind and Opler (1998) 
report that activist blockholders who seek control benefits tend to choose investee firms 
with low market-to-book value of equity (low expected future performance), and argue 
that activist blockholders play an important role in the market for partial control.19 
                                                 
19 Jensen and Ruback (1983) define ‘corporate control’ as the right to determine management of corporate 
resources, that is, the right to hire, fire and set the compensation of top-level managers. The market for 
corporate control is usually referred to as the takeover market in which rival firms’ management teams 
compete for control. The takeover market is an important component of the external managerial labor 
market. In the transfer of corporate control through a takeover, a bidding firm usually acquires 100% of the 
target’s outstanding common stocks. In the transfer of partial control, however, a bidding firm (or investor) 
acquires less than 100% of the target’s ownership but may obtain effective control over the target by being 
a majority shareholder or the largest shareholder.   
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Similarly, Bushee and Noe (2000) show that longer-horizon institutional investors tend to 
prefer lower market-to-book investee firms. In contrast, short-horizon institutional 
investors (short-horizon investors) use momentum strategies extensively; i.e., they buy 
shares of firms with recent good performance and sell shares of firms with poor 
performance (Bushee [1998], [2001]; Dikolli, Kulp and Sedatole [2004]).  
These results suggest that longer-term investors target low growth firms with the 
intention of creating value through improved monitoring, whereas shorter-horizon 
investors target high growth firms with good recent performance to implement 
momentum trading strategies.   
H4 Holding all else constant, low growth firms tend to attract longer-horizon  
blockholders and therefore, experience lower blockholder turnover. In contrast, 
       high growth firms tend to attract shorter-horizon blockholders and therefore,  
experience higher blockholder turnover.  
 
 
Inside Ownership 
The relation between inside ownership (i.e., blocks owned by managers, directors, 
ESOP and affiliated entities) and outside blockholder turnover is unclear. On the one 
hand, the entrenchment hypothesis (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny [1988]) predicts that 
when managers own a substantial amount of the firm’s equity ownership, it is more 
difficult for outside blockholders to pressure management to change firm policy or to 
replace underperforming managers. Consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis, the 
ownership literature documents that inside ownership is negatively associated with the 
probability that the firm will be taken over ([Stulz [1988]; Dann and DeAngelo [1988]). 
Researchers in these studies argue that the presence of entrenched insiders deters changes 
in corporate control or partial corporate control. Therefore, the entrenchment hypothesis 
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suggests that investee firms with higher inside ownership are less attractive to outside 
blockholders who seek control benefits. In other words, blockholders in such firms are 
more likely to be investors with greater focus on trading profits.  
On the other hand, investee firms with large inside ownership tend to be smaller, 
with shares that are traded less frequently (lower share liquidity) and have greater 
transaction costs of trading. Therefore, inside block ownership is likely to deter shorter-
horizon outside blockholders who prefer liquid and lower transaction-cost shares. This 
argument suggests that investee firms with higher inside block ownership are less likely 
to have shorter-horizon outside blockholders who trade frequently.  
Because of the two opposing views on the relation between inside block 
ownership and outside blockholder turnover, I present the hypothesis in null form.   
H5 Holding all else constant, inside block ownership and outside blockholder  
turnover will have no systematic association.  
 
5.2 Univarite Analysis  
 
 As proxies of intervention costs (H1 & H2), share liquidity (H3) and firm 
performance (H4), I use nine firm characteristics: volatility of return on assets 
(ROASTD), volatility of stock returns (RETSTD), firm size (ASSET), the number of 
business segment (SEGNUM), share turnover rate (SHRTRN), the number of analysts 
forecasts (ESTNUM), firm age (AGE), market-to-book value of equity (MKTBV), and 
return on asset (ROA). I use inside block ownership as a measure of inside ownership 
(H5). Finally, I include the level (OUTBLK) and the concentration (HFOUT) of outside 
block ownership to examine how outside blockholder turnover is related to these two 
conventional ownership variables.  
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 As a preliminary examination, I group the sample firms into quintiles based on the 
firm characteristics20 and check how outside blockholder turnover rates vary across the 
quintiles. Table 4 Panels A-C report the results of the univariate analyses.  
First, the univariate results suggest that outside blockholder turnover is higher in 
firms with greater information asymmetry and higher firm risk (Table 4 Panel A).  
Specifically, information asymmetry and firm risk measured by return volatility 
(RETSTD) and earnings volatility (ROASTD) are positively associated with outside 
blockholder turnover. Outside blockholder turnover increases monotonically from 
22.45% (24.47%) for firms in the lowest quintile of ROASTD (RETSTD) to 33.95% 
(34.40%) for firms in the highest quintile of ROASTD (RETSTD). These results are 
consistent with Hypothesis 1. 
Second, to achieve control benefits, a blockholder needs a significant amount of 
share ownership in a firm. As firm size (ASSET) increases, the costs of acquiring and 
owning any given fraction of ownership also increase. Therefore, trading profits may 
become more attractive than control benefits as firm size increases (Hypothesis 2). 
Outside blockholder turnover is generally increasing in firm size (ASSET), supporting 
Hypothesis 2. The mean (median) turnover is 23.91% (21.47%) in the lowest quintile of 
firm size and 29.88% (27.11%) in the highest quintile of firm size (Panel A in Table 4). 
However, the number of business segments (SEGNUM in Panel B of Table 4), another 
proxy for firm size, does not show a systematic association with outside blockholder 
turnover in a univariate setting.  
                                                 
20 For inside block ownership, however, I use indicator variables for the presence of inside blocks (manager 
blocks and director blocks) because most firms do not have inside block ownership.   
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Third, outside blockholder turnover is higher in firms with greater share liquidity 
(SHRTN in Panel A in Table 4). Share liquidity, as measured by the ratio of annual share 
trading volume to total shares outstanding, is positively associated with outside 
blockholder turnover. The outside blockholder turnover rate increases from 14.83% in the 
lowest quintile of share liquidity to 37.13% in the highest quintile of share liquidity. This 
result strongly supports Hypothesis 3. Note that share liquidity measures turnover rate of 
all outstanding common stock, whereas outside blockholder turnover measure turnover 
rate of block shares owned by outside blockholders.   
Forth, recent accounting performance measured by return on assets (ROA) is 
negatively associated with outside blockholder turnover (Panel A in Table 4). For 
example, the mean outside blockholder turnover decreases from 32.27% in the lowest 
quintile of ROA to 25.10% in the highest quintile of ROA. This result is inconsistent with 
Hypothesis 4 which predicts higher outside blockholder turnover in firms with better 
recent performance.  
The number of earnings estimates by analysts (ESTNUM) proxies for either 
information asymmetry or expected future firm performance (Panel B of Table 4). On 
one hand, greater analyst following may lead to more firm-specific information available 
to the public. On the other hand, firms with good performance may attract more analysts 
(Lang, Lins and Miller [2003]). Based on the univariate analysis, outside blockholder 
turnover generally increases in ESTNUM. The mean (median) outside blockholder 
turnover is 21.40% (15.57%) in the lowest quintile of ESTNUM and 32.40% (21.22%) in 
the highest quintile of ESTNUM (Panel B in Table 4). This pattern suggests that shorter-
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horizon outside blockholders are more likely to choose firms that analysts expect to 
perform well. This result is consistent with Hypothesis 4.  
Market-to-book value of equity (MKT/BV), another proxy for expected future 
firm performance measure, demonstrates no systematic association with outside 
blockholder turnover. Taken together, the univariate results of ROA, ESTNUM and 
MKT/BV provide an inconclusive result for Hypothesis 4.  
Fifth, outside blockholder turnover tends be higher in younger, less established 
firms. Specifically, outside blockholder turnover is generally decreasing in firm age 
(AGE) measured by the number of firm years in CRSP (Falkenstein [1996]). Firms in the 
lowest age quintile have a mean (median) outside blockholder turnover rate of 32.81% 
(28.94%), while firms in the highest age quintile have a mean (median) outside 
blockholder turnover rate of 28.54% (23.24%) (Panel A in Table 4).   
Seventh, outside blockholder turnover shows a strong systematic association with 
the ownership structure of firms. Outside blockholder turnover has an increasing non-
monotonic relation with the level of outside block ownership (OUTBLK) and the 
concentration of outside block ownership (HFOUT). Specifically, outside blockholder 
turnover increases in the first three quintiles of both ownership variables but decreases in 
the last two quintiles. Given this result, I control for the level of outside ownership and 
the concentration of outside ownership in the multivariate analysis.  
Finally, outside blockholder turnover is significantly lower in firms with inside 
blockholders. The mean (median) outside blockholder turnover in firms with insider 
blockholder is 18.11 % (14.56%) whereas the mean (median) outside blockholder 
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turnover is 41.02% (37.05%) in firms with no inside blockholders. This result strongly 
supports Hypothesis 5. 
5.3 Multivariate Analysis   
5.3.1 Factor Analysis  
 
The univariate analyses in Section 5.2 identify nine firm attributes (excluding 
ownership variables) that are potentially associated with outside blockholder turnover. 
While the univariate results show that most of these variables are systematically 
associated with outside blockholder turnover, in many cases, these firm characteristics 
are significantly high (Table 5). Therefore, the manner in which they are related to 
outside blockholder turnover becomes unclear in a multivariate setting. For example, 
share turnover (SHRTN) and firm risk measured by earnings volatility (ROASTD) and 
return volatility (RETSTD) are highly correlated. The correlation between SHRTN and 
ROASTD is 0.47 (p <0.01), and the correlation between SHRTN and RETSTD is 0.66 
(p< 0.01). Likewise, the two risk measures have positive and significant associations with 
outside blockholder turnover in an OLS regression without SHRTN.  However, when 
SHRTN is included in the regression, the risk measures are no longer statistically 
significant.  
Therefore, I use factor analysis (principal component) to reduce these nine firm 
characteristics to a smaller set of factors that are statistically uncorrelated (Ittner and 
Larcker [1995]; Nagar [2002]). Three factors with eigenvalues greater than unity emerge 
from the analysis.  In order to aid interpretation of the resulting factors, I employ a 
Varimax rotation to form a simpler structure, and estimate factor scores for each firm. 
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The three factors together explain 65% of the total variance in the nine firm 
characteristics. Table 6.1 presents the factor loading coefficients.   
For Factor 1, the firm attributes with significant factor loading (i.e., those with an 
absolute value of factor loading > 0.50) are share turnover (SHRTN), earnings volatility 
(ROASTD) and stock return volatility (RETSTD). Share turnover (SHRTN) reflects 
overall liquidity of the firm’s stock. Firms with greater earnings volatility and stock 
return volatility are riskier firms with greater information asymmetry. The positive 
association between share liquidity and volatility of stock returns is consistent with 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) who analytically demonstrate that higher share liquidity 
leads to greater volatility of stock returns.  
Return on assets (ROA) is also highly loaded on the Factor 1, but the sign of the 
loading is negative. The negative loading is consistent with the negative correlation 
between ROA and the two performance volatility measures, ROASTD and RETSTD, as 
seen in Table 5. Specifically, ROA is negatively associated with both earnings volatility 
(ρ = -0.53) and stock return volatility (ρ = -0.28). These results are consistent with 
weaker operating performance being associated with greater firm risk, leading to greater 
variation in investors’ opinions on the firm value. Given the loadings above, I interpret 
Factor 1 as ‘Share Liquidity and Information Asymmetry’ (LQDITY/INFOCOST).  
Factor 2 shows significant loadings on the number of business segments 
(SEGNUM), firm age (AGE) and firm size (ASSETS). Firms with greater total assets and 
more complex asset structures are typically more established firms. Also, firms that have 
been listed in the stock market longer are likely to be more mature firms. Therefore, I 
interpret Factor 2 as ‘Size/Maturity’ (SIZE/MATURITY).  
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Factor 3 reflects significant loadings on the number of earnings forecasts by 
analysts (ESTNUM) and the market-to-book value of equity (MKT/BV).  ESTNUM and 
MKT/BV can proxy for either information asymmetry or expected future firm 
performance. Greater analyst following (higher ESTNUM) may lead to greater firm 
information available to the public (lower information asymmetry), or firms with greater 
expected performance may attract more analysts (Lang, Lins and Miller [2003]).  Higher 
market-to-book value of equity (MKT/BV) reflects either higher information asymmetry 
or greater expected future firm performance. The positive correlation between these two 
variables (ρ=0.23, Table 5) and their factor loadings on Factor 3 suggest that ESTNUM 
and MKT/BV proxy for expected firm performance rather than information asymmetry. 
Therefore, I interpret Factor 3 as ‘Performance’ (PERFM).  
As preliminary analysis for the association between outside blockholder turnover 
(OUTTURN) and the three factors, I examine Pearson correlations of among those 
variables (Table 6.2). Hypotheses 1 and 2 predict a positive association between 
intervention costs (measured by information asymmetry and firm size) and outside 
blockholder turnover. Hypothesis 3 predicts that firms with greater share liquidity will 
experience greater outside blockholder turnover.  Therefore, I expect Factor 1 
(Liquidity/Information Asymmetry) and Factor 2 (Size/Maturity) to be positively 
associated with outside blockholder turnover. Hypothesis 4 predicts a positive association 
between Factor 3 (Performance) and outside blockholder turnover. 
Consistent with the predictions, Factor 1 (Liquidity/Information Asymmetry) is 
positively associated with outside blockholder turnover rate (ρ = 0.22, p<0.01), and so is 
Factor 3 (Performance) (ρ = 0.17, p<0.01). The positive correlation between Factor 2 
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(Size/Maturity) and outside blockholder turnover (OUTTURN) is consistent with the 
prediction, but the correlation is not significantly different from zero at conventional 
level. The correlations generally support Hypotheses 1 to 4. 
5.3.2 Multivariate Estimation of Outside Blockholder Turnover 
 
In this section, I test Hypotheses 1 to 5 in a multivariate setting, using the three 
factors obtained from the factor analysis in Section 5.3.1. The three factors are 
Liquidity/Information Asymmetry (LQDITY/INFOCOST), firm size/maturity 
(SIZE/MATURITY) and firm performance (PERFM). The Hypotheses 1 to 4 predict a 
positive association between the three factors and outside blockholder turnover. To 
examine Hypothesis 5, I use inside block ownership which consists of block-shares 
owned by managers, directors, ESOP or affiliated entities could be systematically 
associated with outside blockholder turnover but the direction of the association is 
ambiguous. I also include the following control variables that are potentially associated 
with outside blockholder turnover.   
• Outside block ownership (OUTBLK): The aggregate level of outside block 
ownership may reflect outside blockholders’ intention to seek control benefits or 
their intention to seek profits from trades on their private information. Therefore, 
the relation between OUTBLK and outside blockholder turnover is ambiguous. 
Inclusion of this variable is, however, important because it will help disentangle 
the effect of ownership stake from the turnover measure. 
 
• Herfindahl Index of outside block ownership (HFOUT): The Herfindahl Index 
measures the concentration of outside block ownership. Investors who seek 
control benefits are more likely to acquire larger ownership stakes to enable them 
to influence the management of investee firm, and this will be reflected in the 
higher Herfindahl Index. Therefore, HFOUT and outside blockholder turnover 
should be negatively associated. Also similar to the reasoning above, inclusion of 
this variable is important to control for the effect of ownership dispersion. 
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• Regulated industries: Firms in the Telecommunication industry or in the Utility 
industry tend to be larger and have lower share liquidity. Therefore, firms in these 
industries tend to have lower outside block ownership as well as lower outside 
blockholder turnover (Table 3). I include indicator variables for the 
Telecommunication industry (TELDUM) and the Utility industry (UTILDUM) to 
control for the industry effects on outside blockholder turnover. 
 
These variables yield the following OLS regression. I use log transforms for the 
ownership variables because of their skewed distributions.  
  
log (1+OUTTURN)  = ϕ0 + λ1 LQDTY/INFOCOST + λ2 SIZE/MATURITY  + λ3 PERFM +  
                                                              
         λ4 log(1+INBLK)+ λ5 log(1+OUTBLK)+ λ6 HFOUT+ λ7 TELDUM +  
                                           
λ8 UTILDUM  
 
              
Model 1 in Table 7 reports a positive and significant coefficient for 
Liquidity/Information Asymmetry (LQDITY/INFOCOST) (t = 5.27), supporting 
Hypothesis 1. That is, firms with higher information asymmetry attract outside 
blockholders who tend to maximize their share value by trading on their private 
information (higher turnover) rather than outside blockholders who seek control benefits 
through improved monitoring (lower turnover). Size/Maturity (SIZE/MATURITY) does 
not have a statistically significant association with outside blockholder turnover (t =0.78). 
Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is not supported.  The positive association between outside 
blockholder turnover and Liquidity/Information Asymmetry (LQDITY/INFOCOST) is 
consistent with Hypothesis 3. That is, shorter-horizon blockholders prefers firms with 
greater share liquidity which could contribute to greater increases in their net-trading 
profits.21  
                                                 
21 One may argue that share liquidity and outside blockholder turnover measure the same attribute, i.e., 
share turnover rate. However, share liquidity explains only 8% of total variation in outside blockholder 
turnover in the OLS regression (the result is not reported). Besides, outside blockholder turnover is more 
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Performance (PERFM) is positively associated with outside blockholder turnover 
(t=4.88). This result supports Hypothesis 4 which predicts that longer-horizon outside 
blockholders (i.e., those with lower turnover rates) target poorly performing firms with 
the intention to improve long-term firm value via intervention in the management.  These 
results of the three factors (Liquidity/Information Asymmetry, Size/Maturity and 
Performance) stay qualitatively the same after including inside block ownership and other 
control variables (Models 2 and 3 in Table 7).  
To examine the association between outside blockholder turnover and other 
dimensions of bock ownership structure, I first add the level of inside block ownership 
(INBLK) to Model 1 (Model 2 in Table 7). I then additionally include two outside block 
ownership variables:  the level of outside block ownership (OUTBLK) and the 
concentration of outside block ownership measured by the Herfindahl Index (HFOUT) 
(Model 3 in Table 7). The negative and highly significant coefficients on inside block 
ownership (INBLK) in both Models 2 and 3 in Table 7 support the argument in 
Hypothesis 5 that investors with shorter investment horizons avoid firms with greater 
inside block ownership due to lower share liquidity and higher transaction costs.  
In Table 7 Model 3, both the level of outside block ownership (OUTBLK) and the 
concentration of outside block ownership (HFOUT) have positive coefficients, but they 
are not significantly different from zero at conventional levels. In other words, after 
controlling for inside ownership (INBLK) and other firm characteristics, neither the level 
(OUTBLK), nor the concentration of outside block ownership (HFOUT) explains outside 
blockholder turnover. This result is consistent with the perspective that outside 
                                                                                                                                                 
closely correlated with inside block ownership (ρ = -0.61) than with share liquidity ((ρ = 0.34) (Table 5). 
These results suggest that outside blockholder turnover is not the same as overall share turnover rate.  
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blockholder turnover captures a fundamentally different dimension of outside block 
ownership from that of the level of block ownership (OUTBLK) or the concentration of 
outside block ownership (HFOUT). An important implication of this result is that outside 
block ownership needs to be evaluated in terms of its horizon as well as the level and the 
concentration.  
Finally, the adjusted R2 of model 3 in Table 7 (adjusted R2 = 0.39) demonstrates 
that Liquidity/Information Asymmetry (LQDITY/INFOCOST), Performance (PERFM), 
and the level of inside block ownership (INBLK) together explain an economically 
significant portion of the total variation in outside blockholder turnover. This result 
implies that the investment horizons of outside blockholders depend significantly on 
investee firm characteristics. Additionally, it also explains the observation in Appendix 1 
that block holding periods vary not only across different investors, but also across 
investee firms in an investor’s portfolio. In other words, to the extent that there is cross-
sectional variation in investee firm characteristics within an outside blockholder’s 
portfolio, the outside blockholder’s investment horizon will also vary accordingly. 
Overall, the results demonstrate that outside blockholder turnover is higher in 
firms with higher information asymmetry, greater share liquidity and higher growth. 
Inside block ownership significantly deters outside blockholder turnover, whereas the 
level and the concentration of outside block ownership have no significant effect on 
outside blockholder turnover. These results have two important implications for studies 
on ownership. First, the results suggest that outside block ownership should be evaluated 
along three dimensions of outside block ownership. They are the level of outside block 
ownership, the concentration of outside block ownership and the investment horizons of 
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outside blockholders. Second, horizons of outside blockholders are significantly 
determined by characteristics of the firms in which the outside blockholders invest. 
Therefore, without accounting for the potential endogeneity of outside blockholder 
horizons, the relation between outside blockholder horizons and governance of investee 
firms could be spurious.  
In Chapter 6, I examine how firms design CEO compensation contracts in 
response to the different investment horizons of outside blockholders. Based on the 
results in Chapter 5, I include the three dimensions of outside block ownership (the level 
of outside block ownership, the concentration of outside block ownership and the 
investment horizons of outside blockholders) in the CEO compensation regression. To 
account for the potential endogeneity of outside blockholder turnover, I then employ two-
stage simultaneous estimation approach.  
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CHAPTER 6  
OUTSIDE BLOCKHOLDER TURNOVER AND CEO COMPENSATION 
 
Chapter 5 concludes that attributes of an investee firm influence outside 
blockholders’ decisions about their investment horizons for the investee firm by affecting 
the outside blockholders’ monitoring  cost-benefit trade-offs.  
I argue that the investee firms, in response, take into account the outside 
blockholders’ horizons when designing their CEO compensation contracts in ways that 
are consistent with the optimal mitigation of agency conflicts. To test this argument, this 
chapter examines how outside blockholder turnover is associated with investee firms’ use 
of incentives for their CEOs. In isolating the effect of outside blockholder turnover on 
CEO incentives, I control for the potential effect of the level and the concentration of 
outside block ownership on CEO incentives. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 develops 
hypotheses, and Section 6.2 provides univariate analyses. Section 6.3 discusses 
multivariate analyses including model specifications and results.  
6.1 Hypotheses  
        A firm owner can influence the behavior of managers in the firm by using a 
variety of mechanisms including monitoring22 and incentive contracting. Shareholder 
monitoring includes various shareholder activities that aim to directly or indirectly 
                                                 
22 I do not include external monitoring by stock market, labor market or product market in the shareholder 
monitoring.  
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influence management decisions. Examples of shareholder monitoring activities include 
gathering information about managerial performance, conducting private negotiations 
with management, soliciting shareholder proposals, initiating litigation against the 
management, and in an extreme situation, mounting a proxy contest to replace the current 
management (Del Guercio and Hawkins [1999)]; Shleifer and Vishny [1986]; Bethel, 
Liebeskind and Opler [1998]). Managerial incentives can be either financial or non-
financial. However, the agency theory literature primarily focuses on periodical financial 
compensation.   
While monitoring and incentive contracting mitigate the agency problem, they are 
also costly to the owners. For example, monitoring requires shareholders to commit time 
and resources on the monitoring activities. In addition, Chidambaran and John [1999] 
argue that an owner bears monitoring cost in the form of reduced liquidity. Similarly, 
incentive contracting can also be costly. For example, imposing financial risk on a risk-
averse manager through incentive compensation requires that the owner pay the manager 
a risk premium for the financial risk that the manager bears. Therefore, the owner will 
determine an optimal mix of monitoring and incentive compensation based on the 
marginal cost-benefit trade-off of each mechanism (Core, Guay and Larcker [2003]; 
Hartzell and Starks [2003]).   
Large shareholders, such as outside blockholders, have better access to the 
management of the investee firms and to more firm-specific information than other 
investors in the market can obtain (Shleifer and Vishny [1986]; Kahn and Winton [1998]; 
Heflin and Shaw [2000]). They can potentially use this advantage either to intervene in 
management of the investee firm to enhance long-term firm value (control benefits) or to 
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seek short-term profits from share trades (trading profits) (Kahn and Winton [1998]). The 
two strategies generally involve different investment horizons. Pursuing control benefits 
generally requires longer investment horizons, whereas pursuing trading profits generally 
involve shorter investment horizons. 
Large shareholders who seek control benefits are more likely to invest time and 
resources in investee firm monitoring because their investment strategy is to maximize 
their portfolio value by intervening in investee firm management or providing improved 
monitoring of managerial performance. Accordingly, investee firms with large 
shareholders who seek control benefits are likely to rely more on shareholder monitoring 
than on incentive contracting when inducing desirable actions of managers. 
Large shareholders who seek trading profits are less likely to expand time and 
resources on investee firm monitoring because they improve their portfolio value by 
trading on their superior information rather than by providing direct monitoring of 
investee firm management. Further, due to their frequent share turnover for trading 
profits, these outside blockholders have less time to learn about the firm to provide 
effective monitoring. Therefore, investee firms with large shareholders who seek trading 
profits (i.e., shareholders with shorter investment horizons) tend to rely more on incentive 
contracting than on shareholder monitoring when aligning managers’ interest with those 
of shareholders. Additionally, as the investee firms impose more compensation risk on 
their managers through the increased incentives, they must also increase the risk premium 
that they pay to the managers (Holmstrom [1979]).  
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The preceding argument yields the following hypothesis:  
H1 Holding all else constant, firms with higher outside blockholder turnover are  
likely to design CEO compensation with greater pay-performance sensitivity and  
a higher level of CEO compensation.  
 
Firms frequently use stock returns and earnings as performance measures for 
CEO incentives. Murphy (2000) documents that while his sample firms use a variety of 
financial and non-financial measures for executive compensation, almost all of the 
sample firms rely on some accounting performance measures. Equity-based 
compensation directly links CEO incentives to stock returns. For a sample of firms in the 
period 1993-2000, Core and Guay (2003) find that the majority of CEO compensation is 
in the form of equity incentives.  
Agency theory suggests that the relative weight placed on stock returns and 
earnings in determining CEO compensation is inversely related to the noise in each 
performance measure (Banker and Datar [1989]; Lambert [2001]; Bushman and Smith 
[2001]). Empirical studies support this prediction. For example, Lambert and Larcker 
(1987) show that firms rely more on stock-based compensation when accounting 
measures are noisy, and Yermack (1995) documents that CEO compensation is more 
sensitive to stock returns in companies with noisier accounting data. 
A line of literature suggests that short horizons of investors may encourage 
earnings management by managers of investee firms. Bushee (1998) and Dikolli, Kulp 
and Sedatole (2004) argue that trading decisions of shorter horizon institutional investors 
are more sensitive to current earnings than longer horizon investors. Similarly, Jacobs 
(1991) and Porter (1992) contend that because short-horizon investors make trading 
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decisions in response to current earnings, managers of firms dominated by short-horizon 
investors have a greater incentive to take actions to manage current earnings.   
Earnings are generally more subject to management discretion than are stock 
returns. Further, shareholder monitoring tends to be weaker in firms with higher 
monitoring costs (Kahn and Winton [1998]) and in firms dominated by shareholders with 
shorter investment horizons (Bushee [1998]; Gaspar, Massa, and Matos [2004]). These 
results suggest that the earnings of investee firms with higher monitoring costs and 
greater outside blockholder turnover (shorter investment horizons) are likely to be noisier 
and less informative about long-term firm value, and hence less useful for contracting. 
Such concerns will lead the investee firms with shorter-horizon blockholders to rely more 
on stock returns than on earnings. 
 Providing an alternative reason, Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) also predict that 
firms with shorter-horizon shareholders put greater weight on stock returns than on 
accounting earnings in managerial incentive contracts. They postulate that greater share 
liquidity of investee firms helps speculators (shorter-horizon investors) maximize their 
trading profits from their private information, and thus encourages the speculators to 
acquire more information23 about investee firms. This increased information flow into the 
market improves the information content of the investee firms’ stock price. That is, stock 
price of these investee firms is more informative about managerial performance.  
                                                 
23 Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) classify information into “strategic information” and “speculative 
information”. Strategic information is information that indicates a better course of action for the investee 
firm but is useless unless acted on. Speculative information simply helps to predict the future value of the 
investee firm, and is useful only for trading purposes (Holmstrom and Tirole [1993], p699). Therefore, 
shorter-horizon investors who seek trading profits will seek speculative information but not strategic 
information. 
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While the two views take a different position on how investment horizons of 
investors influence information content of the two performance measures,  both predict 
that investee firms with shorter horizon shareholders will put more weight on stock 
returns than on accounting earnings for the managerial incentives.  
 
H2 Holding all else constant, firms with higher outside blockholder turnover are 
more likely to increase CEO pay-performance sensitivity by increasing the weight  
on stock returns relative to the weight on accounting earnings in CEO  
compensation.  
 
To summarize, Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 above predict that investee firms 
use incentive contracting as an alternative governance mechanism to outside 
blockholders’ monitoring activities. Further, they rely more on stock returns than 
accounting based measures to provide incentives. To test these hypotheses, I conduct 
univariate analyses in Section 6.2 and multivariate analyses in Section 6.3. 
6.2 Univariate Analysis 
 
This section examines how outside blockholder turnover and traditional 
dimensions of block ownership are associated with the level, structure, and sensitivity of 
CEO compensation in a univariate setting (Table 9).  I use the outside blockholder 
turnover rate (OUTTURN) to reflect the investment horizons of outside block ownership. 
In addition I use percentage of the total shares owned by all outside blockholders 
(OUTBLK) to reflect the level of outside block ownership and the Herfindahl Index of 
outside block ownership (HFOUT) to measure the dispersion of outside block ownership. 
For insider ownership, I use dummy variables for the presence of director blockholders 
(DIRBLK) and manager blockholders (MGRBLK). As shown in Table 3, most sample 
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firms do not have manager block ownership (MGRBLK) or director block ownership 
(DIRBLK), resulting in highly skewed distributions of those variables. Likewise, the 
median ownership size is zero for both MGRBLK and DIRBLK. Therefore, I use 
indicator variables for manager block ownership and director block ownership instead of 
treating them as continuous variables.  
For CEO compensation, I use two measures of the CEO compensation level (total 
CEO compensation and CEO cash compensation) and two measures of CEO pay-
performance sensitivity (the ratio of stock options granted to total CEO compensation and 
∆OPTION). Total CEO compensation (TCOMP) is the total payments made to a CEO for 
the fiscal year ($000), including salary, bonus, stock options granted and all other 
compensation. Cash compensation (CASH) is the sum of salary and cash bonus ($000) 
for the year. The ratio of stock options granted to total CEO compensation 
(OPTIONS/TCOMP) measures the extent to which a CEO’s total compensation is tied to 
stock performance. ∆OPTION is the change in the value of options granted during the 
fiscal year per $1,000 in shareholder wealth (Yermack [1995]; Hartzell and Starks 
[2003]).  
Outside Blockholder Turnover  
Table 9 Panel A shows that total CEO compensation (TCOMP) and the 
proportion of CEO compensation in the form of stock options (OPTIONS/TCOMP) are 
generally increasing in outside blockholder turnover. Likewise, ∆OPTION is also 
increasing in outside blockholder turnover. The mean (median) total CEO compensation 
in the lowest quintile of outside blockholder turnover is $4.134 million ($1.064 million) 
versus $4.890 million ($3.273 million) in the highest quintile. The mean value of 
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OPTIONS/TCOMP increases from 24.8% to 43.4% as outside blockholder turnover 
increases from the lowest quintile to the highest quintile. Similarly, ∆OPTION increases 
from 1.416 in the lowest quintile to 2.438 in the highest quintile. These results strongly 
support Hypothesis 1. 
In contrast, the proportion of cash compensation (CASH/TCOMP) decreases in 
outside blockholder turnover. CEOs of firms in the lowest quintile of outside blockholder 
turnover receive 55.8% (54.4%) of their mean (median) total compensation in cash 
(CASH/ TCOMP), while CEOs of firms in the highest quintile receive only 35.6% 
(33.9%) of total compensation in cash.  These results are further supported by the 
correlations in Table 8. Specifically, outside blockholder turnover (OUTTURN) is 
positively associated with TCOMP (ρ = 0.06), OPTIONS/TCOMP (ρ = 0.24), and 
∆OPTION (ρ = 0.10). However, it is significantly negatively correlated with 
CASH/TCOMP (ρ = -0.27). These results indicate that larger total CEO compensation in 
firms with greater outside blockholder turnover result from larger option-based CEO 
compensation rather than larger cash-based CEO compensation. Given that cash-based 
incentives are typically based on accounting earnings, this result supports the prediction 
of Hypothesis 2 that firms with higher outside blockholder turnover will rely more on 
stock returns than accounting earnings to provide CEO incentives. 
Figure 1 summarizes the above univariate analyses in the bar graph. The height of 
each bar represents median total CEO compensation for each quintile of outside 
blockholder turnover. The stacked blocks in each bar reflect components of the median 
total CEO compensation. The median total CEO compensation steadily increases from 
$1.064 million to $3.273 million as outside blockholder turnover rate increases from the 
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lowest quintile to the highest quintile. The graph shows that the increase in median total 
CEO compensation is primarily due to the increase in stock options granted. The median 
value of options granted is $346,000 in the lowest quintile of outside blockholder 
turnover and $1,282,000 in the highest quintile of outside blockholder turnover. Salary 
and cash bonus do not change significantly across different quintiles of outside 
blockholder turnover rates.  
Overall, the univariate analyses indicate that firms with shorter horizon outside 
blockholders employ incentive structures with greater CEO pay-performance sensitivity. 
They do so by relying more on option-based incentives rather than cash-based incentives. 
Further, they pay larger total CEO compensation to offset the greater compensation risk 
imposed on their CEOs. These results are consistent with both Hypotheses 1 and 2.  
Level and Concentration of Outside Block Ownership 
Researchers typically use the size of ownership stake measured by the level and 
the concentration of share ownership as a proxy for the amount of shareholder monitoring 
in a firm. For example, Hartzell and Starks (2003) use the level and the concentration of 
institutional share ownership in an investee firm as a proxy for amount of monitoring by 
institutional investors. To be consistent with the literature, besides the outside 
blockholder turnover, I examine both the level of total outside block ownership 
(OUTBLK) and the concentration of outside block ownership as measured by the 
Herfindahl Index of outside block ownership (HFOUT).  
To the extent that larger outside block ownership reflects greater monitoring 
incentives of the outside blockholders, agency theories predict that both the level of 
outside block ownership (OUTBLK) and the concentration of block ownership (HFOUT) 
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are negatively associated with pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation. 
Because smaller pay-performance sensitivity imposes less compensation risk, agency 
theories further predict that the level and the concentration of outside block ownership is 
negatively associated with the level of total CEO compensation.  
Panels B and C in Table 9 show the univariate analyses relating the level of 
outside block ownership (OUTBLK) and the concentration of outside block ownership 
(HFOUT) to CEO compensation characteristics. The option-based CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity increases in the level of outside block ownership (OUTBLK).  Specifically, 
the mean OPTIONS/TCOMP increases 30.5% in the lowest quintile of OUTBLK to 
39.2% in the highest quintile of OUTBLK. Similarly, the mean ∆OPTION is 1.242 in the 
lowest quintile of OUTBLK but 2.860 in the highest quintile of OUTBLK. This result is 
inconsistent with agency theories that predict a negative association between incentives 
and shareholder monitoring. One potential explanation of this result is that the level of 
outside block ownership does not necessarily reflect the amount of outside block 
ownership. For example, an investee firm has large total block ownership, but its block 
ownership is owned by investors who have shorter investment horizons and seek trading 
profits. In this case, the aggregate level of outside block ownership reflects shorter 
investment horizons of the outside blockholders rather than aggregate amount of their 
monitoring incentives. 
The more direct proxy for outside blockholders’ monitoring incentives is 
concentration of outside block ownership (HFOUT) because an investor who intents to 
seek control of firm are more likely to acquire larger block ownership. Consistent with 
this view, the results for OPTIONS/TCOMP in Panel C of Table 9 show that the option-
 76
based CEO pay-performance sensitivity decreases in the concentration of outside block 
ownership (HFOUT). That is,  as the concentration of outside block ownership (HFOUT) 
increases from the lowest quintile to the highest quintile, the mean value of 
OPTIONS/TCOMP decreases from 38.1% to 32.1%, and the mean value of ∆OPTIONS 
decreases from 2.420 to 1.832  (Panel C in Table 9). These results for HFOUT indicate 
that more concentrated ownership stakes tend to be associated with a reduction in the 
need to impose greater compensation risks on CEO (resulting in smaller amount of 
incentives).   
The proportion of CEO compensation in cash (CASH/TCOMP) decreases in 
OUTBLK but does not have any systematic association with HFOUT. Total CEO 
compensation shows no systematic pattern in either OUTBLK or HFOUT.  
Presence of Inside Block Ownership 
Table 9 Panels D and E characterize CEO compensation as a function of the 
presence (absence) of inside block ownership. Panel D shows that, on average, firms with 
director blockholders (DIRBLK) pay their CEO less (mean $3.107 million) than do firms 
without director blockholders (mean $4.487 million). However, the two groups of firms 
do not demonstrate any significant difference in the structure of compensation or option 
based pay-performance sensitivity.  This result suggests that firms with greater 
shareholder monitoring proxied by director block ownership pay smaller total CEO 
compensation without decreasing pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation. 
 Similarly, Panel E of Table 9 shows that firms with manager blockholders pay 
smaller total CEO compensation ($3.334 millions) than do firms without manager 
blockholders ($4.504 millions). Additionally, these firms pay a greater proportion of 
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CEO compensation in cash than do firms without manager blockholders. The average 
value of the CASH/TCOMP is 55.1% for firms with manager blockholders versus 41.4% 
for firms without managerial blockholders. In contrast, firms with manager blockholders 
have a smaller fraction of CEO compensation in options (28.6%) than do firms without 
manager blockholders (37.0%). This result suggests that CEOs with high stock ownership 
already have enough incentive to maximize firm value, and thus the firms do not need to 
impose additional compensation risk on the CEOs and to pay larger total CEO 
compensation.  
 Overall, the univariate analyses support Hypotheses 1 and 2. Specifically, firms 
with higher outside blockholder turnover tend to have greater CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity and the larger total CEO compensation. The greater CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity is from option-based incentives but not from cash-based incentives which is 
often linked to accounting earnings. I re-examine these results in a multivariate setting in 
Section 6.3  
6.3 Multivariate Analysis of CEO Compensation and Outside Blockholder Turnover 
6.3.1 Regression Model 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that firms with greater outside blockholder turnover will 
have greater CEO pay-performance sensitivity and larger total CEO compensation. 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the greater CEO pay-performance sensitivity will be achieved 
primarily by increasing the weight on stock returns relative to accounting earnings in 
CEO compensation. To test these hypotheses, I first estimate the determinants of CEO 
compensation in Equation (1) using OLS.  However, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, 
outside blockholder turnover (OUTTURN) varies systematically with investee firm 
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characteristics (i.e., firm risk, information asymmetry, share liquidity, performance and 
inside block ownership). Additionally, anecdotal evidence demonstrates that investors 
have strong preferences for particular features of CEO compensation contracts.24 In 
particular, this anecdotal evidence suggests that investors with shorter investment 
horizons prefer firms with greater CEO pay-performance sensitivities. Together with the 
results in Chapter 5, this evidence supports the perspective that an investee firm’s 
blockholder turnover will be endogenously determined as a function of investee firm 
characteristics and also the investee firm’s design of CEO compensation contracts. 
Therefore, to capture the simultaneous determination of blockholder turnover and CEO 
compensation design, I next re-estimate the effect of outside blockholder turnover on 
CEO compensation using simultaneous equations (1) and (2) below. Several key 
variables, such as block ownership, firm size and stock options have skewed 
distributions. Therefore, I use log transformations for those variables. 
CEO Compensation 
                                                                        
log (COMP) =  α0  + β1log(1+OUTTURN) + β2 log(1+OUTBLK) + β3HFOUT + β4MGRDUM + 
 
β5 DIRDUM + β6 CEOTURN  +  β7 log(ASSET) + β8[log(ASSET)]2  +  
                                                                                      
               β9 log (LEV) + β10 log (DIV) + β11 log (BETA ) + β12 log (IDIORISK) +  
 
β13 ROA + β14 ADJRET + β15 log (MKTBV) + β16 (ROA*HITURN) +  
                                                                                            11 
β17 (ADJRET*HITURN) + Σ  γm Industry dummy   + ε……………………… (1)                                   
                                                                             m = 1 
    
   (Where m denotes Fama-French industry  portfolio dummies 1 through 11 and ε denotes   
  random error ) 
 
 
                                                 
24 For example, according to Pearl Meyer & Partners (a New York based consulting firm dedicated to 
executive compensation strategies), about 90% (58%) of the fund managers who participated in their 2002 
(1998) survey responded that when making investment decisions, companies’ CEO compensation practices 
factor into their investment decisions (Source: Mutual Fund Market News, July 15, 2002). 
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Outside Blockholder Turnover                                       
log (1+OUTTURN)  = ϕ0 + λ1log(COMP) + λ2LQDTY/INFOCOST + λ3SIZE/MATURITY  +  
 
        λ4PERFM + λ5 log(1+INBLK)+ λ6 TELDUM + λ7 UTILDUM + ν ….. (2) 
 
   (Whereν denotes random error ) 
 
 
 In Equation (1), COMP is the natural log of the various CEO compensation 
measures (i.e., OPTIONS/TCOMP, ∆OPTION, TCOMP and CASH). To capture the 
effect of outside blockholder turnover on CEO compensation, I include outside 
blockholder turnover (OUTTURN) as the key variable of interest. Prior studies document 
that the size of ownership stake is systematically associated with CEO incentive 
compensation (Mehran [1995]; Hartzell and Starks [2003]). To control for the effect of 
ownership size and different monitoring incentives of blockholders, I include two 
additional dimensions of outside block ownership (OUTBLK, HFOUT) and indicator 
variables for manager blocks (MGRDUM) and director blocks (DIRDUM). OUTBLK is 
the level of outside block ownership, and HFOUT is the concentration of outside block 
ownership as measured by the Herfindahl Index of outside block ownership.  
Beside ownership characteristics, I include control variables that existing 
literature on executive compensation finds to be cross-sectionally related to the level and 
the structure of CEO compensation. For example, CEO turnover (CEOTURN) often 
results in significant fluctuations in CEO compensation because of severance payments to 
the exiting CEO or a hiring bonus paid to the incoming CEO. Therefore, I include the 
number of CEO changes over the four year period (CEOTURN) to control for the effect 
of CEO turnover. 
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Ceteris paribus, the larger the size of the company, the greater the discretion that 
management has to influence shareholder wealth (Demsetz and Lehn [1985]; Core, 
Holthausen and Larcker [1999]). Therefore, larger firms are more likely to rely on 
incentive compensation than are smaller firms to align the interests of managers and 
shareholders. This argument predicts that firm size (ASSET) is positively associated with 
both CEO pay-performance sensitivity and the level of CEO compensation. To the extent 
that leverage (LEV) reflects agency costs between shareholders and debt-holders (Jansen 
and Meckling [1976]), firms with higher leverage will encourage their CEOs to engage in 
risky projects and will pay a greater proportion of CEO compensation in the form of 
stock options. Therefore, I expect a positive association between leverage and the pay-
performance sensitivity of CEO option compensation (OPTIONS/TCOMP and 
∆OPTION). Firms that pay dividends (DIV) tend to be more mature firms with greater 
cash flows, and thus are expected to be negatively associated with equity-based CEO 
compensation (Smith and Watts [1992]).  
Idiosyncratic firm risk (IDIORISK) reflects the volatility of a firm’s operating 
environment, and the ratio of market-to-book value of equity (MKTBV) is often used as a 
proxy for investment opportunities (Smith and Watts [1992]). To the extent that a volatile 
operating environment and investment opportunities are associated with greater 
complexity of managerial tasks and larger managerial discretion, IDIORISK and 
MKTBV will be positively associated with CEO pay-performance sensitivity and the 
level of CEO compensation (Talmor and Wallace [2002]). Agency theory suggests that 
the level of CEO compensation is positively associated with firm performance such as 
return on assets (ROA) or market adjusted stock returns (ADJRET), and so I also include 
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these variables as controls. Finally, I include industry dummy variables because the use 
of option plans varies significantly across industries (Core, Guay and Larcker [2003]).  
To estimate outside blockholder turnover in Equation (2), I use the regression 
model developed in Chapter 5. Full descriptions of all the variables used in the models 
are in Appendix 3. 
6.3.2 Results 
 
Stock Option based Pay-Performance Sensitivity 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that investee firms with greater blockholder turnover will 
tend to display higher CEO pay-performance sensitivity and correspondingly greater total 
CEO compensation. 
OPTIONS/TCOMP, the ratio of stock options granted to total CEO compensation, 
and ∆OPTION, the change in option value per $1000 shareholder wealth, measure CEO 
pay-performance sensitivity. Tables 10 and 11 report the regression results for these two 
CEO pay-performance sensitivity measures.  
The OLS regression results in Table 10 Panel A show that outside blockholder 
turnover (OUTTURN) is positively associated with OPTIONS/TCOMP (t = 3.71) after 
controlling for other dimensions of block ownership and various economic determinants 
of CEO compensation. The result of simultaneous equation estimation (Table 10 Panel B) 
further supports the OLS regression result. The estimated coefficient on OUTTURN in 
Panel B is 0.49, and is statistically significant at p<0.01 (t = 5.04). These results suggest 
that firms with higher outside blockholder turnover use stock options more extensively 
for CEO compensation, thereby increasing CEO pay-performance sensitivity.  
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The results in Table 10 are further supported by the results for ∆OPTION in Table 
11. The estimated coefficients (0.46 in the OLS estimation and 0.78 in the two-stage 
simultaneous estimation) on outside blockholder turnover (OUTTURN) are positive and 
statistically significant at p < 0.01. These results provide strong evidence that option-
based pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation increases as outside 
blockholder turnover increases, supporting Hypothesis 1. This implies that investee firms 
rely more on incentive compensation contracting when facing limited monitoring by 
shorter-horizon outside blockholders.  
Consistent with the results of univariate tests (Table 9 Panels B and C), the 
multivariate results in Tables 10 and 11 indicate that the option-based CEO pay-
performance sensitivity (OPTONS/TCOMP, ∆OPTION) is negatively associated with the 
concentration of outside block ownership (HFOUT) but positively associated with the 
level of outside block ownership (OUTBLK). The negative coefficients on HFOUT in 
OPTIONS/TCOMP (-0.07, t = -2.52) and in ∆OPTION (-0.25, t = -3.14) are consistent 
with the agency prediction that when concentrated ownership yields increased 
monitoring, firms can rely less on costly incentive compensation to motivate CEOs 
(Panel B in Tables 10 and 11). However, the positive coefficients on OUTBLK (Panel B 
in Tables 10 and 11) are inconsistent with the agency prediction.   
A potential explanation for the positive coefficients of OUTBLK is that the level 
of outside block ownership may not necessarily proxy the aggregate amount of outside 
blockholders’ monitoring incentives. The sub-sample results in Appendix 1 suggest that 
large blockholders hold a significant portion of their portfolio less then one year. Further, 
the primary source of blockholder turnover is outside blockholders (Table 1). 
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Specifically, the results in Table 1 show that 92%-94% of blockholder turnover involves 
outside blockholders. These results suggest that outside blockholders dominate a typical 
investee firm’s blockholder turnover rate, and outside blockholders frequently act as 
short-horizon investors. Therefore, higher level of outside block ownership in an investee 
firm may reflect the outside blockholders’ general preference for firms with greater CEO 
pay-performance sensitivity rather than aggregate amount of their long-term monitoring 
incentives.  
In a parallel study, Hartzell and Starks (2003) find that both the level and the 
concentration of institutional ownership are positively associated with pay-performance 
sensitivity of top five executive officers’ (and CEO’s) compensation. They argue that the 
positive coefficient on the level of institutional ownership reflects the institutional 
investors’ preference for firms with high powered incentives on managerial compensation 
contracts. Further, based on the positive association between the concentration of 
institutional ownership and the executive (or CEO) pay-performance sensitivity, they 
conclude that institutional investors use incentive compensation as part of their 
monitoring activities; i.e., incentive contracting and monitoring complement to each other   
The effects of the two inside block ownership dummy variables are rather 
ambiguous because the sign and significance of the two variables are sensitive to 
estimation methods. The presence of manager blocks (MGRDUM) is generally 
insignificantly associated with both OPTIONS/TCOMP and ∆OPTION (Tables 10 and 
11). The presence of director block (DIRDUM) has a statistically significant positive 
association with OPTIONS/TCOMP and ∆OPTION in the two-stage simultaneous 
 84
estimation (Panel B in Tables 10 and 11). However, the coefficients of DIRDUM are 
insignificant in the OLS estimation. (Panel A, Tables10 and 11). 
Pay-Performance Sensitivity of Total Compensation and Cash Compensation 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that CEO compensation will be more sensitive to firm 
performance when outside blockholder turnover is higher. Further, Hypothesis 2 predicts 
that firms with higher outside blockholder turnover will relate CEO compensation more 
to stock returns than to accounting earnings. To test these two hypotheses for total CEO 
compensation and cash compensation, I include two interaction terms, 
[ADJRET*HITURN] and [ROA*HITURN], in the total CEO compensation and Cash 
compensation models. HITURN is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 for all 
firms with above median outside blockholder turnover. ADJRET is the investee firm’s 
stock return adjusted by the CRSP value-weighted market return, and ROA is earnings 
performance measured by return on assets. Coefficients of [ADJRET*HITURN] and 
[ROA*HITURN] indicate how the sensitivity of total CEO compensation (or CEO cash 
compensation) to the two performance measures, ADJRET and ROA, changes as the 
level of outside blockholder turnover increases from low (HITURN = 0) to high 
(HITURN = 1). 
Panel B in Table 12 shows the pay-performance sensitivity of total CEO 
compensation (TCOMP) in the simultaneous estimation. The coefficients on ADJRET  
(-0.07, t = -0.59) and ROA (1.31, t = 2.66) suggest that when outside blockholder 
turnover is low (HITURN = 0), firms rely more on accounting earnings (ROA) and less 
on stock returns (ADJRET) in CEO compensation. The total coefficient on ADJRET 
when outside blockholder turnover is high (HITURN =1) is 0.49 (i.e., the sum of  
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-0.07 for ROA and +0.56 for [ADJRET*HITURN]). This positive total estimated effect 
is significantly different from zero at the p<0.01 level. When outside blockholder 
turnover is high (HITURN =1), the total coefficient of ROA is -0.25 (i.e., sum of 1.31 for 
ROA and -0.56 for [ROA*HITURN]). However, the total estimated effect is not 
statistically significantly different from zero. In other words, when outside blockholder 
turnover is high, firms rely more on stock returns (ADJRET) and less on accounting 
earnings (ROA) in total CEO compensation. These results generally hold in the OLS 
estimation (Panel A in Table 12). For pay-performance sensitivity of total CEO 
compensation (or CEO cash compensation), investee firms put more weight on 
accounting earnings than on stock returns when outside blockholder turnover is low but 
do the opposite when outside blockholder is high.  
In the two-stage simultaneous estimation in Table 13 Panel B, the results on the 
pay-performance sensitivity of cash compensation are generally consistent with those of 
total CEO compensation (Table 12). That is, when outside blockholder turnover is low 
(HITURN = 0), cash compensation is sensitive to ROA (1.03, t = 3.00) but not to 
ADJRET (0.06, t = 0.74). However, this pattern reverses when outside blockholder 
turnover becomes high (HITURN = 1). The coefficients on [ROA*HITURN] and 
[ADJRET*HITURN] are -0.80 (t = -1.61) and 0.19 (t = 1.86), respectively (Table 13 
Panel B). In the OLS estimation, cash compensation is not sensitive to either ROA or 
ADJRET in both levels of outside blockholder turnover. 
Overall, the results suggest that investee firms increase the pay-performance 
sensitivity of CEO compensation in response to an increase in outside blockholder 
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turnover. Further, these firms achieve the increased sensitivity by putting more weight on 
stock returns than on earnings. These results are consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2.  
I next examine the relation between outside blockholder turnover and the 
noisiness of accounting earnings relative to noisiness of stock returns. The basis of 
Hypothesis 2 is that shareholders’ investment horizons influence the information content 
of accounting earnings and stock returns. Specifically, Bushee [1998] and  Dikolli, Kulp 
and Sedatole [2004] suggest that shorter investment horizons of shareholders lead to 
greater noise in accounting earnings. In contrast, Holmstrom and Tirole [1993] argue that 
shorter investment horizons of shareholders (greater share liquidity) lead to greater 
volatility of an investee firm’s stock returns which in return improve the information 
content of its stock return.  
To sort out which argument the results of [ROA*HITURN] and 
[ADJRET*HITURN] support, I examine the relation between outside blockholder 
turnover and the ratio of the volatility of accounting earnings (ROASTD) to the volatility 
of stock returns (RETSTD). According to Holmstrom and Tirole’s (1993) argument, as 
outside blockholder turnover increases, the ratio of ROASTD/RETSTD will decrease 
because the volatility of stock returns (RETSTD) increases. The increased volatility of 
stock returns improves the information content of the stock price. Accordingly, firms 
with greater outside blockholder turnover will put more weight on stock returns than on 
accounting earnings.    
The volatility of accounting earnings is measured as the standard deviation of the 
annual return on assets (ROASTD) over the five-year period from yeart-1 to yeart+3 where 
t is the first year of the sample period.  Similarly, the volatility of stock returns 
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(RETSTD) is measured as the standard deviation of monthly stock returns (RETSTD) for 
the same period. I then measure the volatility of ROA relative to that of RET as the ratio 
of ROASTD to RETSTD.  
Figure 2 shows that the ratio of the volatility of accounting earnings to the 
volatility of stock returns (ROASTD/RETSTD) generally increases in outside 
blockholder turnover. ROASTD/RETSTD is significantly lower (0.19-0.20) in the first 
two quintiles of outside blockholder turnover than in the remaining three quintiles (0.26-
0.28) at the p < 0.00.  Further, the univariate analysis also shows that both the volatility 
of accounting earnings (ROASTD) and the volatility of stock returns (RETSTD) are 
lower in the first two quintiles of outside blockholder turnover than in the remaining three 
quintiles (the result is not reported). These results suggest that as outside blockholder 
turnover increases, the volatility of earnings increases more than the volatility of stock 
returns.  
Additionally, the result in Figure 3 shows that as ROASTD/RETSTD increases 
from the lowest quintile to the highest quintile, the median ratio of options granted to 
total CEO compensation (Options/Total Comp) increases from 30% to 38%, whereas the 
median ratio of cash to total compensation (Cash/Total Comp) decreases from 45% to 
36%.  
Taken together, the results in Figures 2 and 3 indicate that the increased weight on 
stock returns in firms with higher outside blockholder turnover is more likely due to 
greater noise in accounting earnings than due to greater informativeness of the stock 
returns in those firms.  
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Level of Total CEO Compensation  
In both OLS and two-stage simultaneous  estimations, the coefficient for outside 
blockholder turnover (OUTTURN) is positive and significant in the total CEO 
compensation regressions (Table 12, Panels A and B). The coefficient on OUTTURN is 
0.50 (t=2.95) in the OLS estimation and 1.76 (t=4.29) in the two-stage simultaneous  
estimation. The coefficient on outside blockholder turnover for cash compensation (Table 
13 Panels A and B) is positive but not significantly different from zero at conventional 
levels. These results suggest that in response to the greater risk associated with higher 
pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation, firms with higher outside blockholder 
turnover increase the level of total CEO compensation. Further, the increase in total 
compensation tends to take the form of increased option-based compensation rather than 
cash payments. This interpretation is consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Overall, the results of this section strongly support Hypotheses 1 and 2. First, 
firms with higher outside blockholder turnover tend to have greater CEO pay-
performance sensitivity and larger total CEO compensation (Hypothesis 1). Second, to 
increase CEO pay-performance sensitivity, firms rely more on equity-based incentives 
than on cash incentives (Hypothesis 2). This interpretation is reinforced by the finding 
that high blockholder turnover firms rely more on market adjusted returns than on 
earnings for CEO compensation.  
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CHAPTER 7  
ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 
 The key variables of this dissertation are pay-performance sensitivity of CEO 
compensation and outside blockholder turnover. The validity of the results documented in 
this study largely relies on the two measures. In this section, I re-examine the results of 
this dissertation using alternative measures of CEO pay-performance sensitivity and 
outside blockholder turnover to prove that the results are not driven by my choice of the 
measures. 
7.1 Pay-Performance Sensitivity 
 
When examining the effect of outside blockholder turnover on total CEO 
compensation, this study uses flow compensation (i.e., current CEO compensation). 
However, Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Hall and Liebman (1998) show that a CEO’s 
incentives to increase share value derive mainly from the CEO’s existing equity portfolio 
(stock and options that the CEO already owns). Likewise, Core, Guay and Verrecchia 
(2003) argue that total firm-specific CEO incentives reflect not only current CEO 
compensation but also changes in the value of the CEO’s equity portfolio.  
Therefore, I estimate the pay-performance sensitivity of the CEO’s equity 
portfolio25 to examine the effect of outside blockholder turnover on sensitivity of CEO 
                                                 
25 I first estimate the sensitivity of the CEO’s option portfolio following the method suggested by Core and 
Guay (2001a) except that I used in-money option values of total outstanding options available in 
EXECUCOMP (the variable names are INMONUN and INMONEX) to calculate the estimated exercise 
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equity portfolio. I examine Panel B of Table 11 but replace ∆OPTION with the 
sensitivity of CEO equity portfolio (∆EQUITY). The resulting coefficient on outside 
blockholder turnover rate is negative and significant (t = -2.24, p < 0.05), which is 
inconsistent with the hypothesis.  The negative coefficient is potentially driven by CEOs’ 
stock ownership. Specifically, the highly negative association between outside 
blockholder turnover and manager block ownership (t = -18.73 in Model 3 of Table 7) 
suggests that investors with shorter investment horizons are less likely to take a large 
position in firms with higher managerial ownership. In the cross-sectional analysis, this 
will appear as if shareholders with shorter investment horizons reduce pay-performance 
sensitivity of CEO equity portfolio.    
 To confirm this reasoning, I estimate the sensitivity of CEO option portfolio 
(∆Option Portfolio) which includes newly granted options and existing options but not 
existing stock.  I then re-examine the model in Panel B of Table 11 using ∆Option 
Portfolio. As predicted, the coefficient of outside blockholder turnover becomes positive 
and significant (t = 2.17). As is the case in the ∆OPTION regression, the level of outside 
block ownership (OUTBLK) is positive and significant (t=6.27), whereas the 
concentration of outside block ownership (HFOUT) is negative and significant  
(t= - 2.46).26   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
price.  I then add sensitivity of CEO stock ownership to estimate pay-performance sensitivity of equity 
portfolio.  
26 Results are not reported but are available upon request. 
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7.2 Outside Blockholder Turnover 
 
To test the sensitivity of the results in Chapter 6, I rerun the estimation models in 
Table 10-13 using three alternative measures of outside blockholder turnover.  First, I 
calculate the exit rate of outside blockholders (EXITRATE) measured as exit outside 
blocks divided by initial block ownership. An exit outside block is the block ownership 
that existed in the firm at the end of yeart and left the firm by the end of yeart+1. Initial 
block ownership is the total block ownership at the end of yeart. EXITRATE measures 
the extent of block ownership that exited the firm over the current year. Replacing 
outside blockholder turnover (OUTTURN) with EXITRATE in all the compensation 
models in Tables 10-13 yields the results that are qualitatively similar to the results using 
OUTTURN.  
In the second alternative measure of outside blockholder turnover, I attempt to 
control for the potential noise induced in the ownership data due to the reporting rules of 
the SEC. Firms are not required to report stakes of shareholders with less than 5% of 
ownership, and thus proxy statements do not list them as blockholders. Accordingly, 
outside blockholder turnover (OUTTURN) potentially overstates true outside blockholder 
turnover to the extent that the changes in block ownership in the proxy statements are due 
to fluctuations of block ownership around 5%. To address this potential measurement 
error, I calculate a second adjusted outside blockholder turnover rate. Specifically, when 
calculating the adjusted OUTTURN, I do not count outside blockholders who exit the 
firm in one year but return in the following year. I then replace OUTTURN with the 
resulting adjusted OUTTURN in all the compensation models (i.e., regressions in Table 
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10-13). Replacing OUTTURN with the adjusted OUTTURN does not change the results, 
suggesting that the results are robust to this potential source of measurement error.  
Finally, cross-sectional analysis is subject to the potential problem of omitted 
variables. However, due to the limited number of firm years for each sample firm, panel 
data analysis is not available. To address the potential problem of omitted variables, I 
calculate industry-adjusted abnormal outside blockholder turnover by subtracting the 
corresponding industry average outside blockholder turnover from outside blockholder 
turnover of each firm. The results of the regressions in Tables 10-13 remain qualitatively 
the same with the abnormal outside blockholder turnover measure. 
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CHAPER 8  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This dissertation addresses two primary issues. First, it examines whether the 
investment horizons of large shareholders (i.e., outside blockholders) vary across the 
firms in which they invest, and if so, what factors influence these investment horizons.  
Prior studies measure an investor’s investment horizon based on the investor’s 
average portfolio characteristics. An implicit assumption of this approach is that the 
investment horizon does not vary across investee firms in the investor’s portfolio. The 
results in Chapters 3 and 5 show that outside blockholders’ investment horizons, as 
measured by outside blockholder turnover, vary across investee firms, and that the 
variation is significantly determined by the characteristics of the investee firms. This 
systematic association in the data further suggests that outside blockholders’ horizons 
vary in ways that reflect outside blockholders’ rational responses to their monitoring cost-
benefit trade-offs in light of investee firm characteristics. 
Second, this dissertation examines how investment horizons of large shareholders 
are related to the way investee firms pay their CEOs. Prior studies on investor horizons 
argue and document that shorter horizons of large investors result in limited monitoring 
by these investors and can lead to higher agency costs in investee firms. The results of 
this study, however, suggest that investee firms with shorter-horizon investors do not 
necessarily suffer higher agency costs. Specifically, I find that investee firms with greater 
outside blockholder turnover (i.e., shorter-horizon outside blockholders) are likely to 
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design CEO compensation with greater pay-performance sensitivity and a higher level of 
CEO compensation. Further, the greater pay-performance sensitivity is primarily due to 
option-based incentives but not due to cash-based incentives. These results indicate that 
firms with shorter horizon outside blockholders use incentive contracting more 
extensively to counter the potentially weaker monitoring by their outside blockholders.  
Some caveat need to be mentioned in interpreting the results of this dissertation. 
First, I measure blockholder turnover using annual proxy statements. Therefore, outside 
blockholder turnover does not capture the transactions by outside blockholders who 
might have held the firms’ stock only for a short period during the proxy year. This can 
potentially result in understated outside blockholder turnover rates.27  
Due to lack of data on block ownership changes during each fiscal year, I am 
unable to directly assess the implication of this potential effect. However, it seems 
reasonable to expect that understated outside blockholder turnover would work against 
my hypotheses because it would dampen the effect of outside blockholder turnover on 
CEO compensation by reducing the variation in outside blockholder turnover. 
Second, each firm in the sample has only four years of data. Therefore, this study 
primarily relies on cross-sectional analysis, which is subject to a potential problem of 
omitted variables. I attempt to address this issue by using industry-adjusted abnormal 
outside blockholder turnover. As discussed in Chapter 7, using this alternative turnover 
measure yields qualitatively the same results as the results of OUTTURN. However, the 
potential endogeneity issue still remains, and the reader need to interpret the results with 
a caution.  
                                                 
27 On the other hand, the measurement convention for outside blockholder turnover may overstate actual 
outside blockholder turnover rates to the extent that the changes in block ownership are due to ownership 
fluctuation around 5%. The robustness check in Chapter 7 reveals that this is unlikely to drive the results. 
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To summarize, the findings in this dissertation imply that large shareholders’ 
monitoring incentives, as reflected by their investment horizons, are determined in 
equilibrium to a significant extent by investee firm characteristics. Further, investee firms 
use incentive contracting to offset weaker shareholder monitoring that may arise due to 
shorter investment horizons of shareholders.  
Finally, I conclude the dissertation with the following anecdotal evidence which 
illustrates how investment horizons of large shareholders (or investors) can influence 
CEO incentive compensation. Effective April 14, 2003, the SEC requires registered 
investment management companies to file with the Commission the specific proxy votes 
that they cast in shareholder meetings (17 CFR Parts 239, 249 & 274).  
Table C illustrates four investors’ proxy votes with regard to executive incentive 
plans recommended by management during the 2003-2004 shareholder meetings.  
Table C Large Investors’ Proxy Votes on Executive Incentive Plans - Example 
Management Initiated 
Executive Incentive Plan 
Investment  
Company28 
% of portfolio 
that has at least 
3-4 year 
holding period 
(sample period) 
Mean portfolio 
holding period 
(sample period) 
 Number of proxy 
voting reported in 
N-PX (2003-2004 
proxy year ) For Against 
Gabelli  54% 3.00 years 108 60 (56%) 48 (44%) 
FMR 24% 2.27 years 106 58 (55%) 48 (45%) 
Putnam    9% 1.71 years   80 76 (95%) 4 (5%) 
AXA   4% 1.40 years 118 110 (93%) 8 (7%) 
(Data source of proxy voting: SEC N-PX filing for proxy year 2003-2004) 
 
These four investors, Gabelli Funds, FMR Corp., Putnam Investment and AXA 
Financial are blockholders in the sample investee firms used in this dissertation. Gabelli 
                                                 
28 Investment companies often have multiple funds and file their proxy voting results for each fund. The 
table reports the voting result of the following funds: 
 
 Gabelli – Gabelli Investor Funds Inc., Gabelli Growth Fund, Gabelli Funds 
 FMR – Fidelity Advisor Series I 
 AXA – AXA Enterprise Multimanager Funds 
 Putnam – Putnam Investment Funds 
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Funds, FMR Corp., Putnam Investment and AXA Financial held block shares of several 
sample firms during 1996-2001. Based on the average holding period of their block 
ownership in the sample firms, as reported in the third column of Table C, Gabelli Funds 
and FMR Corp. have longer investment horizons (3.00 years and 2.27 years, respectively) 
than Putnam Investment and AXA Financial (1.71 years and 1.40 years respectively). 
Assuming that their block holding period in the sample investee firms is representative of 
their overall portfolio strategy, and that they maintain their portfolio strategy until 2003-
2004, the results reported in this dissertation suggest that Putnam Investment and AXA 
Financial (shorter horizon investors) will support management initiated executive 
incentive plans more frequently than will Gabelli Funds and FMR Corp. (longer horizon 
investors).  
Consistent with the prediction, Putnam Investment and AXA voted for 93%-95% 
of the management initiated executive incentive plans, whereas Gabelli Funds and FMR 
Corp. voted for only 55%-56% of the executive incentive plans. This stark difference in 
the voting patterns of these investors provides a powerful example of how investors’ 
monitoring cost-benefit trade-offs can directly influence investee firms’ governance 
mechanisms.   
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Figure 3 1 
Figures 
Figure 1 Univariate Analysis - Structure of Total CEO Compensation (Median) by 
Outside Blockholder Turnover (N = 874) 
 
 
The following graph demonstrates the structure of total CEO compensation (annual) for each quintile of 
outside blockholder turnover. Total CEO compensation consists of salary, cash bonus, stock options 
granted, restricted stock granted, long-term incentive payments and all others. Salary is dollar value ($’000) 
of base salary. Bonus is dollar value ($’000) of cash bonus earned by a CEO during the fiscal year. Options 
are an aggregate value of stock options granted to a CEO during the fiscal year as valued using S&P’s 
Black-Scholes method.  
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Figure 3 2 
Figure 2 Univariate Analysis - Ratio of ROA Volatility to Return Volatility 
(Median) by Outside Blockholder Turnover (N = 874) 
 
ROASTD is volatility of return on assets (ROA) and is measured by standard deviation of annual ROA for 
the period from t-1 through t+3 where t is the first year of the sample period.  RETSTD is volatility of stock 
returns (RET) and is measured by standard deviation of monthly stock returns for the period from t-1 
through t+3 where t is the first year of the sample period. 
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Figure 3 3 
Figure 3 Univariate Analysis - Structure of CEO Compensation (Median) by Ratio 
of ROA Volatility to Return Volatility (N = 874) 
 
ROASTD is volatility of return on assets (ROA) and is measured by standard deviation of annual ROA for 
the period from t-1 through t+3 where t is the first year of the sample period.  RETSTD is volatility of stock 
returns (RET) and is measured by standard deviation of monthly stock returns for the period from t-1 
through t+3 where t is the first year of the sample period. Cash/Total Comp is the proportion of total CEO 
compensation in cash. Options/Total Comp is the proportion of total CEO compensation in stock options. 
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Table 1 1 
Table1 Sample Composition by Sample Year and Descriptive Statistics for 
Block Turnover (N = 874) 
Tables  
The sample consists of 874 unique firms, and each sample firm has four years of data with different starting 
year (1996, 1997 or 1998).  Turnover is the proportion of block ownership that changed hands, and 
measured annually over the four-year sample period. Therefore, each sample firm has three years of 
turnover measures (yeart+1–yeart, yeart+2–yeart+1, and yeart+3–yeart+2). Panels A and B summarize the 
blockholder turnover by blockholder type: outside blockholder turnover (OUTTURN), manager 
blockholder turnover (MGRTURN), director blockholder turnover (DIRTURN), ESOP blockholder 
turnover (ESOPTURN) and gray blockholder turnover (GRAYTURN).  TOTALTURN is sum of 
OUTTURN, MGRTURN, DIRTURN, ESOPTURN and GRAYTURN. I use four-year average outside 
blockholder turnover (‘Average’ in the last column of the table but for each sample) in my data analyses. 
 
Panel A 
 Total = 874 firms Turnover type 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Average 
Sample firms for  OUTTURN 28.65% 24.73% 27.17%     26.85% 
period 1996-1999 MGRTURN 0.44% 0.15% 0.19%     0.26% 
(233 firms) DIRTURN 0.53% 0.53% 0.30%     0.45% 
  ESOPTURN 0.57% 0.52% 1.38%     0.82% 
 GRAYTURN 0.48% 0.43% 0.00%     0.30% 
  TOTALTURN 30.67% 26.36% 29.04%   28.68% 
Sample firms for OUTTURN   27.82% 29.99% 27.01%   28.27% 
period 1997-2000 MGRTURN   0.22% 0.82% 0.13%   0.39% 
(208 firms) DIRTURN   1.08% 0.84% 0.72%   0.88% 
  ESOPTURN   0.90% 1.19% 0.91%   1.00% 
 GRAYTURN   0.31% 0.00% 0.00%   0.10% 
  TOTALTURN  30.33% 32.84% 28.77%  30.64% 
Sample firms for OUTTURN     30.11% 30.93% 29.49% 30.18% 
period 1998-2001 MGRTURN     0.44% 0.38% 0.48% 0.43% 
(433 firms) DIRTURN     0.93% 1.04% 0.83% 0.93% 
  ESOPTURN     0.69% 0.33% 0.46% 0.50% 
 GRAYTURN     0.22% 0.25% 0.37% 0.28% 
 TOTALTURN   32.39% 32.93% 31.63% 32.32% 
 
Panel B  
     
 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Average 
Average turnover OUTTURN 28.65% 26.19% 29.30% 29.66% 29.49% 28.84% 
by blockholder  MGRTURN 0.44% 0.18% 0.46% 0.30% 0.48% 0.38% 
type and year DIRTURN 0.53% 0.79% 0.74% 0.94% 0.83% 0.79% 
 ESOPTURN 0.57% 0.69% 1.00% 0.52% 0.46% 0.70% 
 GRAYTURN 0.48% 0.38% 0.11% 0.17% 0.37% 0.24% 
 TOTALTURN 30.67% 28.23% 31.61% 31.59% 31.63% 30.95% 
Number of firm 
years  233 441 874 641 433  
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Table 1 2 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics by Industry 
 
Panel A Sample Firm Distribution across Industry 
Industry# Industry classification # of Firms 
1 Consumer Non-durables -- Food, Tobacco, Textiles, Apparel, Leather, Toys 59 
2 Consumer Durables -- Cars, TV's, Furniture, Household Appliances 32 
3 Manufacturing -  Machinery, Trucks, Planes, Office Furniture 160 
4 Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 37 
5 Chemicals and Allied Products 38 
6 Business Equipment - Computers, Software and Electronic Equipment 141 
7 Telephone and Television Transmission 5 
8 Utilities 53 
9 Whole sale Retail and Some services  131 
10 Healthcare, Medical equipment and Drugs 67 
11 Finance 56 
12 Other - Mines, Construction, Transportation, Hotels, Entertainment 95 
  Total number of firms 874 
 
Panel B Mean Block Ownership/Turnover and CEO Compensation by Industry 
 
OUTBLK (%) is block-shares held by an outside blockholder who is non-manager, non-director or non-
founding family members.  MGRBLK (%) is block-shares held by management of the firm. DIRBLK (%) 
is block-shares held by outside directors.  HFOUT is the Herfindahl Index of a firm’s outside-block 
ownership and indicates the concentration of the firm’s outside-block ownership. OUTTURN (%) is an 
annual outside blockholder turnover and is the proportion of outside block ownership that changed hands.  
TCOMP is total CEO compensation for the fiscal year ($’000) and comprised of salary, bonus, stock 
options granted, restricted stock granted and all others.  CASH is sum of salary ($’000) and cash bonus 
($’000) earned by a CEO during the fiscal year. OPTIONS/TCOMP is the proportion of total CEO 
compensation in options and measure. Options are an aggregate value of stock options granted to a CEO 
during the fiscal year as valued using S&P’s Black-Scholes method.   ∆OPTION is change in value of stock 
options granted in the current year per $1,000 in shareholder wealth.  
 
Ind. # OUTBLK MGRBLK DIRBLK HFOUT 
OUT- 
TURN TCOMP CASH 
OPTIONS/ 
TCOMP ∆OPTION 
1 15.26 6.45 5.89 0.48 0.22 4,376 1,372 0.308 2.604 
2 14.37 6.28 1.16 0.50 0.27 2,392 1,222 0.223 1.257 
3 17.12 2.78 2.61 0.50 0.29 2,929 1,111 0.311 1.701 
4 20.47 1.95 3.67 0.43 0.31 3,696 1,183 0.333 1.871 
5 17.13 4.39 2.23 0.46 0.31 3,384 1,206 0.318 1.211 
6 16.50 2.64 1.80 0.45 0.37 5,766 1,077 0.498 3.055 
7 7.70 5.38 0.00 0.32 0.17 16,523 2,810 0.351 1.050 
8 6.16 0.26 1.48 0.43 0.28 1,978 874 0.162 0.447 
9 16.95 5.73 4.77 0.49 0.26 3,523 1,083 0.327 1.930 
10 15.77 4.32 3.31 0.52 0.34 4,410 1,091 0.470 2.448 
11 14.56 5.30 3.73 0.50 0.26 9,521 2,576 0.371 2.132 
12 18.04 5.14 3.10 0.52 0.23 3,392 1,068 0.315 1.975 
 102
 
Table 1 3 
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics for Firm Characteristics (N=874) 
 
The following table reports four-year averages of sample firm characteristics. ASSET is total assets ($ 
million). MKT is market value of equity ($ Million). MKTBV is ratio of market value of equity to book 
value of equity. LEV is ratio of long-term debt to total assets. DIV is dividends per $1 of investment in a 
firm’s stock. RET is stock market return from CRSP. ROA is return on assets measured as income before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operation/beginning assets. AGE is firm age and measured by # of 
firm years in CRSP. SEGNUM is the number of business segment in a firm. ESTNUM is the one-year lag 
number of analyst forecasts (annual earnings) reported in IBES database. TCOMP is total compensation for 
the fiscal year ($’000) and comprised of salary, bonus, stock options granted, restricted stock granted and 
all others. Salary is dollar value ($’000) of base salary. Bonus is dollar value ($’000) of cash bonus earned 
by a CEO during the fiscal year. Cash is salary plus bonus. OPTIONS/TCOMP is ratio of Black-Scholes 
value of stock options granted to total CEO compensation.  ∆OPTION is change in value of stock options 
granted in the current year per $1,000 in shareholder wealth.  OUTBLK (%) is block-shares held by an 
outside blockholder who is non-manager, non-director or non-founding family members.  MGRBLK (%) is 
block-shares held by management of the firm.  DIRBLK (%) is block-shares held by outside directors.  
NUMBLK is number of block holders. HFOUT is the Herfindahl Index of a firm’s outside-block 
ownership and indicates the concentration of the firm’s outside-block ownership. OUTTURN (%) is an 
annual outside blockholder turnover and is the proportion of outside block ownership that changed hands.   
 
  Mean Median 20th 40th 60th 80th Std.Dev 
Firm Characteristics        
ASSET 5,603 1,289 436 895 1,892 5,277 19,986 
MKT 5,445 1,618 487 1,032 2,329 5,381 16,761 
MKTBV 4.129 2.481 1.527 2.168 2.963 4.540 9.720 
LEV  0.204 0.191 0.058 0.147 0.235 0.325 0.154 
DIV 0.014 0.007 0.000 0.003 0.013 0.024 0.029 
RET 0.198 0.141 -0.008 0.089 0.201 0.364 0.322 
ROA 0.047 0.047 0.017 0.038 0.061 0.089 0.080 
AGE 23.86 22.00 7.00 14.00 25.00 35.00 18.76 
SEGNUM 2.36 2.00 1.00 1.75 2.50 3.50 1.33 
ESTNUM 10.38 8.89 3.71 7.08 10.58 17.19 7.65 
CEO Compensation        
TCOMP 4,212 2,459 1,115 1,975 3,122 5,354 6,631 
Salary 597 547 375 489 618 782 296 
Bonus 617 396 150 303 492 797 997 
OPTIONS/TCOMP 0.349 0.332 0.151 0.274 0.388 0.529 0.219 
∆OPTION 2.019 1.085 0.389 0.843 1.578 3.056 2.887 
Block Ownership        
OUTBLK (%) 16.02 14.48 5.60 11.67 17.74 25.20 11.15 
MGRBLK (%) 4.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.95 9.77 
DIRBLK (%) 3.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 000 8.64 
NUMBLK 2.47 2.50 1.50 2.00 2.75 3.50 1.22 
HFOUT 0.482 0.470 0.275 0.402 0.512 0.695 0.232 
OUTTURN (%) 28.84 24.63 8.38 19.04 32.29 46.03 22.33 
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Table 1 4 
Table 4 Mean (Median) Outside Blockholder Turnover (OUTTURN) 
Sorted by Investee Firm Characteristics 
Panels A-C report mean (median) outside blockholder turnover by quintile of firm attributes.  Quintile 
corresponds to firm characteristics, such as ROASTD or RETSTD. ROA is return on assets measured as 
income before extraordinary items and discontinued operation divided by beginning total assets. ROASTD 
is standard deviation of annual ROA for the period from t-1 through t+3 where t is the first year of the 
sample period.  RETSTD is standard deviation of monthly stock returns for the period from t-1 through t+3 
where t is the first year of the sample period.  SHRTRN is share turnover rate measured as annual share 
trading volume/ total outstanding common stock.  MKTBV is market value of equity/book value of equity. 
AGE is firm age and measured by the number of firm years in CRSP. ASSET is total assets.  SEGNUM is 
the number of business segments of a firm. ESTNUM is the one-year lag number of analyst forecasts 
(annual earnings) reported in IBES database.  OUTBLK is block-shares held by an outside blockholder 
who is non-manager, non-director or non-founding family members.  HFOUT is the Herfindahl Index of a 
firm’s outside-block ownership and indicates the concentration of the firm’s outside-block ownership. 
DIRDUM is an indicator variable which takes value 1 if a firm has director blockholders and 0 otherwise. 
MGRDUM is an  indicator variable which takes value 1 if a firm has director blockholders and 0 otherwise. 
INDUM is an indicator variable which take value 1 if firm has inside blockholders (managers, directors, 
ESOP and affiliated entities) and 0 otherwise.  
 
Panel A OUTTURN for Investee Firms Ranked by Firm Characteristics Quintile (1) 
Quintile ROASTD RETSTD SHRTN ROA MKT/BV AGE ASSET 
1 22.45 (17.45) 
24.47 
(18.23) 
14.83 
(8.58) 
32.27 
(30.27) 
28.32 
(23.99) 
32.81 
(28.94) 
23.91 
(21.47) 
2 24.00 (16.91) 
26.17 
(21.51) 
26.12 
(20.18) 
30.19 
(25.92) 
29.54 
(27.15) 
28.16 
(25.94) 
27.82 
(22.89) 
3 31.93 (28.99) 
28.05 
(21.85) 
30.68 
(26.61) 
28.52 
(25.22) 
27.60 
(22.89) 
26.43 
(20.01) 
31.66 
(26.84) 
4 31.39 (26.98) 
30.64 
(27.90) 
34.91 
(32.12) 
27.69 
(22.20) 
27.82 
(21.91) 
27.24 
(23.54) 
30.46 
(26.83) 
5 33.95 (31.65) 
34.40 
(32.89) 
37.13 
(34.99) 
25.10 
(18.05) 
30.47 
(26.79) 
28.54 
(23.24) 
29.88 
(27.11) 
 
Panel B OUTTURN for Investee Firms Ranked by Firm Characteristics Quintile (2) 
Quintile SEGNUM ESTNUM OUTBLK HFOUT 
1 27.61 (22.88) 
21.40 
(15.57) 
20.82 
(10.78) 
21.59 
(16.66) 
2 29.25 (25.26) 
27.50 
(24.73) 
31.45 
(25.58) 
32.46 
(29.47) 
3 28.84 (25.68) 
31.51 
(26.84) 
31.46 
(25.29) 
34.79 
(32.89) 
4 28.84 (24.89) 
30.91 
(26.79) 
31.71 
(28.94) 
32.33 
(25.71) 
5 29.84 (26.22) 
32.40 
(21.22) 
28.27 
(26.06) 
22.55 
(16.45) 
 
Panel C OUTTURN for Investee Firms with/without Inside Blockholders 
 DIRDUM MGRDUM INDUM 
0 31.93 (30.03) 32.66 (31.25) 
41.02 
(37.05) 
1 15.97 (12.89) 17.00 (13.68) 
18.11 
(14.56) 
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log 
(1+OUTTURN) 
log 
(1+INBLK) 
log 
(1+OUTBLK) HFOUT SEGNUM ESTNUM
log  
(SHRTN) 
log 
 (AGE) 
log 
(ASSET) 
log 
(MKTBV) ROA ROASTD
log(1+OUTTURN)  1.00            
log(1+INBLK) -0.61***             1.00
log(1+OUTBLK)  0.25*** -0.32***  1.00          
HFOUT  0.01  0.05  0.17***  1.00         
SEGNUM  0.04 -0.09*** -0.13***  0.05  1.00        
ESTNUM  0.14*** -0.15*** -0.09*** -0.01  0.05  1.00       
log (SHRTN)  0.34*** -0.26***  0.21*** -0.04 -0.24***  0.13***  1.00      
log(AGE)    -0.08** -0.03 -0.23***  0.08**  0.31***  0.09*** -0.35***   1.00     
log (ASSET)  0.07** -0.13*** -0.21***  0.02  0.39***  0.45*** -0.17***   0.36***  1.00    
log (MKTBV)  0.01 -0.01 -0.10***  0.02 -0.12***  0.23***  0.26*** -0.12***  0.01 1.00   
ROA -0.08**  0.10*** -0.13*** -0.01 -0.03  0.12*** -0.16***   0.04  0.05 0.21***  1.00  
ROASTD  0.13*** -0.06  0.11*** -0.05 -0.13*** -0.08**        0.47*** -0.21*** -0.29*** 0.16*** -0.53*** 1.00
RETSTD  0.12*** -0.02  0.17*** -0.01 -0.23*** -0.09***        0.66*** -0.39*** -0.33*** 0.14*** -0.28*** 0.45***
Table 1 5 
Table 5 Correlations – Block Ownership and Firm Characteristics (N = 874) 
 
OUTTURN is annual outside blockholder turnover, and the proportion of outside block ownership that changed hands. INBLK (%) is block-shares held by inside 
blockholders, such as managers, directors, ESOP and affiliated entities. TELDUM is an indicator variable for firms in telecommunication/broadcasting 
industries. OUTBLK (%) is aggregate shares held by outside blockholders who own at least 5% of a firm’s outstanding common stock. HFOUT is the Herfindahl 
index of a firm’s outside-block ownership and indicates the concentration of the firm’s outside-block ownership. SEGNUM is the number of business segments 
of a firm. ESTNUM is the one-year lag number of analyst forecasts (annual earnings) reported in IBES database. SHRTRN is share turnover rate measured as 
annual share trading volume/ total outstanding common stock.  AGE is firm age and measured by the number of firm years in CRSP. ASSET is total assets.  
MKTBV is market value of equity/book value of equity. ROA is return on assets measured as income before extraordinary items and discontinued operation 
divided by beginning total assets. ROASTD is standard deviation of annual ROA for the period from t-1 through t+3 where t is the first year of the sample 
period.  RETSTD is standard deviation of monthly stock returns for the period from t-1 through t+3 where t is the first year of the sample period. 
   *, **,  *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 6 
Table 6.1 Factor Analysis (Principal Component) (N = 874) 
SEGNUM is the number of business segments of a firm. ESTNUM is the number of analyst forecasts 
(annual earnings) reported in IBES database. SHRTRN is share turnover rate measured as annual share 
trading volume/ total outstanding common stock.  AGE is firm age and measured by the number of firm 
years in CRSP. ASSET is total assets.  MKTBV is market value of equity/book value of equity. ROA is 
return on assets measured as income before extraordinary items and discontinued operation/beginning 
assets. ROASTD is standard deviation of annual ROA for the period from t-1 through t+3 where t is the 
first year of the sample period.  RETSTD is standard deviation of monthly stock returns for the period from 
t-1 through t+3 where t is the first year of the sample period. 
 
  
Factor 1 
(Liquidity & 
Information Cost) 
Factor 2 
(Size/Maturity) 
Factor 3 
( Performance) 
SEGNUM  0.00  0.70 -0.09 
ESTNUM -0.02  0.35 0.75 
log(SHRTN)  0.63 -0.36 0.45 
log(1+AGE) -0.21  0.66 -0.12 
log(ASSET) -0.14  0.76 0.38 
log(MKTBV)  0.01 -0.23 0.71 
ROA -0.78 -0.23 0.34 
ROASTD  0.82 -0.15 0.01 
RETSTD  0.67 -0.44 0.15 
% Variance Explained 24.44% 23.22% 17.44% 
 
Table 1 7 
 
Table 6.2 Correlations - Block Ownership and Factors (N = 874) 
 
OUTTURN is annual outside blockholder turnover, and the proportion of outside block ownership that 
changed hands.  INBLK (%) is block-shares held by inside blockholders, such as managers, directors, 
ESOP and affiliated entities. OUTBLK is aggregate shares held by outside blockholders who own at least 
5% of a firm’s outstanding common stock. HFOUT is the Herfindahl Index of a firm’s outside-block 
ownership and indicates the concentration of the firm’s outside-block ownership. Factor 1 
(LQDITY/INFOCOST) is liquidity of shares and information asymmetry. Factor 2 (SIZE/MATURITY) is 
firm size and maturity of firms. Factor 3 (PERF) is firm performance. 
 
  
log 
(1+OUTTURN) 
log 
(1+INBLK) 
log 
(1+OUTBLK) HFOUT Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
log(1+OUTTURN)  1.00       
log(1+INBLK) -0.61***  1.00      
log(1+OUTBLK)  0.25*** -0.32***  1.00     
HFOUT  0.01  0.05  0.17***  1.00    
Factor1  0.22*** -0.16***  0.17*** -0.02 1.00   
Factor2  0.03 -0.13*** -0.20***  0.05 0.00 1.00  
Factor3  0.17*** -0.15*** -0.08*** -0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00 
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Table 1 8 
 
Table 7 Outside Blockholder Turnover – OLS Estimation 
 
OUTTURN is annual outside blockholder turnover, and the proportion of outside block ownership that 
changed hands. LQDITY/INFOCOST (Factor 1) is liquidity of shares and information asymmetry. 
SIZE/MATURITY (Factor 2) is firm size and maturity of firms. PERFM (Factor 3) is firm performance. 
OUTBLK (%) is aggregate shares held by outside blockholders who own at least 5% of a firm’s 
outstanding common stock. HFOUT is the Herfindahl Index of a firm’s outside-block ownership and 
indicates the concentration of the firm’s outside-block ownership. INBLK (%) is block-shares held by 
inside blockholders, such as managers, directors, ESOP and affiliated entities. TELDUM is an indicator 
variable for firms in telecommunication/broadcasting industries.  UITLDUM is an indicator variable for 
firms in utility industry. White heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics are given in the parenthesis. 
 
Independent variables 
 
Dependent variable: log (1+OUTTURN) 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept    0.24*** (43.40)    0.33*** (44.22)    0.30*** (17.16) 
LQDITY/INFOCOST    0.04*** (5.27)    0.02*** (3.85)    0.02*** (3.77) 
SIZE/MATURITY    4.37E-3 (0.78)   -0.01 (-1.39)   -0.01 (-1.20) 
PERFM    0.03*** (4.88)    0.01*** (2.96)    0.01*** (3.21) 
log(1+OUTBLK)          0.01 (1.21) 
log(1+INBLK)      -0.07*** (-22.61)   -0.07*** (-18.73) 
HFOUT         0.03 (1.18) 
TELDUM   -0.08 (-1.22)   -0.08 (-0.94)   -0.07 (-0.85) 
UTILDUM    0.02 (0.64)   -0.01 (-0.35)    5.44E-4 (0.02) 
        
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.39 0.39 
 N 874 874 874 
           *, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed) 
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Table 8 Correlations - CEO Compensation and Outside Blockholder Turnover (M = 874) 
Table 1 9 
HFOUT is the Herfindahl Index of a firm’s outside-block ownership and indicates the concentration of the firm’s outside-block ownership. OUTTURN is annual 
outside blockholder turnover, and the proportion of outside block ownership that changed hands. OUTBLK (%) is aggregate shares held by outside blockholders 
who own at least 5% of a firm’s outstanding common stock. DIRDUM is an indicator variable which takes value 1 if a firm has director blockholders and 0 
otherwise. MGRDUM is an indicator variable which takes value 1 if a firm has director blockholders and 0 otherwise. TCOMP is total compensation for the 
fiscal year ($’000) and comprised of salary, bonus, stock options granted, restricted stock granted and all others. Salary is dollar value ($’000) of base salary. 
Bonus is dollar value ($’000) of cash bonus earned by a CEO during the fiscal year. CASH is salary plus cash bonus. CASH/TCOMP is the proportion of total 
CEO compensation in cash. OPTIONS/TCOMP is the proportion of total CEO compensation in options and measured as ratio of S&P Black-Scholes value of 
stock options granted to total CEO compensation. ∆OPTION is change in value of stock options granted in the current year per $1,000 in shareholder wealth.  
 HFOUT OUTTURN OUTBLK DIRDUM MGRDUM TCOMP
CASH/ 
TCOMP 
OPTIONS/ 
TCOMP 
 
∆OPTION 
HFOUT   1.00         
OUTTURN  0.01  1.00        
OUTBLK -0.15***  0.09***  1.00       
DIRDUM        -0.02 -0.29*** -0.10*** 1.00  
MGRDUM  0.09*** -0.30*** -0.09***  0.00  1.00     
TCOMP -0.01  0.06* -0.05 -0.08*** -0.08**  1.00    
CASH/TCOMP  0.04 -0.27*** -0.12***  0.06*  0.26*** -0.45***  1.00    
OPTIONS/TCOMP -0.05  0.24***  0.15*** -0.04 -0.17***  0.37*** -0.74*** 1.00  
∆OPTION -0.04  0.10***  0.20***  0.04  0.12***  0.26*** -0.36*** 0.39*** 1.00 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         *, **,  *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 10 
Table 9 CEO Compensation sorted by Block Ownership Characteristics 
 
Panels A-E report mean (median) level of CEO compensation (types and structure) by quintile of block 
ownership characteristics.  Quintile corresponds to block ownership characteristics, such as OUTTURN or 
OUTBLK. OUTTURN is an annual outside blockholder turnover and is the proportion of outside block 
ownership that changed hands.  OUTBLK is block-shares held by an outside blockholder who is non-
manager, non-director or non-founding family members. HFOUT is the Herfindahl index of a firm’s 
outside-block ownership and indicates the concentration of the firm’s outside-block ownership.  DIRDUM 
is an indicator variable which takes value 1 if a firm has director blockholder(s) and 0 otherwise. 
MGRDUM is an indicator variable which takes value 1 if a firm has manager blockholder(s) and 0 
otherwise.   TCOMP is total compensation for the fiscal year ($’000) and comprised of salary, bonus, stock 
options granted, restricted stock granted and all others. Salary is dollar value ($’000) of base salary. Bonus 
is dollar value ($’000) of cash bonus earned by a CEO during the fiscal year. Cash is salary plus bonus. 
OPTIONS/TCOMP is ratio of S&P Black-Scholes value of stock options granted to total compensation.  
∆OPTION is change in value of stock options granted in the current year per $1,000 in shareholder wealth.  
 
Panel A Outside Blockholder Turnover (OUTTURN) 
OUTTURN 
Quintile TCOMP 
SALARY/ 
TCOMP 
BONUS/ 
TCOMP 
CASH/ 
TCOMP 
OPTIONS/ 
TCOMP ∆OPTION 
1 4,134 (1,604) 
0.348 
(0.309) 
0.210 
(0.189) 
0.558 
(0.544) 
0.248  
(0.216) 
1.416 
(0.586) 
2 3,568 (2,095) 
0.291 
(0.250) 
0.193 
(0.171) 
0.484 
(0.432) 
0.322  
(0.322) 
1.623  
(1.005) 
3 3,924 (2,471) 
0.269 
(0.225) 
0.173 
(0.155) 
0.442  
(0.413) 
0.364 
(0.362) 
2.416 
(1.507) 
4 4,544 (2,610) 
0.255 
(0.229) 
0.149 
(0.145) 
0.404  
(0.367) 
0.386 2.200 
(1.253) 
5 4,890 (3,273) 
0.203 
(0.185) 
0.153 
(0.135) 
0.356 
(0.339) 
0.434  
(0.392) 
2.438  
(1.523) 
(0.380) 
 
Panel B Level of Outside Block Ownership (OUTBLK) 
OUTBLK 
Quintile TCOMP 
SALARY/ 
TCOMP 
BONUS/ 
TCOMP 
CASH/ 
TCOMP 
OPTIONS/ 
TCOMP ∆OPTION 
1 4,881 (2,390) 
0.282 
(0.240) 
0.193 
(0.170) 
0.475 
(0.424) 
0.305 
(0.276) 
1.242 
(0.517) 
2 4,000 (2,643) 
0.301 
(0.236) 
0.182 
(0.176) 
0.484 
(0.447) 
0.320 
(0.298) 
1.463 
(0.808) 
3 4,007 (2,146) 
0.285 
(0.249) 
0.179 
(0.167) 
0.464 
(0.441) 
0.338 
(0.319) 
2.095 
(1.183) 
4 4,592 (2,567) 
0.252 
(0.229) 
0.161 
(0.144) 
0.414 
(0.399) 
0.389 
(0.388) 
2.432 
(1.494) 
5 3,583 (2,471) 
0.244 
(0.210) 
0.161 
(0.142) 
0.406 
(0.373) 
0.392 
(0.357) 
2.860 
(2.013) 
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Table 9 - Continued 
 
Panel C Concentration of Outside Block Ownership (HFOUT) 
HFOUT 
Quintile TCOMP 
SALARY/ 
TCOMP 
BONUS/ 
TCOMP 
CASH/ 
TCOMP 
OPTIONS/ 
TCOMP ∆OPTION 
1 4,547 (2,288) 
0.278 
(0.239) 
0.171 
(0.158) 
0.449 
(0.405) 
0.339 
(0.327) 
1.942 
(1.060) 
2 3,911 (2,380) 
0.264 
(0.232) 
0.177 
(0.154) 
0.442 
(0.416) 
0.381 
(0.343) 
2.420 
(1.683) 
3 4,114 (2,553) 
0.243 
(0.212) 
0.170 
(0.154) 
0.414 
(0.398) 
0.361 
(0.338) 
2.120 
(1.178) 
4 4,167 (2,202) 
0.287 
(0.246) 
0.176 
(0.161) 
0.463 
(0.441) 
0.340 
(0.330 
1.782 
(0.943) 
5 4,323 (2,517) 
0.291 
(0.231) 
0.182 
(0.168) 
0.474 
(0.416) 
0.325 
(0.312) 
1.832 
(0.955) 
 
Panel D Block Ownership by Outside Directors (DIRDUM) 
DIRDUM TCOMP SALARY/ TCOMP 
BONUS/ 
TCOMP 
CASH/ 
TCOMP 
OPTIONS/ 
TCOMP ∆OPTION 
0 4,487 (2,575) 
0.266 
(0.228) 
0.175 
(0.160) 
0.441 
(0.409) 
0.353 
(0.337) 
1.964 
(1.093) 
1 3,107 (2,017) 
0.301 
(0.250) 
0.177 
(0.153) 
0.478 
(0.439) 
0.332 
(0.319) 
2.241 
(1.066) 
 
Panel E Block Ownership by Managers (MGRDUM) 
MGRDUM TCOMP SALARY/ TCOMP 
BONUS/ 
TCOMP 
CASH/ 
TCOMP 
OPTIONS/ 
TCOMP ∆OPTION 
0 4,504 (2,843) 
0.245 
(0.216) 
0.169 
(0.157) 
0.414 
(0.394) 
0.370 
(0.351) 
1.821 
(1.093) 
1 3,334 (1,428) 
0.357 
(0.317) 
0.194 
(0.167) 
0.551 
(0.524) 
0.286 
(0.251) 
2.615 
(1.048) 
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Table 10 Blockholder Turnover and Options/Total CEO compensation 
(OPTIONS/TCOMP) Table 1 11 
OPTIONS/TCOMP is the ratio of options granted to total CEO compensation. OUTTURN is annual outside 
blockholder turnover. OUTBLK (%) is aggregate shares held by outside blockholders. HFOUT is the 
Herfindahl index of a firm’s outside-block ownership. MGRDUM is an indicator variable for the presence 
of manager blocks (manager blocks = 1, otherwise 0). DIRDUM is an indicator variable for the presence of 
director blocks (director blocks = 1, otherwise 0). INBLK is block-shares held by inside blockholders, such 
as managers, directors, ESOP and affiliated entities. CEOTURN is the number of CEO turnovers during the 
four year sample period. ASSET is total assets. LEV is leverage measured as long-term debt/total assets. 
DIV is dividend yield measured as total dividends/market value of the equity.  BETA is coefficient of 
value-weighted market model estimated by monthly returns of five-year period. IDIORISK is idiosyncratic 
firm risk measured as standard deviation of residuals from value-weighted market model. ADJRET is stock 
return adjusted by value-weighted market return. ROA is return on assets. MKTBV is market value of 
equity/book value of equity. LQDITY/INFOCOST denotes share liquidity and information asymmetry. 
SIZE/MATURITY denotes firm size and is maturity. PERFM denotes firm performance. TELDUM is an 
indicator variable for firms in the telecommunication industry (Telecommunication = 1, otherwise 0).  
UITLDUM is an indicator variable for firms in the utility industry (Utility = 1, otherwise 0). 
IND_DUMMY is an indicator variable for the sample firm industry (Fama-French 12 industry portfolios). 
The results of IND_DUMMY are not reported in the table. log denotes natural log. White 
heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics are provided in the parenthesis for the OLS estimation. 
  
OLS Estimation  
(Panel A) Simultaneous Estimation (Panel B) 
    OPTIONS/TCOMP    OPTIONS/TCOMP   log (1+OUTTURN) 
Intercept  -0.35*** (-2.46)   -0.26* (-1.71)    0.31*** (8.85) 
log (1+OUTTURN)   0.16*** (3.71)    0.49*** (5.04)   
log (1+OUTBLK)   0.03*** (3.91)    0.02** (2.36)   
HFOUT  -0.07** (-2.38)   -0.07** (-2.52)   
log (1+INBLK)        -0.07*** (-17.18) 
OPTIONS/TCOMP         0.05 (0.61) 
MGRDUM  -0.05*** (-2.83)   -0.02 (-0.82)   
DIRDUM   0.02 (1.16)    0.05*** (2.74)   
CEOTURN  -0.01 (-1.02)   -0.01 (-0.87)   
log (ASSET)   0.09** (2.40)    0.05 (1.33)   
[log (ASSET)] 2  -3.62E-3 (-1.57)  -1.52E-3 (-0.62)   
log (LEV)   0.02 (0.25)    0.01 (0.17)   
log (1+DIV)  -0.55 (-1.24)   -0.63** (-2.16)   
BETA   0.05*** (3.14)    0.05*** (3.09)   
IDIORISK   0.44* (1.63)    0.34** (2.34)   
ADJRET   0.02 (0.53)    0.03 (1.12)   
ROA  -0.02 (-0.15)   -0.02 (-0.21)   
log (MKTBV)   0.07*** (4.99)    0.07*** (5.48)   
LQDITY/INFOCOST        0.02** (2.49) 
SIZE/MATURITY       -0.01 (-1.12) 
PERFM        0.01 (1.01) 
TELDUM       -0.08 (-1.31) 
UTILDUM       -1.01E-3 (-0.05) 
IND_DUMMY       
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.32 0.39 
N 874 874 874 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed) 
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Table 1 12 
Table 11 Blockholder Turnover and Option Delta (∆OPTION) 
.∆OPTION is change in value of stock options granted in the current year per $1,000 in shareholder wealth. 
OUTTURN is annual outside blockholder turnover, and the proportion of outside block ownership that 
changed hands. OUTBLK is aggregate shares held by outside blockholders. HFOUT is the Herfindahl 
index of a firm’s outside-block ownership. MGRDUM is an indicator variable for the presence of manager 
blocks (manager blocks = 1, otherwise 0). DIRDUM is an indicator variable for the presence of director 
blocks (director blocks = 1, otherwise 0). INBLK is block-shares held by inside blockholders, such as 
managers, directors, ESOP and affiliated entities. CEOTURN is the number of CEO turnovers during the 
four year sample period. ASSET is total assets. LEV is leverage measured as long-term debt/total assets. 
DIV is dividend yield measured as total dividends/market value of the equity.  BETA is coefficient of 
value-weighted market model estimated by monthly returns of five-year period. IDIORISK is idiosyncratic 
firm risk measured as standard deviation of residuals from value-weighted market model. ADJRET is stock 
return adjusted by value-weighted market return. ROA is return on assets. MKTBV is market value of 
equity/book value of equity. LQDITY/INFOCOST denotes share liquidity and information asymmetry. 
SIZE/MATURITY denotes firm size and is maturity. PERFM denotes firm performance. TELDUM is an 
indicator variable for firms in the telecommunication industry (Telecommunication = 1, otherwise 0).  
UITLDUM is an indicator variable for firms in the utility industry (Utility = 1, otherwise 0). 
IND_DUMMY is an indicator variable for the sample firm industry (Fama-French 12 industry portfolios). 
The results of IND_DUMMY are not reported in the table. log denotes natural log. White 
heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics are given in the parenthesis for the OLS estimation. 
  
OLS Estimation  
(Panel A) Simultaneous Estimation (Panel B) 
  log ((∆OPTION) log ( ∆OPTION)(  log (1+OUTTURN) 
Intercept    1.31***  (3.43)    1.40***  (3.32)    0.33*** (12.42) 
log (1+OUTTURN)    0.46***  (3.87)    0.78***  (2.88)   
log (1+OUTBLK)    0.12***  (4.92)    0.11***  (4.37)   
HFOUT   -0.25*** (-3.33)   -0.25*** (-3.14)   
log (1+INBLK)        -0.07*** (-19.37) 
log(1+∆OPTION)         0.01  (0.26) 
MGRDUM   -0.01 (-0.14)    0.03  (0.49)   
DIRDUM    0.07  (1.34)    0.11*  (1.92)   
CEOTURN   -0.01 (-0.18)   -3.93E-3 (-0.13)   
log (ASSET)   -0.11 (-1.17)   -0.14 (-1.31)   
[log (ASSET)] 2   -8.58E-4 (-0.15)    1.22E-3  (0.18)   
log (LEV)    0.46**  (2.52)    0.46***  (2.64)   
log (1+DIV)   -2.78 (-1.58)   -2.86*** (-3.45)   
BETA    0.05  (0.96)    0.04  (1.03)   
IDIORISK    1.31**  (2.55)    1.20***  (2.96)   
ADJRET    0.01  (0.10)    0.02  (0.24)   
ROA   -0.56* (-1.94)   -0.56** (-2.09)   
log (MKTBV)   -0.06 (-1.27)   -0.06 (-1.59)   
LQDITY/INFOCOST        0.02***  (2.77) 
SIZE/MATURITY       -4.89E-3 (-0.72) 
PERFM        0.01***  (2.89) 
TELDUM        -0.08 (-1.30) 
UTILDUM        -0.01 (-0.24) 
IND_DUMMY       
Adjusted R2 0.30 0.30 0.39 
N 874 874 874 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed) 
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Table 1 13 
Table 12 Blockholder Turnover and Total CEO Compensation (TCOMP) 
TCOMP is total compensation ($’000). OUTTURN is annual outside blockholder turnover, and the proportion of 
outside block ownership that changed hands. OUTBLK is aggregate shares held by outside blockholders. HFOUT is 
the Herfindahl index of a firm’s outside-block ownership. MGRDUM is an indicator variable for the presence of 
manager blocks (manager blocks = 1, otherwise 0). DIRDUM is an indicator variable for the presence of director 
blocks (director blocks = 1, otherwise 0). INBLK is block-shares held by inside blockholders, such as managers, 
directors, ESOP and affiliated entities. CEOTURN is the number of CEO turnovers during the four year sample period. 
ASSET is total assets. LEV is leverage measured as long-term debt/total assets. DIV is dividend yield measured as total 
dividends/market value of the equity.  BETA is coefficient of value-weighted market model estimated by monthly 
returns of five-year period. IDIORISK is idiosyncratic firm risk measured as standard deviation of residuals from 
value-weighted market model. ADJRET is stock return adjusted by value-weighted market return. ROA is return on 
assets. HITURN is an indicator variable for firms with above median outside blockholder turnover (above median=1, 
otherwise 0). MKTBV is market value of equity/book value of equity. LQDITY/INFOCOST denotes share liquidity 
and information asymmetry. SIZE/MATURITY denotes firm size and is maturity. PERFM denotes firm performance. 
TELDUM is an indicator variable for firms in the telecommunication industry (Telecommunication = 1, otherwise 0).  
UITLDUM is an indicator variable for firms in the utility industry (Utility = 1, otherwise 0). IND_DUMMY is an 
indicator variable for the sample firm industry (Fama-French 12 industry portfolios). The results of IND_DUMMY are 
not reported in the table. log denotes natural log. White heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics are given in the parenthesis 
for the OLS estimation. 
 
  
OLS Estimation  
(Panel A) Simultaneous Estimation (Panel B) 
  log(TCOMP) log(TCOMP) log (1+OUTTURN) 
intercept  3.53***  (6.89)    3.79***  (6.95)    0.31***   (3.27) 
log (1+OUTTURN)  0.50***  (2.95)    1.76***  (4.29)   
log (1+OUTBLK)  0.11***  (4.05)    0.08***  (2.66)   
HFOUT -0.17* (-1.68)   -0.17* (-1.62)   
log (1+INBLK)        -0.07*** (-19.86) 
log(TCOMP)         2.40E-3   (0.20) 
MGRDUM -0.19*** (-2.64)   -0.08 (-1.06)   
DIRDUM -0.01 (-0.19)    0.09  (1.33)   
CEOTURN -0.05 (-1.34)   -0.05 (-1.20)   
log (ASSET)  0.54***  (4.09)    0.42***  (2.93)   
[log (ASSET)] 2 -0.01 (-0.74)    1.24E-3  (0.14)   
log (LEV) -0.17 (-0.63)   -0.16 (-0.70)   
log (1+DIV) -2.09 (-1.58)   -2.34** (-2.18)   
BETA  0.10*  (1.67)    0.09*  (1.62)   
IDIORISK  1.07  (1.61)    0.77  (1.46)   
ADJRET -0.06 (-0.24)   -0.07 (-0.59)   
ROA  0.59  (0.74)    1.31***  (2.66)   
ADJRET*HITURN  0.49*  (1.84)    0.56***  (3.80)   
ROA*HITURN -0.08 (-0.09)   -1.56** (-2.19)   
log (MKTBV)  0.25***  (4.45)    0.27***  (5.31)   
LQDITY/INFOCOST        0.02***  (4.43) 
SIZE/MATURITY       -0.01 (-1.15) 
PERFM        0.01*  (1.78) 
TELDUM       -0.08 (-1.31) 
UTILDUM       -0.01 (-0.29) 
IND_DUMMY       
Adjusted R2 0.53 0.52 0.39 
N 874 874 874 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed) 
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Table 1 14 
  Table 13 Blockholder Turnover and Cash Compensation (CASH) 
CASH is total cash compensation which consists of salary and cash bonus. OUTTURN is annual outside blockholder 
turnover, and the proportion of outside block ownership that changed hands. OUTBLK is aggregate shares held by 
outside blockholders. HFOUT is the Herfindahl index of a firm’s outside-block ownership. MGRDUM is an indicator 
variable for the presence of manager blocks (manager blocks = 1, otherwise 0). DIRDUM is an indicator variable for 
the presence of director blocks (director blocks = 1, otherwise 0). INBLK is block-shares held by inside blockholders, 
such as managers, directors, ESOP and affiliated entities. CEOTURN is the number of CEO turnovers during the four 
year sample period. ASSET is total assets. LEV is leverage measured as long-term debt/total assets. DIV is dividend 
yield measured as total dividends/market value of the equity.  BETA is coefficient of value-weighted market model 
estimated by monthly returns of five-year period. IDIORISK is idiosyncratic firm risk measured as standard deviation 
of residuals from value-weighted market model. ADJRET is stock return adjusted by value-weighted market return. 
ROA is return on assets. HITURN is an indicator variable for firms with above median outside blockholder turnover 
(above median=1, otherwise 0). MKTBV is market value of equity/book value of equity. LQDITY/INFOCOST denotes 
share liquidity and information asymmetry. SIZE/MATURITY denotes firm size and is maturity. PERFM denotes firm 
performance. TELDUM is an indicator variable for firms in the telecommunication industry (Telecommunication = 1, 
otherwise 0).  UITLDUM is an indicator variable for firms in the utility industry (Utility = 1, otherwise 0). 
IND_DUMMY is an indicator variable for the sample firm industry (Fama-French 12 industry portfolios). The results 
of IND_DUMMY are not reported in the table. log denotes natural log. White heteroscedasticity robust t-statistics are 
given in the parenthesis for the OLS estimation. 
  
OLS Estimation  
(Panel A) Simultaneous Estimation (Panel B) 
          Log(CASH)         log(CASH) log (1+OUTTURN) 
intercept    4.93*** (13.09)    4.97*** (13.09)    0.39***  (3.09) 
log (1+OUTTURN)    0.02  (0.13)    0.21  (0.75)   
log (1+OUTBLK)    0.05***  (2.81)    0.05**  (2.10)   
HFOUT   -0.04 (-0.52)   -0.04 (-0.50)   
log (1+INBLK)        -0.07*** (-20.93) 
log(CASH)        -0.01 (-0.49) 
MGRDUM   -0.09* (-1.87)   -0.07 (-1.45)   
DIRDUM   -0.05 (-1.23)   -0.03 (-0.66)   
CEOTURN   -0.11*** (-4.48)   -0.11*** (-4.06)   
log (ASSET)    0.22**  (2.27)    0.20**  (2.00)   
[log (ASSET)] 2    0.01  (0.98)    0.01  (1.15)   
log (LEV)   -0.20 (-1.23)   -0.20 (-1.29)   
log (1+DIV)   -0.15 (-0.29)   -0.19 (-0.25)   
BETA    0.02  (0.36)    0.01  (0.35)   
IDIORISK   -0.55* (-1.67)   -0.60* (-1.64)   
ADJRET    0.06  (0.45)    0.06  (0.74)   
ROA    0.92*  (1.95)    1.03***  (3.00)   
ADJRET*HITURN    0.18  (1.26)    0.19*  (1.86)   
ROA*HITURN   -0.56 (-1.14)   -0.80 (-1.61)   
log (MKTBV)   -0.01 (-0.25)   -0.01 (-0.18)   
LQDITY/INFOCOST        0.02***  (3.82) 
SIZE/MATURITY       -3.13E-3 (-0.40) 
PERFM        0.02***  (2.69) 
TELDUM       -0.08 (-1.30) 
UTILDUM       -0.01 (-0.57) 
IND_DUMMY       
Adjusted R2 0.49 0.49 0.39 
N 874 874 874 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively (two-tailed) 
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Appendix 1 Holding Periods of Large Investors Holding Blocks 
in at least 10 Sample firms (N = 61) 
 
The sample has a total of 874 unique firms with 1,102 unique blockholders over 4 year sample period. The 
1,102 blockholders consist of 527 inside blockholders (managers, directors, ESOP or affiliated entities who own 
at least 5% of outstanding common stock), and 575 outside blockholders. Of the 575 outside blockholders, 61 
outside blockholders has at least 10 sample firms in their portfolio. Following table lists the 61 outside 
blockholders, their portfolio size (# of firms) and summary of holding period (year). Meanhp is the mean 
portfolio holding period. Stdhp is standard deviation of holding periods for each blockholder’s portfolio. 
Stdhp/Meanhp is coefficient of the standard deviation and is measure as standard deviation of holding periods 
(Stdhp) divided by the mean portfolio holding period (Meanhp).   
 
Proportion of portfolio by holding 
period (yr = year) 
Blockholder Name 
Portfolio 
size 
(#firms) 0-1yr 1-2yrs 2-3yrs 3-4yrs Meanhp Stdhp 
Stdhp/ 
Meanhp 
Nicholas Applegate Capital Management 11 0.91 0.09 0.00 0.00 1.09 0.30 0.28 
AIM Management Group Inc 23 0.91 0.04 0.04 0.00 1.13 0.46 0.40 
Barclays Global Investors NA 17 0.82 0.18 0.00 0.00 1.18 0.39 0.33 
Filrim Baxter & Associates LTD 28 0.86 0.11 0.04 0.00 1.18 0.48 0.40 
Boston Partners Asset Management LP 11 0.82 0.18 0.00 0.00 1.18 0.40 0.34 
American Century Companies Inc 13 0.77 0.15 0.08 0.00 1.31 0.63 0.48 
TCW Group Inc 18 0.72 0.22 0.00 0.06 1.39 0.78 0.56 
AXA Financial Corp 48 0.73 0.19 0.04 0.04 1.40 0.76 0.55 
Jennison Associates LLC 10 0.70 0.20 0.10 0.00 1.40 0.70 0.50 
Invesco PLC 17 0.71 0.24 0.00 0.06 1.41 0.80 0.56 
Goldman Sachs & Co 14 0.79 0.07 0.07 0.07 1.43 0.94 0.66 
Reich & Tang Asset Management LP 14 0.71 0.21 0.00 0.07 1.43 0.85 0.60 
Equitable Cos. Inc 37 0.68 0.24 0.05 0.03 1.43 0.73 0.51 
Delaware Management Holdings, Inc. 13 0.69 0.15 0.15 0.00 1.46 0.78 0.53 
Janus Capital Corp 38 0.71 0.16 0.08 0.05 1.47 0.86 0.58 
CitiGroup Inc 16 0.69 0.13 0.19 0.00 1.50 0.82 0.54 
Loomis Sayles & Co. LP 21 0.62 0.24 0.14 0.00 1.52 0.75 0.49 
Amvescap PLC 61 0.59 0.30 0.11 0.00 1.52 0.70 0.46 
Merrill Lynch & Co Inc 48 0.67 0.17 0.13 0.04 1.54 0.87 0.57 
Mellon Financial Corp 57 0.67 0.18 0.11 0.05 1.54 0.89 0.58 
Heartland Advisors Inc 14 0.50 0.43 0.07 0.00 1.57 0.65 0.41 
American Express Co 29 0.55 0.28 0.17 0.00 1.62 0.78 0.48 
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co 46 0.61 0.22 0.04 0.13 1.70 1.05 0.62 
Macakay Shields Financial Corp 10 0.50 0.30 0.20 0.00 1.70 0.82 0.48 
Putnam Investments Inc 124 0.58 0.22 0.11 0.09 1.71 0.99 0.58 
Vanguard (various funds) 38 0.47 0.39 0.05 0.08 1.74 0.89 0.51 
JP Morgan Chase & Co 50 0.48 0.34 0.12 0.06 1.76 1.12 0.64 
Lazard Freres & Co LLC 27 0.52 0.19 0.26 0.04 1.81 0.96 0.53 
Sanford C Bernstein & Co, Inc 71 0.48 0.30 0.13 0.10 1.85 0.99 0.54 
Tiger Management LLC 13 0.54 0.23 0.08 0.15 1.85 1.14 0.62 
Binson Partners Inc 42 0.43 0.33 0.19 0.05 1.86 0.90 0.48 
Scudder Kemper Investments Inc 22 0.50 0.23 0.18 0.09 1.86 1.04 0.56 
J&W Seligman & Co Inc 30 0.53 0.17 0.17 0.13 1.90 0.89 0.47 
Harris Associates LP 16 0.56 0.06 0.25 0.13 1.94 1.18 0.61 
 
(Continued) 
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Appendix 1 - Continued 
 
 
 
Proportion of portfolio by holding 
period (yr = year) 
Blockholder Name 
Portfolio 
size 
(#firms) 0-1yr 1-2yrs 2-3yrs 3-4yrs Meanhp Stdhp 
Stdhp/ 
Meanhp 
T Rowe Price Associates Inc 77 0.45 0.27 0.14 0.13 1.95 1.06 0.55 
Neuberger & Berman LLC 51 0.43 0.31 0.10 0.16 1.98 1.09 0.55 
Dimensional Fund Advisors Inc 116 0.39 0.34 0.16 0.11 1.99 1.00 0.50 
Massachusetts Financial Services Co 50 0.52 0.18 0.08 0.22 2.00 1.23 0.61 
Oppenheimer Group Inc 44 0.50 0.14 0.20 0.16 2.02 1.17 0.58 
Primecap Management Co 23 0.30 0.43 0.13 0.13 2.09 1.00 0.48 
Wellington Management Co LLP 113 0.40 0.27 0.17 0.16 2.09 1.10 0.53 
Ariel Capital Management Inc 10 0.40 0.20 0.30 0.10 2.10 1.10 0.52 
Prudential Investment Corp 58 0.36 0.33 0.16 0.16 2.10 1.07 0.51 
Capital Research & Management Co 178 0.35 0.30 0.18 0.17 2.16 1.09 0.50 
Franklin Resources Inc 79 0.35 0.27 0.23 0.15 2.18 1.08 0.50 
Crabbe Huson Group Inc 16 0.38 0.25 0.19 0.19 2.19 1.17 0.53 
Private Capital Management Inc 13 0.38 0.23 0.15 0.23 2.23 1.24 0.55 
FMR Corp 405 0.39 0.20 0.17 0.24 2.27 1.21 0.53 
Dodge & Cox 18 0.44 0.06 0.22 0.28 2.33 1.33 0.57 
Trimark Financial Corp 18 0.17 0.44 0.28 0.11 2.33 0.91 0.39 
State of Wisconsin Investment Board 38 0.37 0.24 0.08 0.32 2.34 1.28 0.55 
Barrow, Hanley, Mewhinney  & Strauss 
Inc 20 0.40 0.10 0.25 0.25 2.35 1.27 0.54 
ICM Asset Management Inc 16 0.25 0.25 0.38 0.13 2.38 1.02 0.43 
Pioneering Management Corp 34 0.38 0.12 0.24 0.26 2.38 1.26 0.53 
Royce & Associates Inc 13 0.38 0.15 0.15 0.31 2.38 1.33 0.56 
First Pacific Avisors Inc 18 0.33 0.22 0.11 0.33 2.44 1.29 0.53 
Southeastern Asset Management Inc 21 0.29 0.24 0.19 0.29 2.48 1.21 0.49 
David Babson & Co Inc 18 0.28 0.17 0.22 0.33 2.61 1.24 0.48 
GEO Capital LLC 10 0.20 0.20 0.10 0.50 2.90 1.29 0.44 
Gabelli Funds Inc & Gamco Investors 24 0.17 0.21 0.08 0.54 3.00 1.22 0.41 
State Farm Mutual Auto. Insurance Co. 22 0.00 0.27 0.05 0.68 3.41 0.91 0.27 
Average across blockholders 48.80 0.51 0.22 0.13 0.14 1.89 0.96 0.51 
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Appendix 2A – Measurement of Blockholder Turnover 
 
I manually examine the blockholders of each firm to identify unique blockholders and 
assign an ID to each blockholder in the sample. I then check the exit of existing 
blockholders and the entry of new blockholders in the sample firms annually, and 
calculate the annual turnover of the block ownership (Refer to Appendix 1B for the 
formula). 
 
I use the following steps to avoid measurement errors in blockholder turnover: 
 
1. Code different funds under single investment company as the same blockholder 
(e.g., Capital Guardian, Capital Group International and Capital Research and 
Management are different investment groups in Capital Group Companies, and I 
code them as the same investors in the sample. Similarly, Franklin Templeton 
Investment and Franklin Resources are coded as the same blockholder).  
 
2. Code related investor groups as the same blockholder (e.g., Mario Garbelli and 
Gamco Investors, and Warren Buffett and Berkshire Hathaway Inc.).  
 
3. Code trustees of a firm’s Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) and other 
employee savings and retirement plans as the same blockholder (Firms typically 
list a trustee of their ESOP in the proxy statements as a blockholder if the ESOP 
has more than 5% of the firm’ common stock. I assign a unique block ID to the 
ESOP regardless of the identity of the ESOP trustee. As a result, a change in a 
firm’s ESOP trustee does not contribute to blockholder turnover).  
 
4. Group shares owned by founding family members into a single block, and do not 
count exit or entry of individual family members as a turnover transaction. 
 
5. Do not count changes in blockholder name due to a merger or a restructuring as a 
turnover transaction.  
 
6. Identify and correct spelling errors or other recording inconsistency in 
blockholders’ names. 
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Appendix 2B – Calculation of Blockholder Turnover  
 
Blockholder turnover in yeart+1 is the proportion of block ownership that changed hands 
during yeart+1. The formula for blockholder turnover in yeart+1 is as follows: 
 
                            l                       m 
     ∑ Bh, t   +  ∑Bi, t+1 
                           h=1                   i=1 
                        -----------------------  
                            o                p 
                           ∑ Bj, t +    ∑ Bk, t+1  
                                        j=1                    k=1 
 
                 Bh, t    : block-shares owned by Blockholder h who existed at the   
  end of year t and exited the firm by end of year t+1  
                 Bi, t+1    : block-shares owned by Blockholder i who entered 
                                      the firm in year t+1  
     Bj         : block-shares owned by Blockholder j at the end of year t 
      Bk, t+1    : block-shares owned by Blockholder k at the end of year t +1 
 
 
(where l ,  m,  o and p  are the number of blockholders, and  l ∈ o,  m ∈ p ) 
 
 
  
(Example) Delta Corp had block ownership at the end of year t and year t+1 as follow:  
        Year t      Year t+1  
 
  Block A     5%  Block A   20% 
  Block B   15% √ Block D   10%  √ 
  Block C   15% √ Block E     5%  √ 
  Total       35%             Total        35%         
 
In the above example, Block B and Block C exited the company, and Block D and  
Block E entered the company during year t+1. Therefore, Delta Corp’s blockholder 
turnover in year t+1 is as follows:  
 
 Blockholder turnover in year t+1  = (15+15+10+5) / (35+35) = 0.643 (64.3%) 
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Appendix 3 Variable Description 
Block Ownership Variables 
OUTTURN: Proportion of outside block ownership that changed hands.      
MGRBLK:  Block-shares (%) owned by a blockholder who is a manager or manager/director 
DIRBLK: Block-shares (%) owned by an outside blockholder who is a director or  
has representatives in the board  
OUTBLK:  Block-shares (%) owned by an outside blockholder who is not a manager,  
director or a member of founding family  
ESOPBLK:  Block-shares (%) owned by the firm’s Employee Stock Ownership Plan or  
employee savings plan  
GRAYBLK:  Block-shares (%) owned by a founding family, subsidiaries or entities that have 
significant business transactions with the firm 
INBLK:  Sum of MGRBLK, DIRBLK, ESOPBLK and GRAYBLK. 
MGRDUM: Indicator variable for the presence of manager blockholder (Manager  
blockholder = 1, otherwise 0) 
DIRDUM: Indicator variable for the presence of director blockholder (Director  
blockholder = 1, otherwise 0) 
HFOUT: Concentration of outside block ownership as measured by the Herfindahl Index of  
outside block ownership.  
 
CEO Compensation Variables 
TCOMP: Total compensation for the fiscal year ($’000) and comprised of salary, bonus, 
stock options granted, restricted stock granted and all others.  
CASH : Dollar value ($’000) of base salary and cash bonus earned by a CEO during  
the fiscal year. 
OPTIONS: Aggregate value of stock options granted to a CEO during the fiscal year as  
valued using S&P’s Black-Scholes method.  
∆OPTION: Change in value of option granted in the current year per $1,000 in shareholder  
wealth.  
 
Financial and Other Variables 
(Unless otherwise stated, Data # refers to COMPUSTAT data reference number.) 
ADJRET: Monthly stock returns adjusted by CRSP value-weighted market return 
ASSET:  Total assets [Data#6]  
BETA:  Coefficient of value-weighted market model estimated by monthly  
returns of five-year period 
CEOTURN: The number of CEO turnover over four-year period 
DIV:  Dividend yield measured as Total dividends/Market value of equity 
IDIORISK: Idiosyncratic firm risk measured as standard deviation of residuals from a  
  value-weighted market model that uses monthly returns of five-year period 
IND_DUMMY: Indicator variables for sample firm industry (Fama-French’s 12 Industry Portfolios) 
LEV:  Leverage measured as Long-term debt/Total assets [Data#9/Data#6] 
MKT:  Market value of equity [Data#24*Data#25] 
MKTBV: Market value of equity/Book value of Equity [(Data24*Data25)/Data216] 
ROA:  Return on assets [Data #18/Data#6] 
SHRTRN: Share turnover rate measured as annual share trading volume/outstanding  
common stock.   
Factors 
LQDITY/INFOCOST: Share liquidity and information asymmetry (Factor 1) 
SIZE/MATURITY: Firm size and maturity (Factor 2) 
PERFM:  Firm performance (Factor 3) 
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